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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the Principle of Compatibility (hereafter, Principle) within the world’s largest tuna
fishery, which occurs in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The Principle is foundational within the
international governance framework for highly migratory species such as tuna and billfish. However, the
application of the Principle within a functioning RFMO is not well documented, and thus, this thesis fills
a void in the academic literature.

This thesis investigates how the Principle was established within international fisheries law, serving to
bridge the gap between management of HMS in waters under national jurisdiction and on the high seas.
The analysis elucidates the rights and obligations afforded to coastal States with respect to national waters
(including in the exclusive economic zone), the freedom enjoyed by all States to fish on the high seas, and
the collective duty shared by all States to cooperate on the management of transboundary fish stocks.

The central focus of the analysis is the application of the Principle by the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. The study employs an analytical tool that includes standards and criteria
associated with the application of the Principle. Each of the WCPFC’s conservation and management
measures associated with the catch of target species is assessed and scored for consistency with the
standards.

The analysis demonstrates that the WCPFC is, at least for the most part, applying the Principle, with the
highest rating concerning the management of tropical tuna stocks (skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna).
Overall, however, the analysis also reveals that the WCPFC has inconsistently applied the Principle and
its associated provisions. This thesis identifies the WCPFC’s harvest strategies approach as both an
opportunity and a mechanism to promote a more consistent application of the Principle, which is
important for the long-term conservation and management of the world’s largest tuna fishery.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction

Fish and fisheries are important. Fish accounts for approximately 17% of the world population’s
consumption of animal protein. 1 Globally, fish provides about 3.1 billion people with almost 20% of their
animal protein consumption, and 4.3 billion people with 15% of such protein. 2 Not only are fish
nutritionally important, but seafood products are economically significant as global commodities, having
served as the basis for economic growth in many national economies. 3 For example, between 1976 and
2014, world trade in fish and fishery products increased from US$8 billion to US$148 billion per year. 4
Tuna, in particular, are among the main globally-traded fish commodities, with canned tuna being one of
the most widespread and recognizable fish products. Collectively, tuna products are among the most
economically valuable seafood commodity, with an estimated annual dockside value at over $10 billion
and retail value of around $40 billion per year.5 Indeed, for several small island countries in the Pacific,
their dependence on tuna as a primary natural resource and foundational economic base is likely
unmatched elsewhere in the world. 6

Due to its global popularity, tunas are heavily targeted and harvested in significant numbers. There are 23
stocks (comprising seven species) of major commercial tuna fisheries worldwide. Among the
commercially harvested stocks, 33% are estimated to be overexploited, 37.5% are considered fully

1

FAO. (2016). The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2016. Contributing to food security and nutrition for
all. Rome, FAO.
2
Ibid at 4.
3
Smith, M.D., Roheim, C.A., Crowder, L.B., Halpern, B.S., Turnipseed, M., Anderson, J.L., Asche, F., Bourillón,
L., Guttormsen, A.G., Khan, A.,& Liguori, L.A. (2010). Sustainability and global seafood. Science, 327(5967), 784786.
4
FAO (2016) at 52.
5
Galland, G., Anthony, R., & Nickson, A. (2016). Netting Billions:a global valuation of tuna. Pew Charitable
Trusts. Washington, D.C.1.
6
Read, R. (2006). Sustainable natural resource use and economic development in small states: the tuna fisheries in
Fiji and Samoa, Sustainable Development., 14, 93-103.
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exploited, and 29% are believed to be non-fully exploited. 7 The total world-wide catch of tuna was
approximately 7.4 million tons in 2013. 8 The major seven tuna species, which include albacore, bigeye,
bluefin (three species), skipjack and yellowfin, yielded 5.1 million tons in 2013, with 70% of those
catches coming from the Pacific Ocean. 9

Tuna are considered a highly migratory species, meaning they have a wide geographic distribution,
occurring both inside and outside the 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal States.
Furthermore, several tuna species undertake migrations of variable distances for both feeding and
reproduction. 10 The distribution of tuna extends over approximately 177 million square kilometers of the
world’s oceans, equating to 35% of the Earth’s surface. 11 Due to the occurrence of tuna stocks across
large oceanic expanses, including waters under national jurisdiction and on the high seas, effective tuna
management requires international cooperation.12

1.2 Bridging the Gap

The ocean can be separated by two basic delineations: 1) the high seas or international waters; and 2)
waters under national jurisdiction. Similarly, the world of nations is comprised of coastal States, which
have geographic boundaries adjacent to the ocean, and non-coastal States, which have no boundaries
adjacent to the ocean. Since the early 1980s, the international legal framework has provided that coastal
States possess sovereign rights and management responsibility over fishery resources within their 200
nautical mile (nm) EEZs. On the other hand, the high seas are subject to international management. Under
7

FAO (2016) at 39.
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Lehodey, P., Senina, I., & Murtugudde, R. (2008). A spatial ecosystem and populations dynamics model
(SEAPODYM)–Modeling of tuna and tuna-like populations. Progress in Oceanography, 78(4), 304-318. Annex 1
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides a list of HMS including tuna, billfish, pomfrets,
species of sauries, dolphinfish, oceanic sharks and cetaceans.
11
FAO. (2012). Sustainable management of the tuna fisheries and biodiversity conservation in the areas beyond
national jurisdiction. FAO/Global Environmental Facility Project Document. Rome. 1.
12
Munro, G. R. (2000). The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995: history and problems of
implementation. Marine Resource Economics, 15(4), 265-280.
8
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international law all countries, including non-coastal States, have the right to fish on the high seas. Since
the 1990s, however, high seas fisheries have been subject to more regulation by the international
community. Generally, fisheries that occur in the high seas are subject to international management
regimes developed by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). For fish that are highly
mobile – that is, fish which do not restrict themselves to political boundaries, international cooperation is
essential to manage these particular fish stocks across their range. For highly migratory species such as
tuna and billfish, there is a need to bridge the management gap between the (Exclusive Economic Zone)
EEZ and high seas regimes to ensure the sustainability of such stocks, and to ensure consistency with the
rights and obligation under international law provided to coastal States and States fishing on the high
seas. To bridge the gap, the international community has come to rely on the Principle of Compatibility
(hereafter, the Principle), which is the focus of this thesis.13

The Principle was first introduced to international fisheries governance in the 1995 United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, commonly known as the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement (UNFSA). 14 The Principle has been referred to one of three pillars of UNFSA. 15 Generally,
the Principle serves as a management objective to be achieved through multilateral cooperation – that is,
through the actions of individual nations (i.e., EEZ management) and collectively within RFMOs (i.e.,
high seas and/or EEZ management). As such, UNFSA established the Principle in international fisheries

13

A principle can be defined as: a basic belief, theory or rule that has a major influence on the way in which
something is done. Retrieved from: http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/principle.
14
Although the Principle was first identified in the UNFSA, earlier international treaties and conventions have
employed similar concepts. One example is the “consistency requirement” in the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries
Organization (NAFO).
15
Nandan. S. N. (2005). Moving words into action. Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. Keynote speaker. Convened by Fisheries and Oceans, Canada. 1-5 March
2005. St. John’s Newfoundland and Labrador. 3. Ambassador Nandan served as chair for the UNFSA. The other
two pillars have been identified as: 2) mechanisms to ensure compliance with conservation and management
measures including the authorization of high seas boarding and inspection of vessels by other parties to the
agreement; and 3) the provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes, whereby every dispute can ultimately be
submitted to a court or tribunal for a binding decision.
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law. In support of this, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) also identified the
Principle as fundamental to managing fisheries within an ecosystem approach in 2003. 16

Given the global importance of fisheries, there is surprisingly little published information concerning the
description and application of the Principle within RFMOs. One reason for this may be that several
RFMOs predate the UNFSA and are still renewing and renegotiating their management
measures/agreements with member States to incorporate UNFSA provisions. Another reason may be that
the UNFSA compatibility provisions are too broad and open to varying interpretations, and further, that
UNSFA does not provide practical guidance on how to implement the Principle. 17 Moreover, there are no
examples of RFMO-established processes to develop compatible measures.

In the academic literature, there are several articles and papers that mention the importance of the
Principle, but few actually provide a detailed analysis of the Principle. Elferink (2001) provides the most
complete review of the Principle and the associated provisions established under UNFSA. 18 While
Elferink’s analysis of Article 7 of the UNFSA is useful, it offers little description of how the Principle is
being applied in practice within RFMOs.

Another study related to the Principle is Finus and Schneider (2015), which combines bioeconomic
modeling and game theory. 19 Their model predicts that the establishment of compatible measures for
highly migratory species within an RFMO is beneficial for all parties, and further, that the current
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structure of many RFMOs (whereby coastal States retain their sovereign rights over their EEZs), can
improve RFMO participation and reduce problems associated with ‘free riders.’ 20 A drawback of the
study by Finus and Schneider (2015) is that it relies heavily on game theory without representative
empirical data, and further, the bioeconomic model employed by the authors has been questioned in
related literature with regard to assumptions about tuna movement and distribution. 21 Moreover, the
complexity and the technical aspects of the analysis renders it accessible to a limited, largely academic
audience.

While the existing studies mentioned above are either too broad or too theoretical, this thesis seeks to
overcome these shortcomings by evaluating how the Principle is being applied, if at all, in the
international management of HMS stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) – the
world’s largest tuna fishery. In this regard, this thesis strives to be practically oriented rather than overly
theoretical, lending itself to a broader audience.

1.3 Compatibility in the World’s Largest Tuna Fishery

This thesis focuses on HMS fisheries in the WCPO, and in particular, assesses the application of the
Principle within the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Tuna has been an
important source of protein for Pacific Islanders for several millennia, and with the advent of industrialscale tuna fishing, only recently has the sustainability of tuna become a food-security issue for the
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region’s inhabitants. 22 Industrial-scale tuna fishing in the WCPO began with pole and line vessels in the
first half of the 20th century, and re-emerged after World War II in the 1950s through the development of
pole and line and longline fishing gears. 23 In the early 1980s, industrial purse seine fishing was introduced
to the WCPO, and since that time, there has been a rapid increase in the number of purse seine vessels
operating in the WCPO, coupled with a rapid increase in associated tuna catches.

Since 2012, the WCPO tuna catch has consistently been over 2.5 million metric tons (mt), with the 2014
catch of 2.85 million mt being the highest on record. 24 The total WCPO tuna catch represents about 80%
of the total Pacific Ocean tuna catch, and 56% of the global tuna catch. 25 The main tuna species targeted
in the WCPO are skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and South Pacific albacore tuna. The total estimated
delivered value of the WCPO tuna catch varies more than the catch, ranging from US$4.8 billion to
US$7.5 billion in recent years.26 The purse seine fishery represents 50-60% of the total value, while the
longline fishery accounts for 25-30%, followed by pole and line and other fishing gears. In terms of catch
and value, skipjack accounts for approximately 70% (catch) and 50% (value), yellowfin at 25 % (catch)
and 30% (value), bigeye at 5% (catch) and 15% (value), and albacore at 4% (catch) and 7% (value). 27

The establishment of the EEZ in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
granted Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) exclusive property rights over exploitable natural resources such
as tuna and other pelagic species. This was immensely significant, with PICs collectively claiming a
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maritime area of approximately 30 million square kilometers under their national jurisdiction.28 For
example, the delineation of EEZs provided several PICs with ownership over the ocean that exceeds their
respective landmass (in square kilometers) by an average factor of approximately 5,000 to one. 29 The
importance of the property rights over fisheries resources found in the EEZ to PICs cannot be overstated.
Figuratively, they were transformed overnight from small island nations to large ocean coastal States,
with tuna fisheries playing a major role in their national economies. For example, approximately 50% of
global skipjack production is derived from waters of members of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement
(PNA). 30

Even prior to UNCLOS there were calls to consider a regional organization to help manage HMS stocks
in the WCPO; however, this was not realized until several decades later.31 Meanwhile, catches continued
to increase at a rapid pace, creating concern among PICs that they were not receiving the greatest
potential economic benefits from tuna resources. Indeed, before UNCLOS was established, 90% of
catches were being made by Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs), with mounting concerns that the
long-term conservation of WCPO HMS stocks could be in jeopardy without international cooperation.32
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Recognizing the need for an international legal framework involving PICs and DWFNs, the negotiation
process to establish a new RFMO covering the WCPO was initiated in 1994. On 4 September 2000 in
Honolulu, and following five years of negotiations at seven Multilateral High Level Conferences
(MHLC), 24 members consisting of individual countries, territories 33 and fishing entities 34 adopted the
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean (Honolulu Convention or WCPF-Convention). 35 The Honolulu Convention
established the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC or Commission), which is
comprised of members and cooperating non-members with interests in the conservation and management
of HMS stocks in the WCPO.

There are several similarities between the UNFSA and the Honolulu Convention. Indeed, both
instruments dedicate an entire Article to the Principle and list comparable provisions related to the
establishment of compatible measures. Regarding the issue of compatible measures, Article 8(2) of the
Honolulu Convention is particularly relevant. 36 Unfortunately, however, neither instrument provides
detailed guidance on how to establish compatible measures or metrics to determine if compatibility has
been achieved or not.

The 2011 WCPFC Performance Review found that from a legal perspective, the “compatibility of
measures” was probably the most challenging issue facing the Commission, with conflicts over the
interpretation of “compatible management” requiring resolution in order for the WCPFC to effectively
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manage and conserve the stocks across their range. 37 Furthermore, the Performance Review
recommended that members cooperate with one another to resolve different legal interpretations of the
Convention in relation to the Convention Area, while emphasizing the duty incumbent upon members to
establish compatible and effective conservation and management measures across the range of the
stocks. 38

The Principle is fundamental to both the UNFSA and the subsequent Honolulu Convention because it
bridges the gap between the rights and duties of coastal States over their EEZs and the rights and
obligations shared by all nations with regard to international waters. This thesis will demonstrate that the
Principle is not being applied in a clear and consistent manner by the WCPFC. This thesis will also argue
that in order for the Principle to be applied more consistently (so as to support effective management of
WCPO HMS stocks), compatibility should be included as a management objective within the
Commission’s Harvest Strategy Approach. This would better facilitate: 1) a clearer understanding of the
Principle and its underlying legal framework; and 2) the identification of indicators to assess whether
compatibility is being achieved or not.

While other frameworks have been suggested to address current WCPFC management needs, including
the development of rights-based 39 and adaptive management strategies 40, market-based approaches 41,
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common pool and risk sharing arrangements 42, as well as methods to distribute the conservation burden
and benefits among members 43, the development of effective management measures may be hindered if
the Principle continues to be applied inconsistently within the WCPFC. If compatible management is not
achieved within the WCPFC, conflicts could arise and erode international cooperation, jeopardizing the
long-term sustainability of the world’s largest tuna fishery. For PICs which rely on tuna as their primary
natural resource, the stakes are extremely high, with ineffective management and overexploitation of tuna
stocks threatening their political independence and long-term socio-economic stability.

1.4 Analytical Objectives and Methodology

The analytical objective of this thesis is to answer the following questions:
1) What is the rationale for the Principle and why was it established?
2) Where do compatibility requirements apply?
3) How is the Principle being applied in the WCPFC?
4) What can the WCPFC do to improve the application of the Principle?
5) What challenges may arise in the application of the Principle?
6) How might the application of the Principle change over time?

This study relies on a qualitative analysis of publicly available literature, historic records, legal
documents, convention texts, conservation and management measures, as well as meeting reports to: a)
describe the rationale for the Principle and why it was established; and b) evaluate where compatibility
requirements apply with regard to marine jurisdiction. To analyze how the Principle is being applied
within the WCPFC, an assessment matrix was developed utilizing six standards and associated evaluation
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criteria found in the Honolulu Convention. Each conservation and management measure applicable to the
harvest of WCPFC-managed stocks was assessed against the standards and evaluative criteria. 44

A scoring system has been used to rate the application of the Principle by measuring consistency with
each standard and associated criteria. The scores have then been added together and divided by the total
possible score to provide a compatibility rating for each assessed CMM. 45 A numerical scoring range
between 0 and 1 has been employed as follows: 0 = not consistent; 0.25 = partially consistent; 0.5 =
moderately consistent; 0.75 = nearly consistent; 1 = fully consistent (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Scoring range used to assess the application of the Principle by the WCPFC

Source: Figure made by author

Information used in the assessment was gained from in-depth reviews of WCPFC meeting records,
including meeting reports of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies (e.g., the Scientific Committee).
The formulation of each conservation and management measure being evaluated is also considered,
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including the preambular text, the objectives of the particular conservation and management measure, as
well as the controlling provisions. To provide an overall rating on the application of the Principle by the
WCPFC, a central tendency was identified by summing the total score for each evaluated CMM and
taking the average of the ratings across conservation measures.

To address how the WCPFC might improve the application of the Principle, a qualitative analysis was
performed with regard to the harvest strategy approach already adopted by the WCPFC. Lastly, to
evaluate what challenges may arise in the future application of the Principle, a qualitative analysis has
been conducted focusing on climate change and its potential impacts on tuna distribution, as well as the
increasing trend in fishing vessel capacity flagged to Pacific Island States. As the proceeding analysis will
demonstrate, these two issues have the potential to change the way the Principle is applied in the future as
compared to its current manifestation.

1.5 Scope and Limitations

The scope of this thesis is focused on the application of the Principle within the WCPFC. The analysis is
largely based on publicly available records of the Commission’s meetings and its published conservation
and management measures. The main limitation of this thesis is the author’s limited access to the
potentially voluminous array of country-specific laws and regulations that apply to fishing vessels in the
WCPF-Convention Area (and which contribute to the existing raft of compatible measures). For example,
there may be domestic restrictions that influence where and how fishing vessels conduct fishing
operations in the WCPF-Convention Area, including laws covering: 1) caps on the number of fishing
vessels (e.g., limited entry programs); 2) catch or effort limits; 3) fishing gear requirements (e.g., marine
mammal mitigation); 4) local landing laws; 5) spatial closures; and 6) fishing subsidies. The Commission
is made up of members, cooperating non-members, and participating territories (collectively referred to as
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CCMs) comprising 26 members, 7 participating territories and 7 cooperating non-members. 46 Indeed, it
would be a large undertaking requiring time spent in-country to survey all the relevant instruments for
each Commission member to appreciate the full suite of domestic measures that may be contributing to
compatibility.

The scope of the analysis with respect to the evaluation and assessment of application of the Principle
within WCPFC CMMs is through 2016. Negotiations related to the Commission’s adoption of a new
tropical tuna conservation and management in occurred in December 2017, but it was not possible to
include these developments within the scope of thesis and submit on schedule. Based on the author’s
participation at the December 2017 Commission meeting and understanding of the adopted tropical tuna
measure, recent developments do not affect the findings of this thesis.

1.6 Thesis Approach and Structure

Chapter 2 provides an in-depth review of the evolution of international fisheries law with respect to
maritime jurisdiction and fisheries governance, including an overview of UNCLOS, UNFSA and the
Honolulu Convention. Chapter 3 analyzes and compares the provisions of UNFSA and the Honolulu
Convention as they relate to the Principle. To provide a clear picture of the resources and fisheries
managed within the WCPFC, Chapter 4 focuses on the HMS fisheries of the WCPO, including a review
of the biology of these species, their stock status, as well as the fisheries that target them.

Chapter 5 provides a critical overview of the existing management framework applicable to HMS stocks
in the WCPO, including a description of coastal States and DWFNs, sub-regional agreements, as well as
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WCPFC conservation and management measures. It provides a detailed summary of the MHLC process
and the development of relevant provisions adopted within the Honolulu Convention.
Chapter 6 evaluates the application of the Principle within the WCPFC. The chapter reviews the
Conservation and Management Measures (CMM) which place restrictions on catch and effort for
managed species, with the analysis employing particular focus on how the Principle is or is not used in
the development of the measures. An evaluation matrix is used to assess consistency with identified
standards linked to Article 8 provisions of the Honolulu Convention and a numerical system used to score
the application of the Principle. A compatibility rating is provided for each CMM evaluated, such that,
when combined and averaged, an overall compatibility rating is provided for the Commission’s
application of the Principle.
Chapter 7 reviews the WCPFC Harvest Strategy approach and provides justification for the need to apply
the Principle in a more formal, transparent manner. The chapter argues that the Commission should
identify compatibility as a management objective within the Harvest Strategy framework. By doing so,
the Commission would support the identification of performance indicators related to the Principle, in
addition to facilitating the incorporation of these indicators within associated management strategy
evaluation.
Chapter 8 summarizes the results of the earlier analyses and draws overall conclusions from the study.

1.7 Contribution of Thesis

This thesis achieves the following: a) it fills a void in the academic literature by providing an in-depth
review of the history, description and application of the Principle in international fisheries management;
b) it provides a practical analysis of the application of the Principle within the world’s largest tuna
fishery, which is managed internationally by the WCPFC; c) it offers a novel approach for evaluating the
application of the Principle within the WCPFC by developing a review standard and assigning a
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compatibility rating for key WCPFC conservation and management measures; and d) it identifies the
Commission’s harvest strategy approach as a mechanism to enhance the application of the Principle.
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Chapter 2- Historical Overview of International Marine
Fisheries Law and Emergence of the Principle
2.1 Introduction

The rights, duties and interests of coastal and other States fishing on the high seas with respect to
internationally shared stocks are critical to understanding the Principle specifically and within
international fisheries management as a whole. This chapter will examine the evolution of international
fisheries law and identify historical milestones which have resulted in the need to establish the Principle.

2.2 Evolving Marine Jurisdictions

As early as the second century Roman scholars critiqued the legal status of marine jurisdiction; 47
however, the contemporary law of the sea is a product of Western European economic interests in trade
routes to and from the New World. 48 International maritime law developed during this period to support
the colonial exploits of England and Holland, both emerging maritime powers at the start of the 17th
century. During the ‘Age of Discovery’ (14th -18th century), and as offshore fleets expanded due to
technological advances in navigation, European countries began paying more attention to the extent of a
nation’s offshore jurisdiction, delineating exclusive areas adjacent to their coasts. 49 After the discovery of
the ‘New World’, the focus turned to the high seas and the control of trade routes.
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It is well known that voyages funded by the Spanish crown to the New World resulted in the ascendance
of Spain, leading to rivalry with Portugal for maritime dominance during the 15th and 16th centuries. 50 In
the mid-15th century, Portuguese mariners began exploring the west coast of Africa, which was
subsequently granted to Portugal by Pope Nicholas V. 51 To Portugal’s dismay, Pope Alexander VI
decreed the largely unknown areas in the West to Spain in 1493, which effectively was the entire New
World. 52 Portugal’s appeal to Spain resulted in the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, which gave Spain
exclusive rights to the Western Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf of Mexico, and Portugal exclusive rights to the
South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. 53 Based on this treaty, Spain and Portugal instituted the regime of Mare
Clausum (closed sea), limiting navigation (and fisheries) on the high seas to their own vessels only. 54

2.2.1 Historical milestone 1 (17th century): the freedom of the seas becomes the prevailing doctrine

As new colonial players such as England and Denmark established themselves in the New World, the
century-old Spain-Portugal agreement was under heavy strain.55 To support his country’s economic
interests in the New World, Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius wrote a seminal legal piece in 1609 called “Mare
Liberum,” which articulated the Freedom of the Seas doctrine. 56 Grotius’ legal analysis, which is well
documented in the academic literature, argues that high seas freedoms are founded on two premises: 1)
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the impossibility that the high seas could be occupied; and 2) the inexhaustible nature of marine
resources. 57 Basing his arguments on these positions, Grotius posited that there should be no limits on the
freedom of navigation and fishing on the high seas. 58

Grotius, however, was not without his detractors. Preeminent British scholar John Selden responded to
Grotius in his 1635 book Mare Clausum, sue de Domino Maris Libri Duo, with the objective of
establishing British sovereignty over the British Seas. 59 Selden sought to prove that the freedom of the
seas was not an all-encompassing doctrine, and that the ocean could be, and had been, allocated in some
circumstances. 60 Selden also argued against the notion that the sea was inexhaustible, not so much in a
biological or physical sense, but with regard to the allocation of marine resources. According to this
conception, fewer profits would accrue to the State that owned the resources if other States were free to
exploit such resources. 61 In this sense, the works of Selden and Grotius have been described as products
of personal and national interests as opposed to writings of pure and unbiased juristic science.62

It was not until the British Empire and its unmatched naval forces gained global dominance after the
Napoleonic War, coupled with its control over India which benefited European trade during the Industrial
Revolution, that Mare Liberum gained traction once again.63 Exploitation and trade with the New World
now seemed limitless, and it could be done much cheaper with a free and open sea. Arguably, the change
57
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was not made for a moral reason, but rather, the doctrine met the needs of the time – freely accessible
trade routes supporting rapidly growing European economies. 64

Grotius’ Freedom of the Seas doctrine, which was based on the principles of freedom of navigation and
freedom of fishing on the high seas, became the cornerstone for the modern law of the sea. 65 The
Freedom of the Seas doctrine resulted in the oceans being considered humanity’s common heritage, or res
communis, and therefore available for use by everyone. 66 While the concept of the freedom of seas
became widely accepted in the 19th century, there was still considerable debate over the extent to which a
sovereign State had jurisdiction over waters adjacent to its shore.

2.2.2 Historical milestone 2 (19th century): the three mile territorial sea is established as customary
international law

Even before Grotius’s Mare Liberum, Italian scholars had postulated for several hundred years that
coastal States possessed exclusive jurisdiction of areas up to 100 miles from their coasts. 67 However, such
delineations failed to gain traction, mainly because naval forces at the time lacked the capacity to enforce
maritime boundaries. 68 In 1598, however, the Dano-Norwegians claimed an exclusive fisheries zone of
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approximately eight nm in breadth. 69 The Dano-Norwegian claim of eight miles was significant, not only
because it was actually enforced, but because it was specifically intended to exclude foreign fishing. 70

In the 17th century, the blending of three principles for determining coastal State sovereignty gave rise to
the internationally accepted three nm territorial sea.71 The first was the use of the Scandinavian league,
which was approximately four nm. 72 The second was the line-of-sight doctrine, which provided that a
coastal State’s jurisdiction extended as far out to sea as one could see while standing onshore at sea level
(coincidentally, the distance one can see towards the horizon standing at the coastline is generally three
nm). 73 The third was the cannon-shot rule, whereby the distance of a coastal State’s jurisdiction was the
farthest extent of a cannon projectile, which at the time was around three nm. 74 Although fisheries
exclusion was an important consequence of this increased jurisdiction, the main reason for extending
coastal State jurisdiction in the 17th century was not fisheries conservation, but rather protecting coastal
States from enemy attacks and intrusions. 75

While there was international support for a three nm territorial sea, no country formally declared such
jurisdiction until 1794, when the United States, by Congressional action, delimited a three nm neutrality
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belt under its domestic law. 76 The establishment of a neutrality belt was not intended for fisheries
management purposes. However, not long after, fisheries rights entered the discussion. The formal
recognition of a three mile boundary for excluding foreign fishermen occurred with the 1818 treaty
between the United States and Great Britain.77 Along the same lines, Great Britain and France signed a
convention in 1839 that provided each country with exclusive fishery rights to three miles adjacent to
their shores. 78

During this period, distinctions emerged between the inexhaustibility of fisheries on the high seas versus
those closer to shore, such that nearshore waters were considered worthy of greater protection with regard
to coastal State interests. 79 As a result, the early to mid-19th century saw a proliferation of treaties between
coastal States for the purpose of fisheries exclusion within the three mile territorial sea. However, the
freedom of all States to fish on the high seas was maintained in these treaties, with the freedom not even
being cited in some agreements because its inclusion was considered superfluous. 80

2.2.3 Historical milestone 3 (19th century): The ocean is no longer inexhaustible: a new fisheries
paradigm

By the end of the 19th century, there was recognition that coastal fisheries were exhaustible, including
within the accepted three nm territorial sea for some fisheries. 81 During the late 19th century, for example,

76

Wilder (1992) at 710. While the Dano-Norwegian four mile claim related to fisheries exclusion, the more
common expression denoting offshore jurisdiction was a zone of “neutrality,” whereby if not declared, warring
nations (e.g., Britain and France) could take ‘prizes’ off US coasts. Thus, a delimited neutral zone, if adhered to,
would prevent warring nations from engaging in hostile acts within the zone. Thus, the main purpose of the zone
was far removed from fisheries conservation and management, although an argument could be made that neutrality
zone offered some protection for food security.
77
Convention respecting fisheries, boundary and the restoration of slaves between the United States of America and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Open for signature on 20 October 1818. Effective 30 January
1819. United Nations Treaty Series 112. For a review of 19th century fisheries treaties between the United States and
Great Britain, see Maddocks, L. (1888). Fisheries treaties between the United States and Great Britain: Discussed
from a fishermen’s perspective. Harvard, United States: Harvard College Library.
78
Juda (1996) at 15. See also Daggat, A.P. 1934. The regulation of maritime fisheries by treaty. The American
Journal of International Law, 28(4), 693-717.
79
Juda (1996) at 15.
80
Daggat (1934) at 704.
81
Juda (1996) at 16.

34

the herring fishery of the North Sea was a focal point for European fishing interests from Scotland,
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain and Germany. Such intensive fishing in a defined area led to
the signing of the International Convention for Regulating the Police of the North Sea Fisheries Outside
Territorial Waters in 1882 (North Sea Fisheries Convention) - the first multinational agreement to reserve
territorial waters (0-3nm) for the exclusive use by fishermen of particular coastal States. 82 Indeed,
previous treaties dealing with the same subject matter had been limited to bilateral participation. 83 The
North Sea Fisheries Convention, however, had less to do with stock conservation than it did with
regulating the vessels of convention parties on the high seas. 84 Although an international precedent had
now been set reserving the territorial waters of party States for the exclusive use by fishermen from
particular adjacent coastal States, little time elapsed before three miles was deemed inadequate to coastal
State interests. The result was States claiming wider jurisdictions for the exclusive right of fisheries, as
well as expressing interest in fisheries resources beyond their territorial waters.85

A particularly good illustration of changing marine jurisdictional claims and the exploitation of marine
resources was the multinational Northern Fur Seal Conflict (1886–1910) between the United States,
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Canada, Great Britain (acting on behalf of Canada), Japan and Russia.86 Indeed, the Northern Fur Seal
Conflict and Bearing Sea Fur Seal Arbitration between the United States and Great Britain is a landmark
historical case on the interests of coastal States and fishing States in transboundary stocks harvested
within waters of national jurisdiction and on the high seas. Germaine to this thesis, the conflict was
fundamentally about the need for compatible management measures for the harvest of seals within
national waters and on the high seas. The Northern Fur Seal Conflict tested the existing international law
at the time, specifically questioning the issue of national jurisdiction and property rights over marine
resources that also occur on the high seas.

The Northern Fur Seal Convention of 1911 is also noteworthy because: 1) it was the first international
environmental agreement for the specific objective of marine resource conservation; 87 2) it represented
the first instance in international fisheries law when the access to the wealth obtained from a resource was
distinct from the access to harvesting the resource; 88 3) it appeared to satisfy all parties involved; 89 4) it
led to the recovery of the northern fur seal populations; 90 and 5) the original agreement was maintained
for several decades. 91 Moreover, the Bearing Sea Fur Seal Arbitration is important in the history of the
law of the sea because it represents the first decision by an ‘impartial’ adjudicator on the rights, property
interests and responsibilities of nations fishing on a common stock within areas of national jurisdiction
and on the high seas. Although the Principle of Compatibility is neither mentioned in the commentary on
the Bering Sea Fur Arbitration nor the Northern Fur Seal Convention of 1911, the deliberative outcomes
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of the decision and the agreement can be viewed as achieving compatible measures between the high seas
and areas of national jurisdiction.
2.2.4. Historical milestone 4 (mid-20th century): Rapid rise in industrial fishing leads to claims for
broader areas of national jurisdiction

While the freedom of the seas doctrine was predicated on the inexhaustibility of fisheries, ripe with its
economic potential, the doctrine became dysfunctional due to the emergence of new fishing technologies
during the Industrial Period. In addition, changing patterns of human use of the oceans, and different
human perspectives of ocean resources, brought increased attention to the law of the sea. 92 While the
three nm territorial sea was generally accepted as customary international law in the early 20th century,
claims for extended fisheries jurisdiction beyond the three nm territorial sea gained popularity and led to
international deliberation.93

In 1894, an unofficial body of experts within the Institute of International Law found that the three nm
limit was insufficient for the protection of coastwise fishing, and instead proposed a six nm territorial
sea. 94 Their finding had no legal effect, and it was not until 36 years later that the international
community assembled at the Hague Codification Conference in 1930 to formally establish the breadth of
territorial waters. 95 The conference, however, failed to reach agreement on this issue. 96 While the three
mile territorial sea was generally accepted as customary international law with regard to neutrality and
coastal State protection, it was the breadth of the contiguous zone and access to fisheries that contributed
to the failure to adopt formal demarcations.97

92

Juda (1996) at 2.
Anand (1982) at 149.
94
Juda (1996) at 50.
95
Daggett, A.P. (1934) at 693.
96
Ibid.
97
Anand (1982) at 149. Demarcations for a contiguous zone represented an attempt to balance the needs of coastal
States by providing an extension of authority (but with limited police powers) to protect local interests while also
recognizing legitimate activities of nations outside of the territorial sea (See Juda (1996) at 50).
93

37

Rapidly advancing fishing power and capacity soon discredited the notion of inexhaustible marine
fisheries, leading to a recognition that the three-mile limit for exclusive fisheries rights was inadequate to
conserve fish stocks, and that wider demarcations were needed. However, global maritime powers
including the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and others, were determined to maintain the three
mile general limit in order to bolster their interest in exploiting fisheries of several other nations just
beyond the three mile mark. 98

Between 1930 and 1945, several States claimed broader marine jurisdictions for the protection of their
fisheries. While this was met with opposition from maritime powers including the United Kingdom and
the United States, it signified that fisheries were generating greater international interest. 99 By the late
1930’s, improved catch and effort information led to growing concerns over fisheries depletion in the
larger expanses of the ocean. Although depletion had been observed in some local areas much earlier
(e.g., Great Britain’s herring fishery), the greater issue of stock depletion was largely eclipsed during this
period by the discovery of new fishing grounds, coupled with advances in fishing technology. 100
Nonetheless, there was growing recognition that the freedom of the seas doctrine was license for powerful
countries to exploit resources near the coasts of other countries. 101 As Anand (1982) has opined, “freedom
of the seas has always meant unequal freedom or only freedom for the few (global maritime powers).” 102
After the Second World War, the long-held concept of the freedom of the seas was found to be
insufficient insofar as it applied to marine resource exploitation – that is, fisheries, and was subsequently
challenged by coastal States. The regime change was spurred by unilateral action taken by the United
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States. In 1945, US President Harry S. Truman issued two proclamations that would fundamentally
change the law of the sea.103

The Truman Proclamations unilaterally extended US jurisdiction beyond the three mile territorial sea and
onto the contiguous continental shelf for natural resources including oil, natural gas, minerals and
fisheries. The “Continental Shelf Proclamation” asserted US jurisdiction over the continental shelf
contiguous with the US out to 100 fathoms, while calling for an equitable process for establishing
boundaries with adjacent States. 104 The “Fisheries Proclamation” declared US rights to establish
conservation zones for the protection of fisheries in areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the
United States, and further, for areas which traditionally had been fished by US nationals only (and thus
subject to US regulation and control). 105 The fisheries proclamation also established that some fishing
grounds could, when conditions warranted, be restricted to fishing by US nationals alone. 106 In areas that
had been fished by nationals of other States, the proclamation instructed cooperative management
between the United States and these other States, while reserving the right to exclude new entrants to
those fisheries if necessary. 107

The Truman Proclamations set off claim and counterclaim responses by other nations. 108 The chain
reactions that ensued resulted in some countries staking claims to areas beyond the territorial sea which
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were broader than those asserted by the United States. 109 Interestingly, it was not the claims of extended
jurisdiction over the continental shelf that caused international concern (indeed, these were viewed as a
positive development in international law), but rather the extended jurisdiction over fisheries.110 In the
1952, Chile, Peru and Ecuador, all of which had narrow continental shelves but rich fisheries beyond
these shelves, signed the Santiago Declaration proclaiming a 200 nm maritime frontier of sole sovereignty
and jurisdiction. 111 Based on the Truman Proclamations, the United States and Great Britain favored
fisheries management on high seas through agreements with coastal States and States with historical
fishing interests in the area. However, neither the United States nor Great Britain accepted the 200 nm
extension of sole jurisdiction and protested vigorously. 112 Latin American countries responded with
continued reiterations of their claims. 113 Unilateral and inconsistent claims of marine jurisdiction were
now fraught with conflict, setting the stage for international negotiations.

2.3 Historical milestones 5 and 6 (mid-20th century): the United Nations Law of the Sea
Conventions, the EEZ, and International Cooperation over Shared Stocks

In 1949, the newly created United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) identified the delineation
of the high seas and the territorial sea as a major agenda item. Indeed, such action signified the
importance of law of the sea issues in a post-World War II world. In this context, the ILC also considered
the conservation of living marine resources, coastal State claims over the continental shelf, straight line
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baselines for territorial waters, mid-ocean archipelagos and their claims, high seas testing areas for
modern weapons, as well as air defense zones. 114

Fisheries were also identified as a primary issue to be discussed, and in 1951 the ILC agreed that, absent
regulations, the freedom to fish in waters beyond the territorial sea would endanger world food supply. 115
In 1955, the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of Living Resources of the Sea was
held in Rome. 116 The fisheries-specific outcome of the conference was that the freedom of all States to
fish on the high seas was maintained, but that such fishing would be subject to formal conventions. 117
These treaties would be formed by fishing nations, coastal States with jurisdiction contiguous to the high
seas, as well as any other State with “an interest in the conservation of the living resources in the area.”118
The ILC recommended that the UN General Assembly convene an international conference to examine
the law of the sea and to implement the results of the conference, including the adoption of international
conventions and other such instruments deemed appropriate. 119

2.3.1 The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the 1958 Geneva Conventions

The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in Geneva in 1958 and attended by
86 States. 120 The work of the conference was divided among five committees considering the following
issues: 1) the territorial sea and the contiguous zone; 2) the general regime of the high seas; 3) fishing and
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the conservation of living resources on the high seas; 4) the continental shelf; and 5) access to the seas of
land-locked countries. 121

As described above, there was growing concern from newly independent coastal States that the
conventional three mile territorial sea was too narrow, and that it did not offer enough protection for their
important fisheries. Conversely, Western maritime powers, including the United States and Great Britain,
did not support the expansion of the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. 122 This divergence of opinion is
illustrated by committee 1 (above) passing, by simple majority, a resolution to establish a 12 mile
contiguous zone, which would have enabled coastal States to exclude foreign fishermen. However, when
that provision was considered in the plenary session, it failed to win the three-fourths majority required
for its inclusion in the convention. 123

Although the conference committee failed to define the extent of the territorial sea in geographic terms,
the participants did agree on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 124
Importantly, that convention designated the territorial sea to be under the sovereign jurisdiction of the
coastal State, subject to other provisions of the convention and international law generally. One such
provision is the right of innocent passage for all vessels transiting through the territorial sea, subject to
coastal States being able to restrict vessel transit in circumstances where a vessel is not abiding by the
rules of the particular coastal State. 125

The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone also established the concept of
a contiguous zone, an area bounded no more than 12 miles from shore and adjacent to the territorial sea.
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In the contiguous zone, the convention provides that a coastal State can exercise control related to
customs, pollution, immigration, as well as the enforcement of infractions that occur in the territorial
sea. 126 However, the convention did not provide that a coastal State could prohibit foreign fishing within
the contiguous zone. 127

The committee on high seas fishing was another contentious forum at the conference. The tension was
between newly developing coastal States and existing maritime powers. The former sought the authority
to manage fisheries that occur on the high seas; the latter wanted to preserve the traditional high seas
fishing freedom, preferring an international approach to managing high seas fisheries.128 The outcome
was a compromise, with the relevant provisions described below continuing to hold currency today.

The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Marine Resources of the High
Seas established, for the first time, special recognition for the interests of coastal States in the
conservation and management of high seas fisheries that occur adjacent to their coasts. 129 Article 1
maintains the freedom of high seas fishing; however, such freedom is subject to: a) treaty obligations; b)
the interests and rights of coastal States; and c) other obligations related to the conservation and
management of highs seas fisheries. 130 Article 1 also provides that States have the duty to adopt, or
cooperate with other States in adopting, such measures as may be necessary for the conservation of high
seas resources.

Article 6(1) recognizes the importance of fisheries to coastal States, affirming that such States have a
special interest in maintaining the productivity of fisheries in any area adjacent to their territorial sea.
126
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Article 6(2) further recognizes the interests of coastal States, granting them equal rights to participate in
any research and regulation for the conservation of high seas fisheries. Indeed, this right persists even
though the nationals of the coastal State may not engage in high seas fishing. Article 6(4) prohibits States
from enforcing conservation measures which are contrary to those measures adopted by the adjacent
coastal State. However, the article does permit such States to enter into negotiations with a view to
prescribing necessary conservation and management measures for living resources in the particular high
seas area.

Importantly, if the States concerned are unable to reach agreement within a year of initiating negotiations,
they may refer the matter to the dispute resolution process. 131 In this regard, it is noteworthy that pursuant
to Article 7(1), if negotiations have failed to produce an agreement within 6 months, any coastal State can
adopt unilateral conservation measures with a view to maintaining the productivity of the resource in
question. 132 This is indeed a significant provision, allowing coastal States to theoretically impose binding
measures on States fishing on the high seas. The provision thus represents a substantial departure from the
historical carte blanche freedom of the seas concept.

While major issues such as the breadth of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone for fisheries
exclusion were not settled, the outcome of the conference resulted in four adopted conventions. When
read together, these conventions reaffirm the principle of the freedom of the seas, but with certain caveats
with respect to coastal State interests. 133 As such, it has been asserted that the major theme to arise from
the conventions was the rule of ‘reasonableness’, whereby potential abuses resulting from one State
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exercising high seas fishing freedoms must be tempered by an obligation on that State to not adversely
affect the activities of another nation.134

2.3.2 The Second United Nations Law of the Sea Conference

In 1960, the Second United Nations Law of the Sea Conference met in Geneva, with representatives from
88 States participating. 135 The conference again focused on defining the extent of the territorial sea, as
well as the issue of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction within the contiguous zone.136 At the time, several
countries had made unilateral claims for the exclusive use of areas between 12 miles and 200 miles. 137
The conference, however, failed to reach agreement on the extent of the territorial sea and exclusive
fisheries zones. As a result, unilateral claims for exclusive areas of jurisdiction proliferated, and conflicts
arose between DWFNs and coastal States over rights to fishery resources beyond three nm. With the
passage of time, the need to resolve these issues became increasingly pressing.

2.3.3 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
In the mid-1960s, a global shift occurred in relation to the extent of costal State jurisdiction, and more
specifically, how coastal States viewed fishery resources, including highly migratory species that occur
adjacent to their coastlines. It was also a time of post-colonial nation-building, with developing States
keen to exert greater control over their natural resources. 138 For example, by 1969, 59 coastal States
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unilaterally extended their territorial seas from three miles to 12 miles. 139 As the extension of coastal State
jurisdiction became commonplace, DWFNs grew increasingly resistant to the idea of relinquishing their
free access to HMS stocks within the territorial sea of other countries. 140 One reason for this was that
between 1960 and 1970 the global marine catch doubled, from 33 million mt to 61 million mt, with the
catch dominated by DWFNs. 141 Relations between the two sets of States remained strained until the early
1970s, when the international community, including two world superpowers - the United States and the
Soviet Union - agreed on the need to reconcile issues related to fishing interests in the territorial sea and
on the high seas. The freedom of navigation was also a pressing issue at the time, with ‘Cold War’
tensions at their height. 142

Around the same period, dozens of countries unilaterally established 200 nm exclusive use zones and
declared sovereignty over the underlying seabed and fisheries in the water column. 143 This added to the
existing tension between coastal States and DWFNs. Another issue gaining traction at the time was the
rapidly developing interest by many coastal and non-Coastal States in seabed mining (e.g., manganese
nodules). 144 The third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference was initiated in 1973 to address these
pressing global issues.

The outcome of the conference, which took 10 years to complete (1973-1982) was the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). 145 It took another decade for the convention to enter
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into force (1994), and it is currently binding on 154 States. UNCLOS has been described as the global
constitution for the oceans, providing nations with their rights and responsibilities in relation to the
oceans and the management of resources contained therein. 146 UNCLOS has also been identified as quite
possibly “the greatest treaty-making accomplishment in the entire history of international law.” 147

Several provisions of UNCLOS heralded changes or introduced new concepts to the law of the sea,
including topics covering navigation and rights to the seabed. However, for the purposes of this thesis,
these issues will not be examined in detail. Central to the current analysis is that UNCLOS managed to
achieve what previous Law of the Sea conferences had failed to accomplish – delineate the breadth of the
territorial sea and the EEZ. UNCLOS also distinguished the differing rights of coastal States within these
zones. Within the 12 nm territorial sea, for example, coastal State sovereignty is absolute; whereas within
the 200 nm EEZ, coastal States only possess sovereign rights and jurisdiction over resource-related
activities.148

The distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights is important. Coastal State sovereignty within
the territorial sea is a recognition of the all-encompassing authority provided to coastal States, subject to
the caveats specified under UNCLOS (for example, that coastal States grant innocent passage and transit
passage within the territorial sea). 149 On the other hand, UNCLOS provides coastal States with sovereign
rights within the EEZ, indicating a more limited authority than the full sovereignty enjoyed within the
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territorial sea. 150 As Juda (1996) has termed it, the EEZ is a zone sui generis, being neither part of the
territorial sea nor the high seas.151

Initially, there was debate over whether UNCLOS provided coastal States with property rights over nonHMS fisheries within the EEZ. However, the issue was settled a few years later, with the predominant
view being that non-HMS fishery resources occurring in the EEZ are the property of the coastal State. 152
There was considerably more debate on whether HMS stocks found within an EEZ constitute the property
of a coastal State, with this issue lingering for several years after UNCLOS. Major DWFNs such as the
United States opposed the concept of coastal State property rights over HMS such as tuna in the EEZ. The
issue was conceded in the 1990s, and it is now accepted that HMS are the property of coastal States while
they occur in this zone. 153 The establishment of the EEZ, and the granting of sovereign rights to coastal
States over the exploitation of living resources in the EEZ, is widely regarded as the most significant
reallocation of fisheries property rights in the 20th century. From once being considered common heritage
property, fisheries resources now have the legal status of being the sovereign property of coastal States. 154

2.3.3.1 Coastal State Duties for the Conservation and Management of Living Marine Resources
within the EEZ and Cooperation Over Shared Stocks

The establishment of the EEZ was a game-changer for coastal States with respect to the reallocation of
fishery resources. However, granting sovereign rights to resources found within the EEZ to coastal States
did not come without responsibility. UNCLOS articulates the rights, jurisdiction and duties of coastal
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States in the EEZ. Article 56, for example, provides coastal States with exclusive rights to explore and
exploit living and non-living resources found within the EEZ.

Article 61 provides coastal States with the ability to determine the total allowable catch (TAC) of living
marine resources within the EEZ, but in doing so, coastal States are to ensure through conservation and
management measures that such resources are not endangered by over-exploitation. Further, management
measures established by coastal States are to be designed so that populations of harvested species are
maintained at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). 155 Coastal States are also
required to take into consideration associated and dependent species, and to maintain these species above
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.156 Lastly, coastal States are to
regularly exchange catch and effort information through competent international organizations.

Under Article 62, coastal States are required to promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living
resources in the EEZ, without prejudice to Article 61. Furthermore, where a coastal State does not have
the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, Article 62 requires the particular coastal State to grant
other States access to the surplus allowable catch through appropriate mechanisms and regulations. 157

It has been argued that the terms “maximum sustainable yield” (Article 61) and “optimum utilization”
(Article 62) are open to broad interpretation and require further definition to provide guidance on how the
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sustainable management of living marine resources is to be achieved. 158 Moreover, pursuant to Article 61,
the maintenance of stocks at levels capable of producing Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) can be
further qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, meaning that the biomass of living
marine resources within the EEZ can be exploited to levels below that which produce MSY. In doing so,
coastal States can achieve what UNCLOS defines as “optimum utilization.” In other words, the overexploitation of a resource (e.g., fishing at a rate above that which produces MSY within a nation’s EEZ is
acceptable under the UNCLOS, provided such action is qualified by relevant factors. 159 Arguably, this
may only apply to fish stocks found within the EEZ, or to the unilateral action of a coastal State
exercising its rights under UNCLOS.

Notably, Article 56 requires coastal States carrying out their rights and duties in the EEZ to have “due
regard to the rights and duties of other states,” and to “act in a manner compatible with the other
provisions of the Convention.” The interpretation of this provision is key to balancing the rights and
obligations of coastal and other States under UNCLOS with respect to transboundary stocks.

Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS cover shared fish stocks (i.e., species that range between a State’s EEZ
and international waters) and HMS respectively. Both stocks are to be managed cooperatively through
bilateral or multilateral international agreements involving coastal nations that fish such stocks in their
EEZ, as well as countries fishing the stocks on the high seas. In the absence of appropriate international
organizations, Article 64 directs coastal States and other States whose nationals harvest HMS species in a
particular region to cooperate to establish such organizations and to participate in their work. Annex I to
UNCLOS provides a list of species considered to be HMS (see Appendix 1).
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UNLCOS maintains the freedom to fish on the high seas in Articles 87 and 116. However, Article 116(b)
also instructs States that fish on the high seas to do so with respect to the rights, duties and interests of
coastal States as provided for, inter alia, in Article 63(2) and Articles 64-67. 160 Article 116(b) can be
viewed as a critical provision within UNCLOS due to its potentially far-reaching effects. For example,
one can infer from the term “inter alia,” as used in Article 116(b), that fishing on the high seas should also
be conducted with due regard to the duties of coastal States (as articulated in Articles 61 and 62). If that
much is accepted, in order for a coastal State to fulfill its duty of ensuring that EEZ fish stocks are
managed through proper conservation measures, the high seas fishing activities of DWFNs cannot be
allowed to undermine coastal State conservation and management measures.161 According to this
conception, there are linkages between particular UNCLOS provisions and those of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on high seas fishing. In other words, fishing on the high seas for shared stocks should be
conducted with due regard for the rights and obligations of coastal States to maintain healthy stocks while
they occur within waters under their national jurisdiction.

Article 117 contains the central tenet of international fisheries management: that States are to cooperate
with one another, either regionally or sub-regionally, in the conservation and management of stocks
exploited on the high seas. Such cooperative engagement is further elucidated in Article 119, which
instructs States to manage fisheries so that they achieve MSY (as qualified by environmental and
economic factors, including the special requirements of developing States), and by taking into
consideration the effects on dependent species.
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UNCLOS was incredibly important in cementing the spatial delineations of the territorial sea and the EEZ
– once highly contentious concepts within the law of the sea. The previous discussion focused on the
sovereign rights provided to coastal States over their EEZs, as well as the duty of all States to cooperate
on the management of HMS stocks. Notably, coastal States under UNCLOS are provided full sovereignty
over their territorial sea (0-12 nm) and archipelagic waters, such that they do not have an obligation to
accept international management measures for HMS resources within those jurisdictions. 162 Indeed, some
of these waters can be quite extensive, resulting in large catches of HMS. The complexity of this issue has
manifested within the WCPO tuna fishery, and is explored in greater detail in subsequent sections of the
thesis.

Overall, UNCLOS provisions were seen as ambiguous in terms of defining what level of cooperation is
required between States on the management of stocks that occur both within the EEZ and on high seas.
As Munro (2001) has proposed, UNCLOS Articles 116-120, which relate to fishing on the high seas, are
“models of vagueness and imprecision.” 163 One explanation for this ambiguity is that the risk of overexploitation on the high seas was low at the time of negotiating the convention, and thus detailed
provisions on cooperative processes and strategies were likely viewed as unnecessary. For example, it
was believed that the establishment of the EEZ would mean that 90% of global marine fishery harvests
would be made from within the 200 nm EEZ, and thus fall under the management jurisdiction of coastal
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States. 164 However, this soon proved to be a false assumption, as evidenced by the overfishing crisis
which ensued on the high seas. 165

2.4 Historical Milestone 7: United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement Establishes the Principle of
Compatibility

The Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was held between 1993 and
1995. The objective of the conference was to solve what was perceived to be a high seas overfishing crisis
and remedy the vagaries of Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS. The outcome was the United Nations
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, commonly known as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA). 166

Convened by the UN General Assembly in 1992, the Conference had the dual purpose of establishing
measures for: 1) the conservation and management of transboundary stocks; and 2) the restoration of
transboundary stocks to levels that can produce MSY. 167 At time of the Conference, it was believed that
many straddling and HMS stocks were either overexploited or depleted.168 In addition, there was a call for
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broader consideration of ecosystem impacts and the use of the precautionary approach to the management
of high seas fisheries. 169

The chief task of the Conference was to harmonize the management of transboundary stocks within the
EEZ and on the high seas while staying within the UNCLOS framework. 170 During the negotiations, the
differing views of coastal States and fishing States with regard to the issue of management control were
stark. Indeed, this issue had been highly contested between the two sets of States since the late 19th
century. From the outset of the Conference, coastal States pushed for an agreement that would apply to
the high seas only, citing their sovereign rights over EEZ fishery resources as provided for in Article 61
of UNCLOS. 171 Furthermore, in the period leading up to the Conference, coastal State interest had shifted
from adequate fishery conservation and management (as envisioned in UNCLOS) to a recognition of the
‘special interests’ of coastal States with regard to the control and allocation of fisheries resources on the
high seas. This shift only served to stir opposition from fishing States, with negotiations stalling as a
result. 172

As the negotiations inexorably continued, it was apparent that both sides would need to make a
concession. The compromise offered by DWFNs was that the Conference would produce a binding
agreement – a result this group initially opposed. On the coastal State side, the agreement would apply to
cover the entire range of the shared stock, both within the EEZ (a proposition coastal States had originally
rejected), and on the high seas.173 However, striking the balance between the interests of coastal States in
shared stocks, and the rights of fishing States on the high seas, was the subject of significant debate. This
169
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was largely due to the inherent tension between UNCLOS provisions that preserve the freedom to fish on
the high seas (subject to the duties, rights and interests of coastal States as contained in Article 116), and
the requirement that coastal States show due regard to the rights and duties of other States in exercising
their sovereign rights in the EEZ (Article 56 (b)(2)).

Over the course of three years and five conferences, UN delegates negotiated a new legally binding
international instrument. The final convention text was said to be based on three pillars: 1) compatibility
between EEZ and high seas management regimes; 2) high-seas enforcement by all parties to the
agreement; and 3) provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes.174 It is important to note that UNFSA
was negotiated to implement UNCLOS, not to supersede it. As Balton (1996) has affirmed, “UNFSA
never strays from UNCLOS,” but rather serves to build upon the UNCLOS framework. 175 This
observation is made strikingly clear in Article 4 of UNFSA:
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the
Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner
consistent with the Convention. 176
As identified in Article 3 of UNFSA, the convention applies to the conservation and management of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species beyond areas of national jurisdiction. However, the
principles and provisions contained in Article 6 (Precautionary Approach) and Article 7 (Compatible
Measures) also apply to EEZ waters. UNFSA also instructs coastal States to apply the general principles
enumerated in Article 5 (General Principles), mutatis mutandis, meaning coastal States need only apply
those measures that require alteration with respect to their EEZ management. The main outcome of
UNFSA was establishing a framework for the international cooperation on the management of shared fish
stocks as they occur in the EEZ and on the high seas.
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An important consideration with respect to Article 7 is that coastal States are not obligated to establish
compatible measures for their territorial sea and archipelagic waters. As previously discussed, under
UNCLOS coastal States possess full sovereignty over their territorial sea (0-12 nm) and archipelagic
waters, such that they do not have an obligation to accept international management measures for HMS
resources that occur within these jurisdictions. Support for this distinction is found in the opening
paragraph of Article 7, which is prefaced with the phrase “without prejudice to the sovereign rights of
coastal States,” and continues with “for the conservation and management of living marine resources
found in waters under their national jurisdiction.” The use of the term “without prejudice” in conjunction
with “sovereign rights” has been interpreted to mean that the duty to implement the relevant measures
only applies to the EEZ and not the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, which are under the sovereign
control of coastal States as provided for under UNCLOS. 177
2.4.1 Core Provisions of UNFSA

The mechanism for cooperation between coastal States and DWFNs is identified in Article 8(1) which
states:
[c]oastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall pursue cooperation in relation to
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks either directly or through appropriate
subregional or regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) or arrangements, taking
into account the specific characteristics of the subregion or region, to ensure effective
conservation and management of such stocks.
Article 8(2) encourages States to enter into cooperative consultations without delay, and to act in good
faith with due regard to the rights, interests and duties of other States until agreement on sub-regional or
RFMO arrangements have been made.

Article 8(3) provides that if sub-regional or RFMO arrangements exist, States shall give effect to their
duty to cooperate by becoming members of such arrangements or by agreeing to apply the conservation
177
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and management measures which have been established by such arrangements to their fisheries. Article
8(3) also provides that the terms of participation in any arrangement shall not discriminate against any
State or group of States which have a real interest in the fisheries concerned. Article 8(4) states that only
those States which are members of sub-regional arrangements or RFMOs, or which agree to apply the
conservation and management measures established by such arrangements or organizations, shall have
access to the fishery resources to which those measures apply. It is this last provision that is perhaps the
most influential in terms of stimulating cooperation. That is, in order to gain access to a particular fishery,
a fishing nation must actively cooperate through the relevant sub-regional arrangement or RFMO.

Article 5 sets out the General Provisions of agreement with respect to international cooperation. While
some paragraphs echo the language found in UNCLOS, others introduce novel concepts, such as the
precautionary approach. This is exemplified in Article 5(a), which requires the adoption of measures to
ensure the long-term sustainability of transboundary stocks and to promote the objective of their optimum
utilization. Although lacking a definition of ‘long-term sustainability’, Article 5(b) requires that measures
be based on the best scientific evidence available, and that stocks be kept at levels capable of producing
MSY. Even so, such measures may be qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors,
including the special requirements of developing States, and by taking into account fishing patterns, the
interdependence of stocks, and any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether
sub-regional, regional or global. 178 The general provisions also require the application of the
precautionary approach (5(c)), an assessment of the impacts of fishing and other human impacts, as well
as the effects of environmental factors on the status of targeted and non-targeted stocks (5(d)). Article
5(e) requires consideration of ecosystem-based measures, while Article 5(f) requires that pollution, waste,
discards and derelict fishing gear be minimized.
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Article 5(g) requires the protection of marine biodiversity. Article 5(f) requires the prevention of
overfishing and the elimination of excess fishing capacity. Lastly, Article 5(i) requires States to take into
account the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers when discharging their cooperative duty in
accordance with the convention.
Article 6 details the application of the precautionary approach under the UNFSA, directing States to: a)
collect comprehensive data and use the best scientific information available; b) exercise caution when
information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate; c) take into account the status of target, non-target and
dependent stocks; and d) develop target and limit reference points. Annex II of UNFSA provides
guidelines for the application of precautionary reference points, stating that the fishing mortality rate that
generates MSY should be used as a minimum standard for limit reference points. 179

Article 7 is dedicated to the Principle, providing that measures established by coastal States for HMS
resources found in their EEZ waters should be compatible with high seas measures, and vice versa. 180
Article 7(2) requires that conservation and management measures established for the high seas and within
the EEZ be compatible to ensure conservation of these fish stocks in their entirety. Article 7(2)(a) lists
several considerations to be taken into account when negotiating measures in terms of compatibility,
including but not limited to: 1) the existing measures adopted by coastal States for waters under their
national jurisdiction in accordance with Article 61 of UNCLOS; 2) the biological unity and distribution of
the stocks and the extent to which such stocks are fished in waters under national jurisdiction; and 3) the
respective dependence on HMS fish stocks by coastal States and States fishing on the high seas. The
following chapter will discuss these issues in greater detail.
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Article 8 directs States to cooperate internationally through appropriate sub-regional or regional fisheries
management organizations (RFMOs) or arrangements, and to do so without delay (Article 8(2)). Article 9
sets out the framework for developing sub-regional arrangements or RFMOs, while Article 10 delineates
the functions of such organizations. Other articles of UNFSA which are relevant to this analysis cover
data collection (Article 14), enforcement and compliance (Articles 19-22), as well as the special
requirements of developing States (Article 24).

2.4.2 Post-UNFSA

Since the 1995 UNFSA, the following RFMOs have been established:
1) Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (2000);
2) South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (2001);
3) South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (2004);
4) South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (2009); and
5) North Pacific Fisheries Commission (2012);

Furthermore, RFMOs which pre-date UNFSA (such as the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission)
have revised their respective charters to incorporate UNFSA provisions – a course of action which is
encouraged in Article 13.181 UNFSA came into force in 2001 and currently 59 States are signatories and
88 are parties to the agreement. In 2006, a Review Conference of UNFSA was undertaken. Based on the
findings of that Review Conference, Balton and Koehler (2006) have identified UNFSA as being the
preeminent instrument in the field of international fisheries management, with virtually all governments
represented at the Review Conference (including those who are not yet party to agreement), indicating
their acceptance of the treaty as an expression of the basic standards for the management of ocean
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fisheries. 182 However, several major fishing nations such as China, Korea and Indonesia, as well as many
Latin American countries, are yet to become parties to the treaty. 183 Stated reasons for resisting UNFSA
include the belief that the provisions of the treaty related to high seas boarding and inspection infringe
upon flag nation rights, as well as the view that Article 7 of UNFSA prejudices the rights of coastal States
(as provided for by UNCLOS), by requiring cooperation on straddling/HMS stocks that occur in their
EEZ.

184

Meetings of the UNFSA Review Conference were held in 2010 and 2016. 185 The 2010 Review
Conference reaffirmed that UNCLOS and UNFSA provide the legal framework for conservation and
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, but noted that several of such
species were severely over-exploited, thus calling into the question the effectiveness of international
RFMO management. 186 The 2016 Review Conference noted, among other things, increased participation
in the Agreement; the formation of new regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements;
the enhanced collaboration between those organizations and arrangements; and the imminent entry into
force of the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing of FAO. 187 It was identified at the conference that RFMOs are crucial in the
implementation of UNFSA; however, several delegations highlighted the need for increased collaboration
through RFMOs to adopt science-based and compatible measures.188
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2.5 Chapter Conclusion

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the law of the sea has evolved as a result of several factors,
including unilateral and multilateral changes to marine jurisdictional limits, resource depletion coupled
with advancements in fishing technology, as well as the persistent tension over the competing interests of
coastal States and high seas fishing States.

Through an historical analysis starting with the 17th century, this chapter has identified the following
milestones as having influenced the current state of international law with respect managing marine
fisheries:
Historical milestone 1: mare liberum, or the freedom of the seas, becomes the prevailing
doctrine within the law of the sea.
Historical milestone 2: The three mile territorial sea limit is established as customary
international law, with subsequent treaties allowing for the exclusion of foreign fishermen in
this zone.
Historical milestone 3: Marine resources are determined to be exhaustible, with activities within
territorial waters and on the high seas affecting the long-term
sustainability of such resources.
Historical milestone 4: Coastal States make claims for broader areas of national jurisdiction
beyond their coastlines to counter the negative effects of unfettered
fishing on the high seas by DWFNs.
Historical milestone 5: UNCLOS defines the territorial sea and EEZ, establishes standards for
the management of marine resources found within the EEZ and on high seas, recognizes the
rights, duties and interests of coastal States and States fishing on the
high seas.
Historical milestone 6: UNCLOS requires international cooperation for the conservation and
management of transboundary fish stocks.
Historical milestone 7: UNFSA establishes the Principle of Compatibility to bridge the gap
between the conservation and management of transboundary stocks found within the EEZ and on
the high seas.
The Freedom of the Seas doctrine (mare liberum), which was first articulated in the early 17th century but
gained favor in the 19th century, remains the cornerstone of contemporary international maritime law
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through UNCLOS. However, the freedoms granted to States by UNCLOS come with a corresponding set
of obligations, not the least of which is to consider the rights and duties of other States. UNCLOS also
served to define areas of national jurisdictional out to 200 nm, thus establishing the concept of the EEZ.
In doing so, UNCLOS reallocated fishery resources to coastal States by providing such States with
sovereign rights over resources found within their EEZ. In exercising their sovereign rights, however,
UNCLOS requires coastal States to fulfil certain duties, such as ensuring that stocks within their EEZ are
properly managed. In this way, UNCLOS endows coastal States with a special interest in the management
of high seas fisheries.

For transboundary stocks, the advancement of technology has allowed for greater fishing power and the
ability to fish farther from shore, leading to the unfettered exploitation of shared stocks beyond the EEZ.
Although UNCLOS directed States to cooperate internationally on the conservation of transboundary
stocks found within EEZs and on the high seas, it lacked specific direction on the fundamental terms for
international cooperation. The result was rapidly expanding fisheries and a concomitant global concern
over the status of transboundary stocks. Thus, the expanded EEZ jurisdiction of coastal States, coupled
with the threat of overexploitation of transboundary stocks, firmed international resolve for a solution to
what many identified as a global fishing crisis only a few years after the signing of UNCLOS.

The international community responded with UNFSA, which continued where UNCLOS left off –
international cooperation. The Principle of Compatibility emerged as a means to reconcile the different
approaches to fisheries management for stocks that occur within the EEZ and on the high seas. The
Principle itself is not exacting, but rather intuitive, and although not identified formally prior to UNFSA,
some of the basic elements have been applied in the past (e.g., the Bering Fur Seal Conflict).

Despite the importance of the Principle of Compatibility in terms of bridging the gap between EEZ and
high seas management for shared stocks, questions remain over its interpretation and application within
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RFMOs. Moreover, tensions persist over how best to balance the interests of coastal States and high seas
fishing States. The following chapter takes a closer look at the Principle and how it has been employed in
UNFSA. The chapter also investigates how the Principle addresses the management of shared stocks in
the relevant maritime jurisdictional zones, and further, how it could be used to resolve the problems
discussed above, if at all.
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Chapter 3: Bridging the Gap: the Principle in detail
3.1 Introduction

Central to UNFSA are the compatibility provisions, which serve to bridge the gap between EEZ and high
seas management of transboundary fish stocks. 189 This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the
Principle, 190 as well as a review of its origins within the negotiations of UNFSA. Indeed, these
negotiations took place during a period where the high seas were believed to be the subject of increasing,
unmitigated fishing exploitation. Against this backdrop, coastal States and high seas fishing States saw
the UNFSA conference as potentially eroding the rights which had accrued to them under UNCLOS.
Negotiating the Principle was indeed a challenge, but ultimately an entire article dedicated to the Principle
was incorporated into the agreed text of UNFSA. This chapter analyzes Article 7 of UNFSA with a view
to understanding the meaning of the text and how to interpret the article in practice.

3.2 The Need for the Principle?

The world was facing a global fishing crisis in the lead up to the UNFSA conference, with fisheries,
catches and gear types on the high seas being largely unregulated.191 Although UNCLOS directs coastal
States and high seas fishing States to cooperate, it does not provide guidance on how such cooperation
should occur. Nor does it contain definitive provisions on how to balance the rights, obligations and
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interests of coastal States and fishing States with respect to the management of straddling or highly
migratory fish stocks. 192 The UNSFA conference was held to resolve this problem.

A major outcome of UNFSA was agreement on the Principle, which in simple terms requires the
establishment of compatible measures within the EEZ and on the high seas. Compatibility can be defined
as: “a state in which two things are able to exist or occur together without problems or conflict.”193 As
described in the preceding chapter, the Principle serves to balance the rights and obligations of coastal
States and States fishing on the high seas with respect to the management of shared stocks.

The Principle is considered to have stemmed from the 'consistency principle' found in the 1978
convention establishing the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). 194 In NAFO, for
example, members are to ensure consistency in the conservation and management of straddling stocks
within EEZs and on the high seas. 195 The consistency principle within NAFO is said to lean towards the
interests of coastal States, such that high seas measures are to be consistent with those adopted in the EEZ
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of a coastal State. 196 It has also been argued that the ‘consistency principle’ is implicit in the relationship
between UNCLOS Articles 61-64 and Article 116. Indeed, these articles suggest that, in order to fulfil
their obligations under UNCLOS, coastal States are required to maintain management interests in
fisheries beyond the EEZ and into the high seas.197

By instituting the consistency principle, NAFO may have succeeded in addressing the management of
transboundary cod stocks in their region. However, going into the UNFSA conference, there was clearly
no international consensus on how to balance the rights of coastal States and high seas fishing nations
with regard to straddling stocks or highly migratory species. For example, high seas fishing nations
sought to maintain their right to fish on the high seas (as stipulated in Article 116 of UNCLOS), whereas
coastal States were keen to curb high seas fishing – an activity that conflicted with their obligation to
prevent the overexploitation of fish stocks when they occur within their national waters.
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3.3 Negotiating the Principle in UNFSA

The First Session of the UNFSA conference was held in April 1993 and served to organize the work to be
accomplished in the sessions to follow. At this meeting, Ambassador Satya Nandan (Fiji) was chosen to
chair the conference, and he identified the “high seas problem” as being the result of a lack of cooperation
and management. 198 Nandan further emphasized that:
the mandate of the Conference [was] not about the extension of national jurisdiction or the
abridgement of the right of States to fish in the high seas…but rather to resolve the festering
problems of high seas fishing in order to give full and faithful effect to the very delicately
balanced provisions of the Convention (UNCLOS)... 199
The Second Session of the conference took place in July 1993, with Nandan asserting that “the biological
nature and distribution of these stocks necessitate compatible and coherent management measures over
their entire range.” 200 This was followed by several days of opening statements by participating States,
with coastal States expressing strong support for high seas measures to be consistent with EEZ-based
measures. Meanwhile, high seas fishing States propounded that the adopted measures should not unduly
infringe upon the freedom to fish on the high seas. 201 Despite such divergent statements, there was
consensus on the need for the negotiated agreement to ensure consistency between EEZ and high seas
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management measures. 202 Nandan acknowledged the support for consistent measures and stated that the
need to harmonize EEZ and high seas measures was at the heart of the Conference’s negotiations.203

Recognizing there was strong support for this concept within the early debates of the Conference, the first
draft of the agreement, called the “Negotiating Text,” included Article IX - “Compatibility and Coherence
Between National and International Conservation Measures for the Same Stock.” 204 For brevity, a review
of the provisions included in Article IX will not be provided herein; however, it is worth mentioning that
several of the initial provisions were not maintained in the final agreement. 205 Discussion on this draft
article was varied, and as expected, coastal States made strong statements in support of measures that
would not undermine their sovereign rights. On the other hand, DWFNs made several statements
regarding the importance of recognizing the biological unity of stocks in developing compatible
measures. 206

The Third Session of the conference was held in March 1994, with the negotiations again centering on the
issue of compatibility. Discussions advanced to a point where there was general support for the need to
establish compatible measures for waters under national jurisdiction and on the high seas, and to ensure
that common minimum standards were applied to the management of stocks in both maritime zones. 207
However, the area that presented difficulty was the application of minimum standards in the EEZ and in
the adjacent high seas. This was due to the sovereign rights of coastal States to manage their resources, as
202
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well as the interrelationship of the stocks found in the adjacent high seas.208 In other words, ‘the devil was
in the detail.’ As the contents of the next iteration of the Negotiating Text were divulged, several
countries conveyed concerns that the new text shifted the balance towards high seas fishing States rather
than coastal States. Moreover, concerns were raised that the new text did not adequately recognize the
interest of coastal States in the management of high seas fisheries.209

Nandan opened the Fourth Session by stating that the voluntary system of regulation of global fisheries
had failed. 210 He identified that the rampant use of subsidies were overcapitalizing fishing fleets and that
the rate of increase for fishing fleets has more than doubled the rate of increase in catch. Nandan stated
that the right to fish, whether in the EEZ or on the high seas, is a conditional right that is accompanied by
the duty to conserve and manage fishery resources for future generations, and further, that any abuse of
this right is an act against humanity. He reminded delegates that the world was watching and expecting
the conference to solve the global fishing crisis. 211

Nandan further explained that in order for the agreement to be effective, the adopted conservation and
management measures for the EEZ and adjacent high seas areas must be compatible and coherent, taking
into account the biological unity of the stocks and the supporting ecosystem. 212 To counter negotiations
that were faltering due to jurisdictional issues, Nandan reminded delegates that because straddling and
HMS stocks do not recognize jurisdictional boundaries, it is critical that consistent management is applied
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throughout a stock’s range. 213 A complicating factor in the negotiations, however, was that although
UNCLOS requires States that are members of regional or sub-regional organizations to share data on
fisheries, at the time of the Conference many high seas fishing States were not sharing their data on high
seas catches. Thus, the amount of catches of straddling and HMS stocks was largely unknown at the
time. 214

At the Fourth Session of the Conference, negotiations over the proposed compatibility provisions were
suggestive of the chair’s draft representing a somewhat more balanced approach to the interests of coastal
States and high seas fishing States. Although a few States tried to influence the text to support their
specific circumstances, the text went forward largely unchanged from the chair’s draft. 215 It was agreed
that two more sessions of the Conference were needed to finalize the agreement, with the Fifth Session to
finalize negotiations and the Sixth Session to harmonize the agreed text in several languages.

Nandan opened the Fifth Session by reviewing some of the intersessional discussions that had taken
place. 216 He mentioned that the compatibility provisions of the draft agreement had been the focus of
many of the intersessional meetings, further demonstrating the importance of this issue to the
agreement. 217 The Fifth Session added two additional paragraphs to the draft Article 7, covering the
notification of management measures adopted within the EEZ and on the high seas. At the close of the
session, Nandan related that the draft agreement was based on three pillars: 1) effective management
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through the establishment of compatible measures; 2) facilitating compliance through high seas
enforcement by State parties on vessels of other State parties; and 3) the peaceful settlement of
disputes. 218

At the Sixth and final session, interventions on the compatibility provisions were still varied, with some
delegates arguing that a balance had not been struck between the interests of coastal States and those of
high seas fishing States. Meanwhile, other delegates indicated that the compatibility provisions did not
mesh well with other draft articles of the agreement. 219 Nonetheless, common ground on the text was
found and the agreement was signed on December 4, 1995. In his closing remarks, Nandan emphasized
that the compatibility provisions represent one of the cornerstones of the agreement.220

In summary, the Principle was a critical issue in the negotiation of UNFSA, and reaching consensus on
the provisions related to the Principle (e.g., Article 7) was fraught with difficulty. 221 During the
negotiations, the Principle invoked trepidation among coastal States, with such States fearing that its
implementation would infringe upon coastal State sovereign rights in the EEZ as provided for by Article
61 of UNCLOS. On the other side, high seas fishing nations were anxious over the potential for coastal
States to gain extended control over shared stocks occurring on the high seas, and that the freedom of the
high seas guaranteed by Article 116 of UNCLOS would be threatened. The formula, as articulated by
Nandan, was that consensus on the Principle and on the agreement in general was forged by adhering to
the rights and duties of States under the UNCLOS. 222

218

Ibid.
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 7(47). Retrieved from http://www.iisd.ca/vol07/0747000e.html
220
Nandan. S. (1995, July 24). Statement by the Chairman at the closing of the Sixth Session. United Nations
Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. A/CONF.164/30. Retrieved from http://daccessdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/284/53/PDF/N9528453.pdf?OpenElement
221
Nandan, S. (1995). Conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks under the
Convention on the Law of the Sea. American Society of International Law, 89, 454-456.
222
Ibid. Article 4 states that “nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of States
under UNCLOS. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent with
the Convention.”
219

71

3.4 UNFSA Article 7: the compatibility provisions

As described in the previous section, the primary driver in reaching consensus on UNFSA was that the
agreement was purposefully crafted to adhere to UNCLOS. The subordinate relationship of UNFSA to
UNCLOS was also noted in Article 7 paragraph 1, such that the exclusivity of the EEZ (as far as coastal
States were concerned) was not affected, and that the right to fish on the high seas was also maintained.
Even so, both these rights were made subject to cooperation within RFMOs. 223
Article 7(1):
Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the living marine resources within areas under national jurisdiction as
provided for in the Convention, and the right of all States for their nationals to engage in fishing on the
high seas in accordance with the Convention…
In this regard, the sovereign rights of coastal States over living marine resources in their EEZs (UNCLOS
Article 56 and 61-64) are maintained, and the right of all States to engage in fishing on the high seas
(UNCLOS Articles 116), is protected. By remaining consistent with the drafting of Articles 63 and 64 of
UNCLOS, Article 7(1) maintains the textual distinction with respect to straddling stocks and HMS. For
example, Article 7(1)(a) requires States to seek to agree upon measures necessary for the conservation of
straddling stocks, whereas Article 7(1)(b) requires States to cooperate “with a view” to ensuring
conservation and optimum unitization with respect to HMS stocks.
Article 7(1)(a):
with respect to straddling fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and the States whose nationals
fish for such stocks in the adjacent high seas area shall seek, either directly or through the
appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, to agree upon the measures
necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent high seas area;
Article 7(1)(b):
with respect to highly migratory fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and other States whose
nationals fish for such stocks in the region shall cooperate, either directly or through the
appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, with a view to ensuring
conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such stocks throughout the
region, both within and beyond the areas under national jurisdiction.
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The textual differences between paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) above suggest that paragraph (a), as it
relates to the conservation of straddling stocks, is more rigid than paragraph (b), which relates to HMS
stocks. Paragraph (b) also incorporates the concept of optimal utilization, which suggests socio-economic
factors may be involved. The language found in Article 7 paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) is almost verbatim to
that used in Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS respectively. However, as Burke (2000) has asserted, not
only are these UNCLOS provisions not well understood, their lack of specificity contributed to the need
for UNFSA to address the regulation of fisheries on the high seas. 224

If Article 7(1) provides the Principle’s foundational adherence to UNCLOS, then Article 7(2) provides
the working parts. Pursuant to Article 7(2), States have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving
compatible measures, with those measures “established” for the high seas, and those “adopted” for areas
under national jurisdiction, needing to be compatible to ensure conservation of transboundary stocks in
their entirety. 225
Article 7(2):
Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas
under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management
of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, coastal
States and States fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving
compatible measures in respect of such stocks.

Indeed, this instruction is fundamental to the Principle’s application within UNFSA. It mandates
cooperation to ensure that compatible measures are developed and applied wherever these shared stocks
may swim – whether in the high seas or in areas of national jurisdiction (or both).
224
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UNFSA, however, goes further than simply directing States to cooperate on compatible measures. Article
7(2) lists six subparagraphs that guide States in their development of compatible measures. These six
subparagraphs, however, are not particularly detailed in terms of practical application and involve some
degree of interpretative complexity. 226 The manner in which the six subparagraphs are formulated is
likely indicative of the challenging UNFSA negotiations with regard to the compatibility provisions. As
described earlier, coastal States and high seas fishing States were at pains to avoid shifting the balance in
either one’s direction, resulting in compromise language that is not overly prescriptive. For example, it
remains an open question whether Article 7 paragraph 2(a-f) provides a balance between the rights of
coastal States and States fishing on the high seas, or whether they favor one group of States over the
other.

In discharging their duty to cooperate on the establishment of compatible measures for the high seas,
Article 7(2)(a) requires coastal States and fishing States to take into account measures already applied in
areas under national jurisdiction in accordance with the rights provided to coastal States under Article 61
of UNCLOS. Furthermore, Article 7(2)(a) requires that high seas measures not undermine EEZ measures
established by coastal States.
Article 7 paragraph. 2(a):
(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and
applied in accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same
stocks by coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure
that measures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not
undermine the effectiveness of such measures;
Article 7(2)(b) provides a parallel requirement, such that previously agreed high seas measures should be
taken into account when developing compatible measures for waters under national jurisdiction.
However, it does not go as far as paragraph 2(a), which requires that high seas measures do not
undermine measures taken by a coastal State. The differences in these textual formulations have been the
subject of debate, with questions being raised over whether or not the final text shifts the balance towards
226
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coastal States. Burke (2000) concludes that the standard for compatibility between high seas and coastal
State measures is whether or not the effectiveness of coastal States measures is undermined by high seas
measures. 227 In other words, because there is a lack of parity in the formulation of these paragraphs,
whereby high seas measures cannot undermine EEZ measures, but not vice versa, the balance has clearly
been shifted in favor of coastal States.228 This, however, is not a universally held interpretation.

Other commentators have suggested that UNFSA makes the distinction found in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b)
because only coastal States have competency over their respective EEZs, whereas competency over the
high seas is not unilaterally provided, but shared among nations. 229 Thus, the textual difference could
indicate that UNFSA negotiators were hamstrung in their ability to provide parallel formulations for
paragraphs (a) and (b), with only coastal States being able decide what is appropriate for their waters, and
UNFSA being perfectly placed to instruct more specifically with respect to the high seas.

Elferink (2001) warns against placing too much weight on the textual differences between paragraphs (a)
and (b), relating that the goal of UNFSA was to achieve a balance consistent with the rights and
obligations provided to coastal States and high seas fishing nations under UNCLOS. 230 However, it
should be noted that there are interpretations of UNCLOS suggesting that, because coastal States have a
duty to ensure that stocks found within their national waters are sustainable, the interests of such States
can naturally be said to extend to the high seas. This view, if accepted, would certainly shift the balance
of power towards the coastal States with respect to the management of shared stocks. 231 Of course, if one
considers the divergence of opinion within the academic literature as to the balance struck by Article 7
and UNCLOS, it is rather unsurprising that coastal States and distant water fishing States are yet to reach
agreement on this issue.
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Article 7(2), however, does not stop at paragraphs 2(a) and (b), but includes other factors to consider
when developing compatible measures. Article 7 paragraph 2(c) provides that existing measures
established by regional or sub-regional organizations must also be taken into account when developing
compatible measures.232

Article 7 paragraph 2(d) requires consideration of the biological unity and other biological characteristics
of affected stocks, as well as the relationship between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the
geographical particularities of the region concerned, including the extent to which the stocks occur and
are fished in areas under national jurisdiction. Although the term ‘biological unity’ is undefined in
UNFSA, one can reasonably infer that consideration should be placed on the impact of conservation and
management measures on a stock’s entire geographical range, rather than being limited to a specified area
or jurisdiction. 233

Article 7 paragraph 2(e) mandates that States take into account the respective dependence of coastal
States and distant water fishing States on the stocks concerned. Unfortunately, UNFSA does not further
define the term “respective dependence.” However, one could reasonably infer that developing coastal
States, and in particular Small Island Developing States (SIDS), could use paragraph 2(e) to make strong
arguments that their national economies and food security are highly dependent on the shared stocks
under consideration (as compared to, for example, developed nations with vessels fishing on the high
seas). 234
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Elfernick (2001) suggests that other articles of UNFSA offer contextual guidance with regard to
“respective dependence.” For example, UNFSA Article 11 paragraphs (d) and (e), which relate to
participatory rights to fish within RFMO managed areas, state that such rights need to take into account
the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing for the stocks, as well as
the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of living
marine resources (emphasis added). In addition, UNFSA Article 24 paragraphs 2(a) and (b), which focus
on the special requirements of developing States, instruct States engaged in cooperative conservation
measures to consider the vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation of
living marine resources, including for meeting the nutritional requirements of their populations, as well as
the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and access to fisheries, by subsistence, small-scale and artisanal
fishers. 235

The use of the term “respective” suggests that each State is to evaluate dependence separately and not
collectively or in absolute terms. 236 For developing coastal States, it seems Article 7 paragraph 2(e) would
tilt the balance of rights in their favor (all other considerations being equal), as such States are likely to be
much more dependent on fisheries in terms of their national economies, coastal communities and
nutritional requirements as compared to developed States. Thus, the term “respective dependence” in
Article 7 paragraph 2(e) suggests that, when developing compatible measures, consideration must be
given to the importance of the stocks in relation to a nation’s economy, the needs of coastal communities,
and when used in the context of developing States, the nutritional requirements of its population. 237
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Lastly, Article 7 paragraph 2(f) requires that the measures established by States do not result in harmful
impact on ‘the living marine resources as a whole’ (emphasis added). 238 It is not entirely clear whether
this formulation only applies to targeted straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, or whether it refers
to the broader ecosystem. However, as UNFSA has incorporated the precautionary approach in Article 6,
it likely that the term “the living marine resources” encompasses more than just target stocks, with nontarget, dependent and associated stocks, as well as the marine environment as a whole, falling within the
ambit of the term. 239

The considerations in Article 7(2)(a-f) suggest that compatible measures can be negotiated on a case-bycase basis. Elferink (2001) has posited that in developing compatible measures and taking into account
the considerations listed in Article 7(2)(a-f), equity should play an important role. 240 Although equity is a
key concept in international law, countries often negotiate international agreements with a high degree of
self-interest, seeking to preserve existing benefits or obtain a greater allotment of shared resources. 241 As
history has shown, developing States have often been on the losing end of international agreements as
they lack the institutional capacity to implement them. 242 To level the playing field, international law has
evolved in recent decades to support the concept of differential treatment and capacity building for
developing States within international agreements.243 In this regard, UNFSA has incorporated a specific
article to recognize the special requirements of developing States and the need to ensure that measures
ultimately established do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of
238
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conservation action onto such States. 244 UNFSA, however, does not provide any guidance on what form a
‘disproportionate burden’ may take, or how to avoid the imposition of such a burden in the first place. 245

The UNFSA conference also anticipated that a lack of compatible measures would lead to disputes
between States. Article 7(3) instructs States that in giving effect to their duty to cooperate, they are to
make every effort to agree on compatible conservation and management measures within a reasonable
period of time. Article 7(4), however, provides that if no agreement on compatible measures can be
reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned may invoke dispute settlement
procedures provided for in Part VIII. 246

3.4.1 Establishing Compatible Measures and Balancing UNFSA Article 7 Considerations

As identified in the preceding section, UNFSA provides several factors to take into consideration when
developing compatible measures. Unfortunately, however, UNFSA provides no guidance on the
weighting of these factors or how to balance them. It is worth reiterating that the main objective of
establishing compatible measures is to ensure the conservation and management of shared stocks in their
entirety. 247 Moreover, if the status of a specific highly mobile stock is unhealthy, a lack of compatibility
between EEZ and high seas measures may be a significant factor contributing to poor stock status.

Elferink (2001) suggests that the logical starting point in establishing compatible measures is to determine
the extent to which conservation and management measures already exist for: 1) waters under national
jurisdiction (paragraph 2(a)); 2) the high seas (paragraph 2(b)); and 3) RFMO-managed areas (paragraph
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2(c)). 248 It is axiomatic that if existing measures are identified, but found not to be meeting the
conservation and management objective, then they should be revised. If it is found that the existing
measures applicable to waters under national jurisdiction are unsustainable, either individually or
cumulatively, then any new entrant to the high seas fisheries targeting the same stock would result in noncompatibility. However, if one considers that HMS stocks can range thousands of miles and are part of
large ocean basin-scale populations, a critical issue emerges with regard to the issue of non-compatibility.
This issue can be stated as follows: the wide-ranging nature of HMS stocks means that it is difficult to
demonstrate a significant impact on such stocks from fishing solely conducted in the waters of one coastal
State. Conversely, fishing mortality would need to take place through a stock’s entire range in order for a
significant impact on these wildly dispersed stocks to be shown.

Elferink (2001) also argues that if coastal State measures have not been established for national waters,
but measures exist for the high seas, it is necessary to determine if the relevant coastal State participated
in the development of the high seas measures. For example, if the coastal State refused to cooperate in the
development of the high seas measures, then it would be difficult for that particular coastal State to
maintain that such measures are not compatible with measures that apply in their national waters.
However, if certain high seas measures were adopted without the knowledge of a particular coastal State,
then the high seas measures would potentially be ripe for evaluation with respect to compatibility, and
perhaps even conflict resolution. 249

After determining what measures exist within national waters or within the high seas, a logical next step
is to evaluate whether or not existing measures appropriately take into account the biological unity of the
stocks (paragraph 2(d)). HMS stocks are wide ranging, broadly dispersed and found in various densities
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related to spawning and foraging habitats, which sometimes do not overlap.250 Therefore, to properly
manage the resource, it is important to understand the movement of fish in relation to their preferred
habitat, the extent of their range as dictated by oceanographic conditions, as well as the genetic
connectivity within a species.

Without a good understanding of the characteristics listed above, the biological unity of a stock cannot be
deciphered. Tagging activities constitute the primary method of gaining information on the movement of
fish stocks and are critical to applying paragraph 2(d). 251 Understanding habitat preferences for spawning
and foraging is also important in predicting the occurrence of fish stocks in a particular area of the ocean.
Genetic testing is a yet another powerful tool in understanding biological unity, with analyses from this
testing gaining better resolution as time goes on.252

Fisheries targeting HMS stocks typically occur throughout the range of stock and include catches of
juveniles and adults. 253 Therefore, an important reason to take into account the biological unity of a stock
is for the purpose of regulating catches with respect to temporal and spatial characteristics of the fisheries,
including spawning areas, migration routes, as well as foraging areas. Critical to applying this provision is
data on the location of fish catches and the size of the fish at capture. To properly obtain this data, a
fisheries dependent monitoring system which includes catch reporting (e.g., logbooks) is necessary and
supplemented with independent observer coverage. Preferably, operational level data should be provided
for independent review by scientific experts, with such data being of the quality used in stock
assessments. Port sampling is also an important aspect of a comprehensive monitoring program, as it
250
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allows for verification of logbook submissions and landings, and as a means of collecting life history
information and well as monitoring and enforcement.

As an example, fishing on a spawning aggregation could greatly impact a stock if the fish were caught
prior to having had the ability to spawn and fertilize eggs. Secondly, the overharvesting of adults can lead
to recruitment overfishing. This occurs when too many adults are removed from the population, resulting
in low numbers of juveniles entering the population. This, in in turn, affects the population’s ability to
produce MSY. Third, an overharvest of juveniles can lead to growth overfishing, whereby substantial
losses in yield occur, resulting in significant economic losses. 254 Therefore, in order to properly take into
account the biological unity of a stock, additional factors such as the location of catches and the life
history stage of the catch are essential to understand. Like most issues related to fisheries conservation
and management, this is predicated on the quality of data available to scientists and managers.

Following on from the investigation into the ‘biological unity of the stocks,’ the next issue to consider is
the respective dependence of coastal States and fishing States on the stocks concerned (paragraph 2(e)).
To properly account for a State’s dependence on a fishery, transparent information should be available
under the following categories: a) the number and type of fishing vessels (commercial, artisanal and
subsistence) participating in a fishery; b) where the vessels operate (e.g., in domestic wasters, the EEZ of
another coastal State, or on the high seas); c) the amount of catch harvested by the vessels; d) where the
catch is landed; e) whether the catch is consumed in domestic markets or exported to foreign markets; f)
the number of direct and indirect jobs associated with the fishery; and g) the contribution of the fishery
(expressed as a percentage) to the State’s Gross National Product. 255
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Arguably, the primary reason to consider the respective dependence of a coastal State or high seas fishing
State on a particular stock or fishery is to determine catch allocations or effort limits between States.
Catch or effort allocations represent the business end of international fisheries negotiations, with
decisions being made on how much catch or fishing effort is allowed for each member. Indeed, allocation
decisions are among the most difficult to reach agreement on within international fisheries management
fora. 256 What complicated UNFSA negotiations on the issue of compatibility was the fear held by
participating nations of being on the losing side of catch or effort allocations. The outcome was Article 7
and its associated six subparagraphs, which when read collectively, allow for compatibility being
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

With the right political will, existing measures, whether applicable in-zone or on the high seas, could be
modified to take into account the considerations listed in Article 7. This is important in the context of
adaptive fisheries management as it recognizes that management measures should be adaptive rather than
static, and thus capable of responding to changes in stock status, fishing conditions or governance
structures. 257

3.4.2 Dispute Resolution - the last resort

UNFSA negotiators were mindful that agreement on compatibility may not always occur (or endure), and
therefore incorporated provisions for the settlement of disputes within Article 7. On this issue, however,
UNFSA refers back to Article 297 paragraph 3(a) of UNCLOS, which does not oblige coastal States to
256
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accept measures derived from the dispute settlement process relating to their sovereign rights with respect
to living marine resources in their EEZs. Thus, the potential for the compulsory settlement of disputes
regarding compatible measures with respect to coastal State EEZ management is limited. 258 As coastal
States would not be obligated to accept a court’s ruling on compatible measures as they apply to waters
under national jurisdiction, other avenues would be need to be pursued, such as public information
campaigns that look to sway public opinion. In this respect, it is important to note that all parties to
UNFSA have a duty to cooperate, and failure to do so could be viewed as an abdication of responsibility.

3.5 Pathways towards achieving compatibility

In prescribing the Principle of Compatibility, as well as the basic elements to consider when developing
compatible measures, UNSFA anticipates two States working together directly (or regionally within a
RFMO). 259 Orebach et al. (1998) suggest that a RFMO could take two basic approaches to developing
compatible measures – bottom up or top down. 260A bottom up approach is where a RFMO accepts the
autonomy of a coastal State to establish management measures for its EEZ, which the RFMO is then
obliged to consider when developing compatible measures.261 With a top down approach, the RFMO has
the responsibility to develop compatible measures and authority to set quotas and other management
measures throughout the entirety of the stock, both within national waters and on the high seas. 262

Orebach et al. (1998) argue that with the bottom-up approach, only States fishing on the high seas would
have an obligation to establish compatible measures, resulting in potential conservation and management
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inequity (and thus a process that is destined to fail from the outset). 263 However, the authors note that
coastal States would still have other conservation burdens associated with their rights and obligations for
waters under their national jurisdiction, such as ensuring that stocks are not overexploited, as well as the
responsibility of implementing the precautionary approach. Conversely, Orebach et al. (1998) argue that
with a top down approach, a RFMO could emphasize ecological integrity, integrative and holistic
management, as well as supranational authority. 264 High seas fishing nations would likely lend support for
a top-down approach, as they would have enhanced bargaining power within the decision-making area
that includes EEZs. 265 It is further argued that negotiations are better facilitated where there are packages
and trade-offs, as this allows for more options to be considered. Indeed, under a top-down approach all
States could bring potential trade-offs to the negotiating table.266 In reality, however, the main drawback
to a top down approach is the need for States participating in RFMOs to acquiesce to the process and
forfeit their sovereign EEZ rights to the RFMO, something which is unlikely to ever occur.

3.6 Parallels to International Water Management

Like tuna, water can be considered a common resource for public good and/or a private good. 267
Moreover, neither tuna nor water follow political boundaries, but are rather influenced by natural forces.
As such, there are similarities in the international management of water and tuna, including in the areas of
conflict and cooperation. 268 Within international water management law, the following principles have
been identified: 1) equitable utilization; 2) preventing significant harm to other States; 3) data sharing;
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and 4) cooperative management. 269 These principles are very similar to the common principles of
international fisheries management and representative of international standards that exist for the
cooperative management of shared resources. 270

3.7 Chapter Conclusion

UNCLOS has provided certain rights and obligations to coastal States for the management and utilization
of fishery resources when they occur within national waters. UNCLOS has also provided all States with
the right to fish on the high seas, subject to the rights, duties and interests of coastal States. Although
UNCLOS mandates that coastal and high seas fishing States are to cooperate on the management of
straddling stocks and highly migratory species, it lacks precision on how best to accomplish this
important task. The ambiguity found in UNCLOS resulted in what was described as a global fishing crisis
in the late 1980s/early 1990s, with fisheries operating on the high seas being largely unregulated. The
UNFSA conference met to resolve the crisis, and what emerged was the Principle. The Principle, and to a
greater extent UNFSA, was negotiated so as not to prejudice States’ existing rights and obligations under
UNCLOS.

The Principle was elucidated within Article 7 and includes several considerations to take into account
when developing compatible measures. In establishing compatible measures for the high seas, for
example, States are to take into account measures that apply to the same stocks within the national waters
of coastal States. Furthermore, high seas measures are not to undermine the effectiveness of the measures
in place within national waters. When developing compatible measures for waters under national
jurisdiction, coastal States are to take into account measures in place for the high seas that have been
agreed to by relevant coastal States and States fishing on the high seas. However, UNFSA does not
269
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provide a reciprocal obligation – that is, there is no provision prohibiting coastal State measures from
undermining the effectiveness of high seas measures. This difference has led some commentators to argue
that UNFSA provides a slight tilt in favor coastal States. Even so, other academics have described the
difference as immaterial, asserting that UNFSA achieves an overall balance between the rights and
obligations of the States involved.

Article 7 of UNFSA lists additional considerations to take into account when developing compatible
measures. They include: 1) the biological unity of the stocks concerned, as well as the relationships
between the distribution of the stocks, fisheries and the geographic considerations of the particular region;
2) the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing on the high seas on the stocks
concerned; and 3) the need to ensure that compatible measures do not harmfully impact the marine
resources as a whole. Unfortunately, UNFSA does not provide further details or definitions on the
considerations listed above, a situation which allows for differing interpretations and variability in the
application of the provisions.

Understanding that disputes are likely arise over the development of compatible measures, or in
circumstances where no such measures have been developed, UNFSA lays out a dispute resolution
procedure consistent with UNCLOS. Importantly, however, any result from a dispute settlement
procedure has no application to living marine resources found within the national waters of coastal States.
Notwithstanding this situation, States have a duty to cooperate and to “make every effort” to agree on
compatible measures within a reasonable period of time. While UNFSA sets up the basic framework to
apply the Principle, the detailed work of developing compatible measures lies with the relevant RFMO.
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Chapter 4: Description of the World’s Largest Tuna Fishery:
oceanography, major tuna stocks, catch, and fishing capacity
Tuna has been an important source of protein for Pacific Islanders for several millennia, and with the
advent of industrial-scale tuna fishing, only recently has the status of tuna become a food-security issue
for the inhabitants of this region. 271 Industrial-scale tuna fishing in the WCPO began with pole and line
vessels in the first half of the 20th century, and re-emerged after World War II in the 1950s through the
development of pole and line and longline fishing gears. 272 In the early 1980s, purse seine fishing was
introduced to the WCPO, and since that time, there has been a rapid increase in the number of purse seine
vessels operating in the WCPO, coupled with a rapid increase in associated tuna catches. The WCPO
catch of skipjack, yellowfin, albacore and bigeye tuna represent nearly 60% of the global tuna catch, and
80% of the tuna being harvested in the Pacific Ocean.273 This chapter will describe the main target tuna
stocks in the WCPO and the fisheries that target them, which collectively represent the world’s largest
tuna fishery. The discussion will also examine Pacific bluefin tuna, which due to its extremely depleted
population is of significant concern.

4.1 The Western and Central Pacific Ocean

4.1.1 Boundaries
The Pacific Ocean is made up of geopolitical and oceanographic boundaries. With regard to HMS
fisheries management, the Pacific Ocean is divided into two large areas: the Western and Central Pacific
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Ocean, and the Eastern Pacific Ocean. The longitudinal line separating the WCPO from the EPO is
typically delineated at 150º W. Between the WCPFC and IATTC, however, there is an area of overlap,
such that the WCP-CA encompasses waters east of 150º W to include French Polynesia (see Figure 2). 274

WCPFC

IATTC

Figure 2: Map showing the areas of responsibility for the WCPFC and IATTC and shared
jurisdiction
Source: Brouwer et al. 2015
Note: red lines delineate WCPO and EPO.
4.1.2 Oceanography

Although the separation between the WCPO and EPO is largely political, there are oceanographic
differences. For example, the thermocline is much shallower (~50 m) in the EPO, whereas in the WCPO,
it progressively deepens towards the west (~150 m). 275 During El Niño, which involves the eastward
movement of warmer surface water, the thermocline deepens in the central and eastern Pacific, while
274

As indicated in Figure 2, there is an overlap area shared between the WCPFC and IATTC. When providing catch
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area.
275
The thermocline is a band in the water column where water temperatures significantly differ from the surface
layer, forming a temperature gradient which inhibits mixing with the surface layer.
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rising in the western Pacific. Conversely, during La Niña, the warm pool stays in the westernmost portion
of the WCPO, resulting in a deeper thermocline in the EPO. El Niño and La Niña oceanographic
conditions cause fluctuations in the distribution of Pacific tuna fisheries and associated catches.276

Major ocean currents move water and transport plankton, fish, heat, momentum, salts, oxygen and carbon
dioxide over large geographic scales. Tuna and other HMS are known to follow areas of current
convergence, where prey items tend to aggregate. 277 Figure 3 shows the major surface currents of the
Pacific Ocean.
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Figure 3: Major Oceanographic Currents of the Pacific Ocean
Source: Tomzack and Godfrey 2003

In the eastern and central Pacific Ocean, a westward-flowing upwelling current exists along the equator
from the coast of South America. This water mass, which is commonly referred to as the ‘cold tongue,’
contains cold, nutrient-rich waters that support high primary production extending to the surface in the
EPO (Figure 4). On the other side, the western equatorial Pacific supports the ‘warm pool’ which is
observed to have low primary production and high sea surface temperatures (SST) – among the warmest
sea temperatures on Earth.
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Figure 4: Map showing WCPO Warm pool - Cold tongue conversion and temperatures 278
Source: Nicol et al. 2014
Skipjack tuna, for example, are believed to follow the convergence zone between the warm pool and cold
tongue, allowing them to remain in waters with relatively high concentrations of prey species. 279 The
largest proportion (approximately 80%) of the tuna catch (mainly skipjack) in the Pacific Ocean is taken
within the warm pool area, primarily by purse seine vessels. In contrast, the catch of longline vessels is
more widely distributed over the tropical and sub-equatorial areas of the Pacific Ocean. 280

El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) has been found to have profound effects on tuna distribution. 281 For
example, during ENSO events, the equatorial warm pool in the WCPO moves east, shifting the
boundaries of the equatorial warm pool/cold tongue convergence zone as far as 4,000 km east. 282 Skipjack
tuna follow the eastward shift of the warm pool during El Nino. Catch rates for skipjack in the central
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equatorial Pacific have shown a strong correlation to the eastern movement of the warm pool during El
Nino. 283

4.1.3 Tuna Stocks

Tuna are found in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans and are harvested commercially on a large scale
for various types of seafood markets. Tuna, along with mackerel and bonito, comprise the Scombidae
family. 284 Fish species are often categorized into separate stocks of larger populations. Stocks are
groupings of fish that are assumed to be homogenous for management purposes, and where intrinsic
factors such as growth, recruitment, natural mortality and fishing mortality can affect population
dynamics. 285 Understanding stock structure, stock abundance, as well as the uncertainty associated with
these factors, is critical for effective fisheries management. 286

4.1.3.1 Skipjack Tuna

Skipjack tuna (Katusownis pelamis) is found in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. With a combined
catch of over 2.5 million tons per annum, skipjack tuna represents nearly 60% of global tuna landings. 287
Skipjack is a highly productive tuna species with levels of biomass exceeding those of all other tuna
stocks combined in the WCPO. 288 Within the Pacific, skipjack subpopulation structure is believed to
exist; however, distinctions between areas are not well defined. For this reason, skipjack are believed to
make up a single population in the Pacific, but the chances of two fish breeding are inversely proportional
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to the distance separating them. 289 For stock assessment and management purposes, skipjack is assessed
separately in the WCPO and EPO, with a stock delineation defined generally at 150°W longitude. 290

Skipjack prefer warm waters of the mixed surface layer, and can be found in ocean waters with
temperatures above 15° C and distributed between 45ºN and 45ºS in the Western Pacific and between 30º
N and 30º S in the Eastern Pacific. 291 However, other oceanographic features and biological
characteristics also affect skipjack distribution. 292 Skipjack move between the surface layer and the
thermocline during the day, while generally remaining within 75 m of the surface at night. 293 Skipjack
lack a swim bladder and must thus maintain constant forward motion to achieve hydrodynamic lift and
respiration. This likely explains why they have the highest proportion of deep red muscle tissue in
comparison to other tunas. 294

Skipjack maturation and first spawning is estimated to occur at approximately 40 cm or one year of age,
based on growth estimates.295 Skipjack spawn year-round in tropical waters and seasonally in sub-tropical
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areas when temperatures are optimal, typically in spring and fall months.296 In the Pacific, the highest
concentration of skipjack larvae is found between 5º N and 5º S and from 160° E to 140° W. Even so,
skipjack larvae can be found as far north as 35° N off Japan and as far south as 37° S of Australia. 297
Skipjack larvae have also been found in relatively high concentrations near coral reefs in French
Polynesian islands, suggesting that productive waters around oceanic islands and reefs provide habitat for
larval development.298

Relatively little is known about the juvenile phase of skipjack. This is due to a lack of samples appearing
in plankton tows, and because juveniles are too small to be captured in the major fisheries.299 Most of the
small juvenile skipjack which have been collected derive from stomach content analysis of larger tunas
and billfish, indicating that skipjack are forage prey for predators at higher trophic levels.300 Juvenile
abundance in the Pacific has been found to be greatest during October-March between the equator and
25°S in two broad geographical areas - eastern Polynesia (130°-150°W), and in the area adjacent to Papua
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (140°-170°E). 301

Overall, skipjack abundance is highest in the equatorial regions, with horizontal movements
corresponding to preferred habitat and prey availability. Tag and recapture studies in the Pacific have
indicated that skipjack are not as highly migratory of other marine species (e.g., billfish) that fall in the
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same category. 302 Although an individual fish may move large distances (i.e., over 1,000 nm), such
occurrence is the exception rather than the rule, and most skipjack do not migrate more than 500 nm, with
approximately 50% migrating less than 500 nm in their lifetime. 303 This has implications for the domestic,
sub-regional and international management of skipjack, with domestic (EEZ-based) and sub-regional
(adjacent EEZs) conservation and management measures being vitally important for skipjack fishery
sustainability. 304

Figure 5: Movements of tagged and recaptured skipjack tuna
Source: McKechnie et al. 2016
El Nino affects skipjack distribution, both in the WCPO and EPO. During El Nino events, skipjack are
believed to follow the eastward movement of the warm pool towards the central and eastern Pacific
Ocean. 305 The eastward movement of skipjack during El Nino can range up to 4,000 km, impacting
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fisheries across substantial distances in terms of catch rates within short periods of time. 306 While it is
recognized that domestic and sub-regional measures are important for skipjack management, the
substantial movement of skipjack during El Nino events also exemplifies the need for compatible
management measures across large swaths of the Pacific Ocean.

Human-induced climate change will likely lead to future changes in the marine environment, which in
turn is expected to affect the geographical distribution of skipjack tuna, as well as their migration,
physiological rates (growth, reproduction), and ultimately skipjack abundance and catchability in various
fisheries. 307 For example, climate modeling indicates that increased temperature stratification from a rise
in sea surface temperature will degrade preferred skipjack habitat in equatorial surface waters, resulting in
a considerable decrease of population abundance toward the end of the century. 308 This potential
occurrence also suggests that future spatial changes in skipjack abundance as a result of climate change
are an important consideration in the compatibility of management measures.

4.1.3.1.1 Fisheries

Skipjack catches dominate tuna landings in the WCPO in terms of individual numbers, tonnage and value.
With respect to the weight of the catch, skipjack landings are nearly double the combined amount of
yellowfin, albacore and bigeye tuna landings (Figures 6 and 7).
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Figure 6: Catch of skipjack, yellowfin, albacore and bigeye tuna in the WCPO
Source: Williams et al. 2017

(a)

(b)

Figure 7: Catch value (a) and percentage of total value (b) of WCPO skipjack, yellowfin, albacore
and bigeye tuna landings
Source: Williams et al. 2017
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Historically, bait boats (pole-and-line) were the main gear used to catch skipjack tuna. However, since the
1950s, purse seiners have dominated the fishery in the EPO, with a similar trend occurring in the WCPO
since the early 1980s. 309 Some skipjack tuna are also caught incidentally by longliners on much lower
levels, as well as by handline and trolling methods (Figure 8). 310

Figure 8: WCPO catch of skipjack tuna by gear
Source: Williams et al. 2017

Most of the catch of skipjack occurs within tropical waters between 10° N and 10° S of the equator
(Figure 9).
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Figure 9: Distribution of skipjack catch in the Pacific Ocean by gear, 2006-2015
Source: McKechnie et al. 2016
Note: purse seine (blue), pole and line (red), longline (green), other (yellow). Boxed areas represent the
WCPO stock assessment sub-regions.

4.1.3.1.2 WCPO Stock Status

While catches of skipjack have increased nearly every year since 1980, WCPO stock assessments have
found that skipjack is neither overfished nor experiencing overfishing with regard to fishing mortality and
biomass levels (Figure 10). 311
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(a)

(b)

Figure 10: Majuro Plot (a) and Kobe Plot (b) for skipjack tuna in the WCPO
Source: McKechnie et al. 2016
4.1.3.2 Yellowfin Tuna

Yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) is found in tropical waters of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
Yellowfin is considered a ‘tropical’ tuna, as distinguished from ‘cold-water’ tuna such as bluefin,
albacore, and to some extent bigeye tuna. 312 Within the Pacific, yellowfin tuna are found widely from
around 35° N – 33° S in the EPO, and from 40° N - 35° S in the WCPO, and within the temperature band
of 18°C and 31°C (Figure 11). Sea surface temperatures play a primary role in the horizontal and vertical
distribution of yellowfin, particularly at higher latitudes. 313 Yellowfin in the WCPO and EPO yellowfin
stocks are assessed separately and managed by the WCPFC and IATTC respectively.
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Figure 11: Yellowfin tuna movement over 1,000 nm based on tagging studies
Source: Tremblay-Boyer et al. 2017
Feeding is opportunistic at all life stages, with prey items consisting of crustaceans, cephalopods and
fish. 314 Growth is considered very rapid, with individuals reaching approximately 55 cm in fork length
(FL) at the age of one, and over 90 cm at the age of two. 315 Yellowfin tuna are not considered long-lived
in comparison to bluefin tunas or albacore, with a maximum age believed to be around 6 - 7 years.
Yellowfin are considered to mature very quickly at around two years of age, with some regional
variability. 316 The size of yellowfin at 50% maturity is estimated to be approximately 110-120 cm. 317
Yellowfin prefer water temperatures above 24°C to spawn, which are not uncommon in the equatorial and
sub-tropical zones of the Pacific.
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4.1.3.2.1 Fisheries

Yellowfin is second to skipjack in terms of catch within the WCPO, with the highest catch recorded at
over 600,000 mt in 2016. Purse seine, longline, pole and line, troll, and handline methods are used to
catch yellowfin (Figure 12). Catches are dispersed in both the equatorial and sub-tropical regions, but like
skipjack, most of the catch occurs in the equatorial region of the WCPO. Significant amounts of yellowfin
are caught in the national waters of Indonesia and Philippines by mostly artisanal fishing gears (Figure
13).

Figure 12: Catch of yellowfin tuna in the WCPO by fishing gear
Source: Williams et al. 2017
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Figure 13: Location of yellowfin catch in the Pacific, 2006-2015
Source: Tremblay-Boyer et al. 2017
Note: Fishing gears: longline (green), pole-and-line (red), purse seine (blue) and miscellaneous (yellow).

4.1.3.2.2 WCPO Stock Status
Yellowfin in the WCPO is not overfished or experiencing overfishing; however, it is understood that the
biomass of yellowfin has been continuously declining since the 1960s (Figure 14). 318 Based on current
estimates, WCPO yellowfin spawning biomass is around 33% of unfished biomass levels. 319

(a)

(b)

Figure 14: Majuro plot (a) and Kobe plot (b) of WCPO yellowfin tuna stock status
Source: Tremblay-Boyer et al. 2017
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4.1.3.3 Albacore

Albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga) is a sub-tropical tuna species found in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian
Oceans, with six genetically different stocks globally. 320 In the Pacific, there are separate northern and
southern stocks, each with differing growth rates, spawning areas and migration patterns.321 In the North
Pacific, there is believed to be only two sub-stocks, 322 while in the eastern equatorial Pacific, albacore is
considered to be absent. 323

North Pacific Albacore are mainly centered around 35º N, but range between 10° N and 50º N. 324 South
Pacific Albacore are distributed in the central South Pacific between 10º S and 30ºS and 150º E to 120º
W, but can also be found as far as 50ºS. Although albacore can be found at the surface and at deeper
depths, the most important factor in determining albacore distribution is temperature.325 Sea surface
temperatures between 10º C and 20ºC provide the general boundaries for albacore; however, deepswimming albacore can be found in waters up to 25ºC.326

Oceanic features such as thermal fronts are believed to be important habitat areas for albacore, including
the Kuroshio Front east of Japan and North Pacific Transition Zone.327 Albacore undertake complex
migration patterns, and depending on age may make different migrations. For example, in any given year,
one year class of North Pacific Albacore is believed to migrate east to west and then east again in a band
320
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between 30ºN and 45ºN. This class of albacore leave the northeast Pacific in September-October,
reaching waters off Japan the following summer, before returning to the east in the summer of the
following year. After a period of four-to six years (the time it takes to reach maturity), North Pacific
adults enter sub-tropical waters south of 30º N to spawn. 328

Concentrations of albacore larvae have been found off coral reefs in French Polynesia and Hawaii, which
suggests that spawning may occur close to islands. 329 Small juvenile albacore (12mm to 300 mm in
length) have been found in Western Pacific coastal waters including the Mariana Islands, Japan, Fiji, the
coast of east Australia, Hawaii and Tuvalu. 330 As juvenile fish mature up to the age of five, they prefer
cooler waters, and then enter the tropics as adults. 331

In the North Pacific, female albacore tuna reach maturity by about 90 cm, while males are believed to
reach maturity later at approximately 97 cm. 332 In the South Pacific, mature females are generally found
to be greater than 80 cm. 333 South Pacific albacore exhibit sexual size dimorphism, with males being
larger than females after about 85 cm in length.334 The maximum life span for albacore is up to 15
years. 335
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South Pacific albacore spawn in the tropical and sub-tropical waters in the South Pacific between 10°S
and 25°S. 336 Juveniles appear about one year later at a size of 45−50 cm in the vicinity of the sub-tropical
convergence zone (STCZ, at about 40°S) in the central Pacific. 337 Catch rates of South Pacific albacore in
subequatorial waters peak during December–January and May–July, indicating that albacore migrate
south during early summer, and north during winter. As a result of different movement patterns
commensurate with life stage, there is a latitudinal gradient in size distribution, with predominately small
fish (<80 cm) at latitudes south of 35°S, and large fish (>80 cm) at latitudes north 30°S. 338

4.1.3.3.1 Fisheries

The availability of juvenile populations closer to the surface, and adults at deeper depths, results in
different types of fishing gear being used to target albacore at particular life stages. Currently, most North
Pacific albacore is caught using troll gear, whereas longline fishing gear catches the most albacore in the
South Pacific (Figures 15 and 16). In the 1980’s, there were substantial drift gillnet fisheries in the South
Pacific conducted by Taiwanese and Japanese vessels. 339 However, drift gillnet fisheries were banned on
the high seas after the 1989 UN General Assembly Resolution called for a moratorium on this type of
fishing gear. 340
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Albacore are widely dispersed throughout the Pacific and caught at both relatively low and high latitudes.
For example, surface troll and jig vessels target juvenile in temperate waters, whereas longline gear is
used to target adults in tropical and subtropical waters (Figure 17). 341 The major fish surface fisheries
occur off the West Coast of North America (troll), south of Japan (poll and line), New Zealand (troll and
poll and line), and in the northwest and south Pacific, with longline gear being used to capture deepswimming fish (Figure 17).

Figure 15: Catch of North Pacific albacore by gear, 1952-2016
Source: ISC 2017
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Figure 16: Catch of South Pacific albacore in the WCPO by gear, 1972-2016
Source: Williams et al. 2017

Figure 17: Catch distribution of South Pacific albacore, 1988-2016
Source: Williams et al. 2017

109

Figure 18: Size distribution of South Pacific albacore catch, 2014-2016
Source: Williams et al. 2017
Note: Green (longline) and orange (troll).
4.1.3.3.2 Stock status

As of the date of this thesis, the most recent stock assessment for North Pacific Albacore was conducted
in 2017. After reviewing the stock assessment, the WCPFC Scientific Committee concluded that the stock
was not in an overfished condition. 342 The Scientific Committee also noted that although no fishing
mortality reference points have been established for this stock, recent levels of fishing mortality were

342

WCPFC SC13 (2017) at 75.
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below six of the seven reference points evaluated.343 Overall, North Pacific Albacore is believed to be in a
reasonably healthy condition (Figure 19).

Figure 19 Kobe plot indicating stock status of North Pacific albacore
Source: ISC 2017
Note: Blue triangle represents start time for the series (1993)

South Pacific albacore is not believed to be overfished or experiencing overfishing (Figure 20). However,
there has been concern for several years that adult biomass - the age class most vulnerable to longline
fishing - has been declining and negatively impacting longline catch rates. The WCPFC SC has
recommended that longline fishing mortality be reduced to avoid further declines, and to ensure that
economically viable catch rates can be maintained.344
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WCPFC SC13 (2017) at 71.

111

Figure 20: Majuro plot of South Pacific albacore
Source: Harley et al. 2015
4.1.3.4 Bigeye tuna

Bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) is a large pelagic species that occurs throughout the tropical and
subtropical waters of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 345 Bigeye are considered highly adept
predators and occupy the higher trophic levels of the pelagic food web. 346 Although genetic analysis has
failed to reveal population subdivision within the Pacific, there is evidence from tagging studies of bigeye
movement in excess of 4,000 nm, which lends support for Pacific bigeye being considered a single
stock. 347 However, most recaptured tagged bigeye have been caught much closer to their areas of release
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– a finding which supports the inclusion of spatial structure into stock assessments. 348 Tagging studies
have also shown that bigeye exhibit latitudinally-constrained movement between 10°N and 10°S, and a
general eastward longitudinal dispersion pattern, particularly from fish tagged around 170°W. 349 It is
generally believed that there is considerable mixing of bigeye tuna between the central equatorial regions
of the WCPFC and IATTC Convention Areas (Figure 21). 350 Even so, bigeye are assessed and managed
separately by the WCPFC and IATTC.

Figure 21: Map of bigeye movement from equatorial tagging studies
Source: Schaefer et al. 2016
Note: black dots represent release locations; red dots are recapture locations of fish released in western
region; green dots are recaptures of fish released in central region; blue dots are recaptures of fish
released in eastern region.

Bigeye are fast growing and are believed to reach maturity between 80 cm and 120 cm (approximately 34 years old). 351 Many bigeye live in excess of 8 years, reaching a maximum length of around 200 cm. 352
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Bigeye spawn across the Pacific Ocean from between 15° N and 15° S in areas of the WCPO where sea
surface temperatures are above 24°C. However, data collected from the Eastern Pacific Ocean suggests
little spawning in waters below 28°C. Generally, bigeye spawn year around, with peak spawning
occurring between February and September, and at a frequency of every 1-3 days. 353

4.1.3.4.1 Fisheries

Although bigeye are caught in lesser numbers compared to other tuna stocks, their harvests hold high
commercial value, ranking behind skipjack and yellowfin in terms of total landed value in the Pacific.
Bigeye are principally targeted by longline vessels fishing between 40º N and 40º S, but can be
incidentally caught by purse seine vessels fishing between 10º N and 10º S when using fish aggregation
devices (FADs). Bigeye can also be caught by pole and line and handline fisheries. 354 The annual Pacificwide catch of bigeye for the last decade has been around 250,000 mt, with around 60% coming from the
WCPO. Around 150,000 mt of bigeye have been harvested annually in the WCPO over the last 10 years
(Figure 22).
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Figure 22: Catch of bigeye in the WCPO, 1960-2016
Source: Williams et al. 2017
Like skipjack and yellowfin, most of the bigeye catch is taken in the equatorial region, but catches are
also dispersed in higher latitude regions of the North Pacific (Figure 23). The composition of the bigeye
catch is also similar to that of skipjack and yellowfin, with mostly small, juvenile fish being caught in
purses seine and fisheries in Indonesia and Philippines and larger fish caught in longline fisheries (Figure
24).

Figure 23: Distribution of bigeye catches in the Pacific Ocean, 1990-2016
Source: Williams et al. 2017
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Figure 24: Number of individual bigeye caught by fishing gear, 2014-2016
Source: Williams et al. 2017
Note: Indonesia/Philippines fisheries in archipelagic waters (yellow); purse seine (blue); longline (green).

4.1.3.4.2 Stock Status

Due to the political bifurcation of the Pacific Ocean, with the WCPFC and IATTC being responsible for
different management jurisdictions, the stock status of bigeye must be assessed separately. Bigeye in the
WCPO was thought to have been experiencing overfishing since the early 2000s, and overfished since
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2013 with respect to the WCPFC-established spawning biomass limit reference point.. 355 As explored in
Chapter 6, the poor stock status of bigeye in the WCPO resulted in the implementation of international
management measures over several years – measures which sought to address bigeye overfishing and
reverse declines in spawning biomass. However, the 2017 WCPO stock assessment yielded different
results. Not only did this most recent stock assessment consider overfishing to no longer be occurring, it
also revealed that spawning stock biomass is no longer below the WCPFC limit reference point (Figure
25). 356 Such positive changes in stock status are believed to be related to a new WCPO bigeye growth
curve, changes to the boundaries of the stock assessment sub-regions, as well as improved catch per unit
effort (CPUE) trends. 357

Figure 25: Majuro plot indicating WCPO bigeye stock status
Source: McKechnie et al. 2017
Note: Plot provides stock status using growth estimates used in the 2014 assessment and the new growth
estimates derived from Farley et al. 2017.
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In the EPO, bigeye is also not overfished or experiencing overfishing (Figure 26). 358 It is important to
note, however, that the stock assessment methods used in the WCPO and EPO are different. 359

Figure 26: “Kobe” plot indicating bigeye status in the EPO
Source: Aires-da Silva et al. 2017

4.1.3.5 Pacific Bluefin Tuna
Pacific bluefin tuna (Thunnus orientalis) is found mostly in the North Pacific Ocean between 20° N and
50° N, but there are accounts of this species occurring in the western South Pacific as well. Pacific bluefin
is genetically distinguished from other bluefin species such as Southern bluefin and Atlantic bluefin;
however, like other bluefin species, Pacific bluefin are large and long-lived. 360 Pacific bluefin generally
reach maturity after 5 years and can live past 20 years, reaching lengths greater than 300 cm. 361
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Spawning of Pacific bluefin is known to occur only in the northwestern Pacific Ocean, with a portion of
each cohort between the ages of 1-3 conducting trans-Pacific migrations to waters off the west coast of
North America (Figure 27). 362 The individual fish spend several years in the EPO before returning to the
western Pacific to spawn, remaining in these waters until death. 363

Figure 27: Map showing Pacific bluefin distribution and spawning areas
Source: http://isc.fra.go.jp/working_groups/pacific_bluefin_tuna.html

4.1.3.5.1 Fisheries

Pacific bluefin are caught by a variety of fishing gear including purse seine (the major gear type),
longline, troll, handline and fixed traps. The historical annual catch of Pacific bluefin has fluctuated
between 10,000 and 40,000 mt, with the most recent five-year average being around 23,000 mt (Figure
28). 364 Since the early 1990s, bluefin have been caught in purse seines and transferred to enclosed
offshore pens, where they are grown-out and sold. This practice is called “tuna ranching,” and is
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conducted in the waters of Japan and Mexico. 365 In Japan, offshore aquaculture of Pacific bluefin also
involves fish that are farm-hatched and raised from eggs to adults – a practice referred to as “closed-loop
cycle” aquaculture. 366 Most of the catch is caught by Japan followed by Mexico (Figure 29).

Figure 28: Annual catches of Pacific bluefin by gear, 1952-2014
Source: ISC 2016

Figure 29: Annual catches of Pacific bluefin by country, 1952-2014
Source: ISC 2016
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4.1.3.5.2 Stock Status

Compared to other tuna stocks, Pacific bluefin is the most heavily depleted. The proportion of current
spawning biomass compared to that of unfished biomass is estimated at 2.6%, with substantial decline in
spawning biomass beginning in the 1960s and again in the mid-1990s (Figure 30).

Figure 30: Pacific bluefin spawning biomass, 1959-2014
Source: ISC 2016

A major concern related to stock health is that a large proportion of the Pacific bluefin catch is comprised
of juveniles which have not had an opportunity to spawn. In fact, most of the catch is made up of
individuals with 0 year age-class (Figure 31). Although no limit reference points have been established
for Pacific bluefin, existing fishing mortality and biomass levels exceed most biological reference points,
and thus the stock can generally be considered overfished or to be experiencing overfishing (Figure
33). 367

367

ISC 2016.

121

Figure 31: Catch at age for Pacific bluefin
Source: ISC 2016

Figure 32: Stock status Pacific bluefin tuna in Kobe Plot
Source: ISC 2016

4.2 Fishing Capacity

Fishing capacity generally refers to the capability of catching fish, and has been defined by the FAO as
“the amount of fish (or fishing effort) that can be produced over a period of time (e.g., a year) by a vessel
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or a fleet if fully utilized.” 368 Overcapacity in a fishery should be avoided, otherwise it will result in
wasteful fisheries, reduced economic rent, as well as diminished economic viability of the fishing industry
as a whole. 369 Unfortunately, overcapacity is affecting many of the world’s fisheries. 370 Greboval and
Munro (1999) have estimated that in the 30 years prior to their study, the world’s fleet of active fishing
vessels increased several times faster than the growth in world catches.371 Excess fishing capacity is
believed to exist in the major industrial-scale tuna fisheries in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans,
perpetrated primarily by purse seine and longline vessels.372 Globally, the United Nations FAO has been
examining issues associated with overcapacity in the world’s tuna fisheries, concluding that options to
address this excess capacity are urgently needed.373 As a result of ecological and economic impacts
arising from overcapacity, coastal States which are fisheries-dependent stand to face significant social
impacts from depleted resources, including food security issues.374

It is widely accepted that overcapacity is a primary threat to the long-term sustainability of fishery
resources. 375 Fisheries can become overcapitalized for multiple reasons, including: 1) open access
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participation; 376 2) common-pool fisheries that are managed non-cooperatively; 377 3) sole-ownership
fisheries with high discount rates and/or high price-to-cost ratios; 378 4) the replacement of small-scale
fishing vessels with larger ones; 379 and 5) the payment of subsidies by governments to fishery
participants. 380

From a technical fisheries management perspective, there are numerous FAO reports and publications on
fishing capacity that are both informative and comprehensive.381 However, it is often the case that
fisheries scientists, managers and economists have differing views (e.g., inputs vs. outputs) on how to
measure and express fishing capacity. 382 For example, fisheries scientists tend to conceptualize capacity
in terms of fishing effort (input perspective) and its resultant impact on fishing mortality. Fishery
managers often think of fishing capacity in terms of the number of vessels (input perspective), whereas
economists tend to consider capacity as the potential production (output perspective) of a vessel at various

376

Gordon, H. S. (1954). The economic theory of a common property resource: the fishery. Journal of Political
Economics, 62, 124-142.
377
Munro, G. (1979). The optimal management of transboundary renewable resources. Canadian Journal of
Economics, 12, 355-376.
378
Sumaila, U. R. (1979). Cooperative and non-cooperative exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock in
the Barents Sea. Environmental and Resource Economics, 10, 147-165.
379
Sumaila, U. R., & Bawumia, M. (2000). Ecosystem justice and the marketplace. In Coward, H.,
Ommer, R. & Pitcher, T. J. (Eds.).Fish Ethics: Justice in the Canadian Fisheries (pp. 140-153). Institute of Social
and Economic Research, Memorial University, St John’s, Newfoundland.
380
Hatcher, A., & Robinson, K. (1999). Overcapacity, overcapitalization and subsidies in European Fisheries. In
Proceedings of the first Concerted Action Workshop on Economics and the Common Fisheries Policy. Portsmouth,
United Kingdom: CEMARE Miscellaneous Publication. No. 44.
381
There are numerous FAO reports and publications on fishery capacity that are both informative and
comprehensive. The FAO also focused on tuna fishing capacity in a project called the “Management of tuna fishing
capacity: conservation and socio-economics”. For further reading, see: FAO. (1998). Report of the FAO Technical
Working Group on the Management of Fishing Capacity. FAO Fisheries Report. No. 586. 15-18 April 1998.La
Jolla, United States. -- FAO. (2002). Report of the expert consultation on catalyzing the transition away from
overcapacity in marine capture fisheries. Metzer, R., & Ward, J.M. (comps). FAO Fisheries Report. No. 691. Rome,
FAO. 89. – Pascoe, S., Kirkley, J.E., Greboval D., & Morrison-Paul, C.J. (2003). Measuring and assessing capacity
in fishereies.2. Issues and methods. FAO Technical Paper. No.433/2. Rome, FAO. -- FAO. (2004). Measuring and
appraising capacity in fisheries: framework, analytical tools, and data aggregation. FAO Fisheries Circular No.
994. Rome. -- Bayliff, W.H., de Leiva Moreno, J.I. & J. Majikowski, (Eds.). (2004). Second meeting of the
Technical Advisory Committee on the Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity: conservation and socio-economics.
15-18 March 2004. Madrid, Spain. -- Bayliff, W. H., & Majkowski, J. (Eds.). (2007). Methodological Workshop on
the Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity: Stock Status, Data Envelopment Analysis, Industry Surveys and
Management Options (Vol. 8). Food & Agriculture Organization. Rome.
382
FAO (2002) at 53.

124

utilization levels. As different disciplines have formulated different concepts of fishing capacity,
addressing the issue can be a complex endeavor. 383

Excess Capacity vs. Overcapacity

Excess capacity can be described as the difference between fishing capacity and actual harvest.384 Indeed,
this problem is usually short-run, 385 and can vary annually depending upon target stock status and a
broader set of environmental, social and economic variables affecting the operation of the fishery. 386 For
example, a fishery could experience excess capacity in one year due to stock fluctuation or market
conditions, but in the next year be fully utilized.

On the other hand, overcapacity refers to excessive levels of fishing capacity and is a longer-term
phenomenon. Overcapacity occurs when the potential output that could exist under normal operating
conditions is greater than the target level of production.387 A fundamental concept when dealing with
issues of overcapacity is target capacity, which can be described as either the level of input or output
required to meet management objectives.388 For example, if the management objective is to achieve a
harvest level (output) associated with MSY, then the number of vessels operating at full utilization to
achieve MSY would be the corresponding input target. The same is true if the management objective is to
achieve Maximum Economic Yield (MEY). In this situation, there would be a corresponding number of
vessels to achieve MEY.
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It is believed that excess capacity could be eliminated simply by fishermen changing their production
levels in response to market conditions. Eliminating overcapacity, on the other hand, would require a
change in the management regime of the particular fishery. 389 Overcapacity, without effective controls on
the total output of a fishery, often results in overfishing, which is the level of fishing effort on target
stocks above that which supports MSY. Overfishing leading to severe biomass depletion is certainly an
unsustainable use of ocean resources in the long term. 390

In addition, overcapacity can result in unsustainable bycatch levels on associated and dependent stocks
(e.g., non-target stocks), as well as the overuse of essential fish habitats, which in turn impacts stock
conditions. 391 Overcapacity has also been linked to the promotion of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
(IUU) fishing. This is because the greater the number of vessels operating in an area, the less available
fish, resulting in a tendency to engage in IUU fishing to maximize returns.392

From an economic perspective, both excess capacity and overcapacity can impact profit margins due to
operational inefficiency (e.g., gear competition) and leave fishermen vulnerable to resource and economic
shock. 393 When this occurs, the same, if not greater catches, could be taken with less vessels fishing for
the same target stock. A reduced number of vessels would also result in less fixed or capital costs being
incurred unnecessarily. Moreover, if overfishing were eliminated as a result of a reduced number of
vessels, higher catches per unit effort would be realized, allowing for vessel profits to be maximized.
However, without management intervention, fishery participants tend to ‘race to the fish’, resulting in
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bigger, faster, more efficient fishing vessels to capitalize individual returns, further exacerbating the
overcapacity problem. 394

Unfortunately, the ‘less is more’ concept is often lost on the fishing industry (and particularly fishery
managers), as there can be high variation in resource availability coupled with short-term economic
incentives. Furthermore, when addressing capacity issues for transnational and HMS stocks, the ‘playing
field’ is often not ubiquitous for vessels of differing flag nations. For example, some countries have very
few domestic regulations in place compared to others. In addition, government subsidies in the fisheries
sector is widespread. Indeed, this can be destructive practice which generates ‘profits’ even when
resources are overfished. 395

4.2.1 Fishing capacity in the WCPO

A 2005 study by Reid et al. determined that excess fishing capacity existed in the WCPO purse fishery
with respect to all national fleets operating in the investigation area. In particular, the authors concluded
that the level of fishing capacity was between 14 and 35% greater than required to take the available catch
of skipjack, and between 11 and 28% greater than required to take the available catch of yellowfin and
skipjack. 396 For yellowfin and bigeye, the purse seine excess capacity was between 11 and 28% greater
than necessary. 397 The number of purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO has steadily increased since
the early 1970s, with the current number of vessels approaching 300 (Figure 33). 398
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Figure 33: Number of purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO
Source: Williams et al. 2017
Note: Excluding Indonesian/ Philippine and Vietnamese domestic purse seine/ringnet fleets
Capacity levels for the longline fishery in the WCPO are not well understood; however, there are
thousands of longline fishing vessels generally believed to be fishing below their full capacity. 399 In the
WCPO, statistics indicate that the number of longline vessels has decreased from their historically high
levels. Even so there is great uncertainty regarding the degree of longline fishing effort prior 2006. This is
because many longline vessels flagged to DWFNs were authorized by their countries to fish globally and
not just in the WCPO. Over the last 10 years, the active number of longline fishing vessels in the WCPO
is believed to be have reached 3,000 (Figure 34). 400

Figure 34: Number of longline vessels operating in the WCPO
Source: Williams et al. 2017
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4.3 Chapter Conclusion

The WCPO supports the world’s largest tuna fishery, mainly driven by large catches of skipjack and
yellowfin, followed by albacore and bigeye. Tuna in the WCPO are caught by a handful of fishing gears,
with purse seine fishing being the most dominant and accounting for nearly 80% of the total tuna catch.
While the distribution of tuna stocks is wide ranging, tuna are heavily exploited within the WCPO, with
the highest levels of exploitation occurring within equatorial waters. The four main tuna stocks are not
currently overfished or experiencing overfishing. 401 Pacific bluefin, on the other hand, is significantly
depleted, with concerns of stock collapse and even extinction. Fishing capacity is a concern for the
WCPO tuna fishery, with over 300 purse seine vessels and several thousand longline vessels operating in
the region. Excess capacity is believed to exist for the purse seine fishery, with the longline fishery in the
WCPO likely experiencing a similar situation. Such conditions do not generally result in increased
harvests or higher catch rates of target species, but rather poorer economic conditions for vessels and
greater impacts on non-target species.

401

Prior to the most recent stock assessment for WCPO bigeye in 2017, this stock was believed to experiencing
overfishing since the early 2000s.
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Chapter 5: Managing the World’s Largest Tuna Fishery
5.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the current framework for managing the world’s largest tuna fishery, which occurs
in the WCPO. The roles of PICs and DWFNs within this framework are examined. Furthermore, the
responsibilities of regional organizations including the Forum Fisheries Agency, Parties to the Nauru
Agreement, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, will be investigated. Sub-regional agreements such
as the Palau Arrangement, the FSM Arrangement, and the Tokelau Arrangement, which have shaped
regional fisheries outcomes, are also considered. Environmental non-governmental organizations,
academic institutions, and fishing industry groups and their roles are also briefly described.

Following on from these discussions, a review of the Multilateral High Level Conferences (MHLC) is
conducted. Negotiations at the MHLC meetings, which occurred between 1994 and 2000, established the
framework which eventually became the Honolulu Convention. An overview of the provisions of the
Honolulu Convention is provided, and where appropriate, an historical review of MHLC negotiations on
selected topics.

Taken as a whole, this chapter provides an overview of the countries and international agreements which
manage the world’s largest tuna fishery, with an emphasis on the Honolulu Convention, the establishment
of the WCPFC, and linkages to the Principle.

5.2 The Players

5.2.1. Pacific Island Countries

Fishery resources, and in particular tuna stocks, constitute the primary renewable resource for PICs in
their EEZs. Indeed, the dependence on tuna by many PICs as their primary economic commodity is
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unmatched elsewhere in the world.402 These PICs, which for present purposes exclude Australia, New
Zealand, and territories of the United States and France, are found within the Oceania region of the
Pacific. As previously stated, UNCLOS’s codification of the 200 nm EEZ has been touted as the most
significant reallocation of fisheries property rights in the 20th century. 403 For coastal States such as PICs,
the establishment a 200 nm EEZ was incredibly significant, collectively providing them with
approximately 30 million square kilometers of ocean under national jurisdiction.404 In actuality, the
establishment of the 200 nm EEZ provided several PICs with ownership over the ocean that exceeded
their respective landmass by substantial ratios (e.g., Cook Islands sea to land ratio in square kilometers is
7,627). 405 Thus, in the wake of UNCLOS and the recognition of the EEZ, PICs went from small island
countries to large ocean States with custodianship of vast maritime areas and fishery resources.

UNCLOS has provided PICs with sovereign property rights over the fish that occur in their EEZs,
including tuna while they are found there. While tuna forms a significant economic base for many PICs, it
is likely that PICs are yet to fully realize the potential economic benefits that derive from the world’s
largest tuna fishery. 406

Since the formal recognition of EEZs, PICs have generated revenue from selling access rights to DWFNs
to fish in their EEZs. Domestically-based industrial-scale fishing fleets, support industries, as well as
402
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local processing facilities, also provide tuna-related economic revenue to PICs. In total, the revenue
gained from tuna is a significant percentage of the government revenue and gross domestic product
(GDP) of many PICs. 407 For some PICs, it is their only source of non-foreign aid income and the basis for
their future economic development. 408 Therefore, ensuring effective conservation and management of
tuna stocks within areas of national jurisdiction and on the high seas is of critical importance to the longterm economic stability and independence of many PICs.

The EEZs of PICs that produce the most tuna include Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, the FSM and Tuvalu
(Figure 35). It is noteworthy that these countries, which collectively control over 80% of the purse seine
tuna catch and around 60% of the total catch in the WCPO, are all members of the PNA. 409 The two
countries that produce the most tuna out of their national waters are Kiribati and Papua New Guinea, with
Kiribati surpassing PNG’s tuna production in recent years (Figure 36). There are other PICs that are nonPNA members but nonetheless derive significant economic benefits from tuna fishing in their waters,
including from longline fishing. 410 Some of these PICs are situated in the South Pacific and have a strong
interest in South Pacific Albacore, with domestic longline fleets being based in their ports. 411
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Figure 35: Average total tuna catch in national waters of PICs (2013-2015)
Source: SPC data tables; Figure made by author
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Figure 36: Tuna catch in national waters of Kiribati and Papua New Guinea
Source: SPC data tables. Figure made by author
5.2.1.1 The Forum Fisheries Agency

In the 1970s, PICs were following global trends regarding the extension of coastal State jurisdiction and
the need for international cooperation for the conservation and management of HMS stocks. 412 In 1979, a
412

Van Dyke, J., & S. Heftel. (1981). Tuna management in the Pacific: an analysis of the South Pacific Forum
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cooperation on fisheries issues first emerged within the South Pacific Forum in 1976.
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group of ten self-governing Pacific Island nations, including Australia and New Zealand, agreed to a
convention establishing the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). 413 The FFA was formed as a
means for members to coordinate on regional fisheries management issues, with membership only being
offered to nations within the region, excluding the United States, Japan, and other distant water fishing
nations. 414

The impetus for this sub-regional organization stemmed from discussions three years prior within the
South Pacific Forum. 415 The formation of a regional fisheries management organization was proposed as
a way of enhancing regional cooperation and supporting the surveillance of foreign fleets fishing in the
waters of Pacific Island nations. 416 Efforts within the South Pacific Forum began to identify the
foundations of the potential regional organization, but disagreements soon surfaced regarding the scope of
the agreement, membership, as well as its objectives. 417

Two camps quickly emerged within the Forum with regard to the scope of the agreement. On one side
was Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Tonga. These nations were against including
DWFNs as members, asserting that one of the purposes of establishing the regional body was to provide a
unified front in access negotiations with DWFNs. 418 The opposing camp consisted of Australia, New
Zealand, the Cook Islands, Western Samoa and Niue. These countries maintained that the chief aim of the
413
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regional management organization was to facilitate cooperation for conservation objectives as envisioned
by Article 64 of UNCLOS. 419

The camp advancing an economic agenda eventually won out and the FFA was created with 16 members
comprised of Forum nations only. 420 A contributing factor to the win was the position held by the United
States and Japan at the time - that coastal States had no exclusive ownership or management authority
over HMS stocks within their EEZ. 421 One can reasonably infer that this position was largely self-serving,
with DWFNs seeking to preserve the ability of their vessels to fish unfettered within the newly
established EEZ.

Although the South Pacific Fisheries Forum Convention of 1979 was limited to Forum members only,
Article III of the agreement does recognize that effective conservation of HMS stocks in the region
requires the establishment of “additional international machinery” to provide for cooperation between all
states involved in fishing in the region and all states involved in the harvesting of such resources.” 422 In
this context, “additional machinery” envisages a broader agreement pursuant UNCLOS Article 64 - one
which includes coastal States and DWFNs.

The FFA Convention established the Forum Fisheries Committee (FFC), which is composed of
representatives from all members of the Pacific Island Forum and a Secretariat. Neither the FFC nor the

419
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Secretariat has the power to allocate fishery resources, but rather serve respective administrative and
advisory roles. 423

It has been proposed that the FFA exists as a means for members to: a) adopt coordinated actions with
respect to their EEZ rights; b) sustainably manage the fisheries within their EEZs; and c) secure a fair
share of the benefits from fisheries that occur in the region. 424 Since its establishment in 1979, the FFA
has increased benefits derived from the harvest of fishery resources within the EEZs of member
nations. 425 In particular, the FFA was able to increase benefits by leveling the playing field between
DWFNs and Pacific Island States with respect to negotiating fishing access agreements. 426 Prior to the
establishment of the FFA, it was believed that DWFNs were playing PICs against each other, threatening
to move their fleets to another country’s EEZ if access terms were not to their liking. After the FFA was
established, this negotiation strategy ceased to be viable option for DWFNs, with the FFA developing
minimum terms and conditions (MTCs) for foreign fishing access. 427
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The FFA has been involved in the establishment of several sub-regional agreements and programs
including: a) the Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common
Interest (1982); b) the Regional Foreign Vessel Register (1984); c) the US Multilateral Treaty on
Fisheries (1987); the Niue Treaty on Cooperation on Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement (1992);
d) the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Purse Seine Fishery in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean (Palau Arrangement) (1993, 1997 and 2003); e) the FSM Arrangement for Regional
Fisheries Access (1994); f) the FFA Vessel Monitoring System; and g) the Tokelau Arrangement
(2014). 428 The FFA also played a key role in the MHLC process which led to the formation of the
WCPFC. To this day, FFA countries participate within the WCPFC as a formidable bloc that routinely
share common positions and perspectives on issues before the Commission. Through its membership
framework and institutional capacity, the FFA is integral to the management of tuna fisheries in the
WCPO.

5.2.1.2 Parties to the Nauru Agreement

In 1982, a subset of FFA member countries signed the Nauru Agreement.429 This sub-regional agreement
between eight member countries (the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands,
Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu) was adopted to establish uniform
MTCs for fisheries access agreements within their respective EEZs. 430 In addition to harmonizing access
agreement terms and conditions, the Nauru Agreement also strives to grant preferential access to vessels
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of member nations, thereby encouraging domestic participation in the fishing industry and enhancing
local economic development. 431

Collectively, approximately 80% of the WCPO tuna catch, and 40% of the global raw material for canned
tuna markets, is caught within the EEZs of PNA members. 432 Nearly all of this catch is from purse seine
vessels targeting skipjack tuna and to a lesser extent yellowfin tuna, with longline fishing also occurring
in the waters of PNA members targeting bigeye, yellowfin and albacore tuna. 433

The PNA has advanced its policies through a series of implementing arrangements. The First
Implementing Arrangement of the PNA occurred in 1983, and provided that only vessels listed in good
standing on the FFA’s Regional Registry would be authorized to fish in the national waters of PNA
members. 434 Other MTCs which have been set for vessel access include: 1) the non-transferability of
vessel licenses; 2) an acceptance that authorized personnel may board vessels; 3) logbook catch and effort
reporting requirements; and 4) vessel marking requirements. 435

The PNA’s Second Implementing Arrangement was adopted in 1990 and included the following
additional licensing terms and conditions: a) a prohibition on transshipment at sea by purse seine vessels;
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b) a requirement that vessels fishing in PNA waters report their high seas catch; and c) a requirement for
independent on-board observers, with the associated cost to be borne by vessel owners. 436

The PNA’s Third Implementing Arrangement was agreed to in 2008 and requires: a) catch retention of all
bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin taken by purse seine vessels; b) acceptance of a three-month Fish
Aggregation Device (FAD) closure for purse seine vessels fishing in PNA waters; c) closure of high seas
pockets as a licensing condition; and d) one hundred percent observer coverage on purse seine vessels. 437

In addition to the above implementing arrangements (which focus primarily on MTCs for licensing
foreign fishing vessel access), the PNA have established measures aimed at controlling fishing effort as
well as enhancing the economic benefits flowing to PNA members. These include the Palau Arrangement,
FSM Arrangement, and the Vessel Day Scheme.

5.2.1.3 Palau Arrangement

Facing a rapidly growing purse seine fishery, PNA members adopted the Palau Arrangement in 1992.438
The main objective of the Palau Arrangement was to restrict the number of purse seine vessels operating
within PNA waters. To this end, the total number of purse seine vessels was capped at 205, with vessel
limits being allocated among the various flags 439 The leading conservation argument to control the
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number of purse seine vessels operating in the region was a concern over the stock status of yellowfin.440
However, limiting the number of purse seine vessels had an economic rationale as well. It was believed
that controlling vessel numbers would improve purse seine catch per unit effort, thus making vessel
operations more efficient and paving the way for higher access fees. In addition, a cap on the number of
vessels was thought to increase competition for licenses, resulting in higher access fees for PNA
members. 441 While a cap on the number of vessels was ultimately adopted, initial consideration had also
been given to establishing a TAC. However, a TAC was not adopted as it would have required more
involvement by DWFNs, and at the time, there were serious concerns over the accuracy of catch data due
to rampant under reporting by DWFN fleets.442

The vessel limits established under the Palau Arrangement focused on limiting foreign flagged vessels in
particular, as these vessels were the most active in the fishery. For some PNA members, however, the
Palau Arrangement did not result in domestic fisheries development or increased resource rent from
selling access agreements.443 To address these issues, the Palau Arrangement was modified in 1995, with
the authorized number of non-PNA flagged purse seine vessels being reduced, and 10% of the total vessel
limit being reserved for “domestic/locally based” vessels. 444 This modification was adopted to enhance
domestic fisheries development by enticing distant water purse seine vessels to base their operations
within the ports of PNA members, thus promoting shore-side development and local employment. 445 The
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change coincided with the 1994 Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries
Access (FSM Arrangement), which was also established to support domestic fisheries development. 446

5.2.1.4 FSM Arrangement

The FSM Arrangement provides preferential treatment to domestic or locally based vessels of PNA
members. 447 The early 1990s saw investments in locally based purse seine vessels by some PNA
members. Indeed, before this time, most of the domestic catch by PICs came from pole and line
vessels. 448 At the time, the FSM Arrangement was viewed as the primary vehicle to achieve a greater
share of the profits derived from tuna fishing in the region. This preferential access was believed to
provide PNA vessels with a significant cost advantage over DWFN-flagged vessels, thus driving more
vessels to operate under flags of PICs. 449 The effect would be the eventual phase-out of foreign fishing in
the region. 450 It should be noted, however, that many of the domestically-flagged purse seine vessels were
part of joint venture agreements involving foreign investors.451

The centerpiece of the Arrangement was the establishment of a points-based vessel eligibility criteria
system, whereby a vessel had to score at minimum number of points to be listed on the Registry of
Eligible Fishing Vessels. The criteria was based on five topics: 1) vessel ownership equity; 2) the flag of
the vessel; 3) the nationals employed on the vessel; 4) local purchases; and 5) onshore investment.452
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A qualifying vessel would be granted access to fish within the FSM Arrangement Area, which is defined
as the EEZ or fisheries zone of PNA members, subject to any waters closed by a particular party. 453 Most
of the prescribed closed areas include a party’s territorial and/or internal and archipelagic waters, as well
as radiuses around anchored FADs. 454 In addition to meeting the specified criteria, vessels pay on an
individual basis according to vessel size, with payments being calculated in accordance with the
following formula: the average catch of the vessel multiplied by the average ex-vessel price of tuna
multiplied by five percent. 455 Payments are made to the FFA, and later disbursed to the relevant members
within whose EEZ the catch was harvested.

Upon its entry into force in 1995, there were only two vessels that met the eligibility criteria.456 After a
slow initial period, authorized FSM Arrangement vessels increased, reaching a peak of 42 vessels in
2012. 457 The FSM Arrangement served to strengthen PNA member control over their EEZs through the
exercise of their sovereign rights, resulting in increased participation and benefits derived from the
harvests of tuna from their national waters. 458 However, the returns from domestic development were
modest, and a shift in how the PNA managed the purse seine fishery in their waters was looming.

5.2.1.5 Vessel Day Scheme

Beginning in the late 1990s, there was burgeoning interest by States to gain access to the WCPO purse
seine fishery. This, in turn, drew attention to the limit of 205 purse seine vessels under the Palau
Arrangement. Pressure was soon mounting on PNA members to remove the flag-based vessel limits they
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had originally agreed upon, and to instead license additional foreign vessels to fish within their EEZs. 459
The fact that only around five percent of the economic value of the resource was being captured through
fishing access licenses (in the form of resource rents) also weighed heavily in the debate. 460 The growing
tension over the issue began to threaten the group’s regional solidarity – a solidarity that had been in place
for over a decade. 461 For example, the vessel slots assigned under the Multilateral US Tuna Treaty were
scrutinized because there were not enough active US purse seine vessels to fill the US limit (60 vessels).
Around the same time, there was keen interest by European Union (EU) vessels to enter the fishery,
particularly those from Spain. The choice was made to allow Spanish vessels in, and to assign them the
latent US slots. However, once the EU vessels were granted access, other nations sought entry too. 462
Chinese purse seine vessels soon received authorization, receiving slots that had gone unused in the
domestic/locally-based category. The flag-based vessel limits of other countries were also changing as
vessel numbers shifted around the available slots, resulting in the program becoming unwieldy. 463 This
flurry of activity also coincided with worsening stock conditions for bigeye and yellow tuna, and the
burgeoning MHLC process to develop an internationally binding agreement. These events essentially
‘loosened the screws’ and threatened the solidarity that the PNA had forged in managing the fishery.

In 2002, PNA members agreed to restructure the existing Palau Arrangement by moving away from
vessel limits and instead focusing on flag-based, transferable purse seine fishing effort limits measured in
459
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fishing days. The result was the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS), which was first implemented in 2008. The
objective of this transformation was to establish a flexible and more responsive regime that would
promote social and economic returns as well as ensuring the conservation and management of tuna
stocks. 464

In light of the quantity and value of tuna being harvested across eight EEZs of PNA members, the VDS
has been labeled the largest and most complex fishery management arrangement to date. 465 The VDS
process generally involves PNA members meeting annually to set the Total Allowable Effort (TAE),
which is then divided up into member allocations called Party Allowable Effort (PAE) limits. 466 These
PAE limits are capable of being freely transferred among PNA members. At the annual VDS meetings,
PNA members also agree on the basic price-per-day fee structure. Prior to fishing, vessels pay on a price
per day basis to the government whose waters they are conducting fishing operations, including searching
for fish.

As stated in the Palau Arrangement, the specific objectives of the VDS are to:(i) promote the optimal
utilization and conservation of tuna resources; (ii) maximize economic returns, employment generation
and export earnings from the sustainable harvesting of tuna resources; (iii) support the development of
domestic locally based purse seine fishing industries; and (iv) promote effective and efficient
administration, management and compliance.467

In the short time the VDS has been operating, the annual revenue collected by PNA members through
fishing access fees has increased by 500% to nearly $450 million. 468 While it is certainly true that the
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PNA VDS is providing economic benefits to member governments, the number of purse vessels operating
in the WCPO has also increased, adding exploitation pressure on key tropical tuna stocks.

5.2.1.6 Tokelau Arrangement

In 2014, a subset of FFA members formed the Tokelau Arrangement. Signatories include Australia, the
Cook Islands, Niue, New Zealand, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
According to the FFA, the Tokelau Arrangement establishes a framework for the development of
cooperative zone-based management of South Pacific albacore tuna fisheries, including a potentially
wider implementation of the South Pacific Albacore Harvest Strategy agreed by FFA members in 2013.469
A key feature of the Tokelau Arrangement is the establishment of EEZ-based South Pacific albacore
limits that are nominated by members, as well as a collective TAC which is the sum of individual EEZ
limits. 470

Under the agreement, all members are entitled to 2,500 tons as a base limit, but if a particular member has
higher catches, they can use their highest historical catch. 471 In developing this framework, the FFA
envisioned that the WCPFC would adopt a new South Pacific albacore measure - one that established a
stock-wide TAC set at MSY and comprised of collective limits for Tokelau Arrangement members, EEZlimits for non-members, and a total catch limit for the high seas.472 As will be described in the following
chapter, this scenario has not played-out in the WCPFC or with the Tokelau Arrangement itself.473
Indeed, as the foregoing discussion with explore, the Tokelau Arrangement could be a powerful tool with
regard to the establishment of compatible measures for South Pacific albacore within the WCPFC. For
example, if there were agreement on EEZ-based catch limits, the Commission would be forced to
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consider the limits with respect to the Principle and Article 8 of the Honolulu Convention. To date,
however, this has not come to fruition.

5.2.2 Distant Water Fishing Nations and Coastal States

Within the WCPFC, all non-FFA members tend to be grouped in the DWFN category, although many of
these countries are coastal States with EEZ waters contained within the Honolulu Convention Area.474
Figure 37 provides the amount of tuna caught in the national waters of non-FFA member coastal States in
the WCPO, with the total amount of tuna caught by the fleets of these nations shown in Figure 38.
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Figure 37: Average tuna catch in national waters of non-FFA coastal States (2013-2015)
Source: SPC data tables. Figure made by author
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The United States, for example, is a coastal State with an EEZ spanning 1.5 million square miles and located
within the WCPO. However, it also has a fleet of purse seine vessels that fish in the EEZs of PICs under the
Multilateral Tuna Treaty.
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Figure 38: Average tuna catch made by non-FFA coastal Sates and DWFNs in WCPO (2013-2015)
Source: SPC data tables. Figure made by author

United States

The United States is both a costal State and a DWFN. The US EEZ in the WCPO amounts to 1.5 million
square miles, due to a combination of waters around Hawaii, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands,
American Samoa, and US uninhabited possessions located in the central equatorial Pacific. 475 The United
States has domestic troll and longline tuna fisheries that occur around Hawaii and American Samoa and
adjacent high seas. The United States also has a distant water purse seine fleet that fishes within the EEZs
of PICs under a multilateral treaty and on the high seas. 476 The amount of tuna harvested in US national
waters is less than 10,000 mt annually (Figure 37); however, the combined catches of US purse seine and
longline vessels is around 250,000 mt annually (Figure 38; over 95% caught by purse seine vessels).
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Japan

Japan has EEZ waters within the WCP-Convention Area and extensive domestic coastal fisheries that
target tuna and other HMS stocks (Figure 37). Japan also has a fleet of distant water pole and line,
longline, and purse seine vessels that fish on the high seas and in the EEZs of PICs (Figure 38).
Collectively, Japan’s fisheries are second only to Indonesia, which holds the record for the world’s largest
tuna catch on an annual basis. Japan’s domestic tuna consumption is also the highest per capita, and is the
primary market for raw (sashimi) quality tuna. 477

China

With EEZ waters that are within the WCP-CA, but also located in the South China Sea, it is possible to
view China as a coastal State. Very few catches of tuna are made in China’s national waters (Figure 37);
however, most of the country’s tuna fishing is associated with distant water fleets that include longline
and purse seine vessels. China first began industrial tuna fishing in the late 1980s. 478 It rapidly expanded
its distant water longline fleet from seven vessels in 1988 to over 450 vessels in 1994. In the years that
followed, the fleet reduced dramatically, and by 1999 there were only 66 longline vessels operating. 479 In
the mid-2000s, China again grew its longline fleet, and in 2015 the nation reported that 429 vessels were
operating in the WCPO. The number of purse seine vessels flagged to China has also seen an increasing
trend within the last decade. The first Chinese purse seine vessel operated in 2001, whereas there are now
20 Chinese purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO. China subsidizes its distant water tuna fleets
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(DWF) to levels which are unmatched elsewhere in the world. The subsidies cover fuel, vessel
construction, preferential tax treatment, as well as payments for access to other nation’s EEZs. 480 The
extent and magnitude of these subsidies, combined with other support given by the Chinese government
to its DWF sector, is extensive and likely provides Chinese DWF fleets with a significant cost advantage
over unsubsidized fleets.

Korea

Korea’s distant water tuna fishery began in the late 1950s, starting with the Indian Ocean, followed by
operations in the Pacific Ocean in the mid-1960s. 481 By the following decade, there were over 270 Korean
longliners in the Pacific, which then reduced to around 100 in the mid-1980s. 482 In 2015, Korea reported
to the WCPFC that 84 longline vessels fished in the WCPO, which is down from 126 vessels in 2012. 483
Korea’s longline vessels are of the larger variety, with 83 reported to have a capacity between 200 and
500 gross tons. Korea began purse seining in the mid-1980s, with the number of flagged purse seiners
hovering around 25 vessels since the mid-1990s. 484

Taiwan

In terms of annual global tuna catches, Taiwan ranks third behind Indonesia and Japan respectively. 485
Longline fishing began in the offshore waters of Taiwan in the 1913 and was introduced by the
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Japanese. 486 In the 1960s, however, Taiwan began to construct a distant water fishing fleet with the aid of
government subsides. By the 1970s, Taiwan shipyards began equipping longline vessels with ultra-low
temperature (ULT), which allowed them to access lucrative Japanese sashimi markets. Indeed, with the
construction of large longline vessels of around 400 gross tons, Taiwan was now able to ply the world’s
oceans in search of tuna. 487 In 2015, Taiwan had 76 large-scale longline vessels and 1,306 small-scale
longline vessels fishing in the WCPO. 488 Taiwanese purse seine fishing began in the early 1980s and
rapidly increased to over 40 vessels in 1995. 489 In 2015, the Taiwanese purse seine fleet numbered 34
vessels. 490

European Union

While the EU is comprised of 28 countries, the largest interest in WCPO tuna fisheries within the EU
comes from Spain. Ranked within the top ten countries in terms of global tuna catches, Spain is a major
player not only in fishing for tuna, but also in canning and other value-added seafood processing sectors.
Spain, for example, is the EU’s largest producer of canned seafood, with tuna comprising two thirds of
that production. 491 Spanish purse seine vessels first started fishing in the WCPO in 1996, peaking at five
vessels in 2003. By way of comparison, only two seiners fished in 2016. 492 It should be noted that the size
of these purse seine vessels is no trivial matter, with EU purse seine vessels being among the largest in the
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world to fish in the Pacific, exceeding 2,000 mt hold capacities. Since 2004, three Spanish flagged
longline vessels have fished in the WCPO targeting swordfish. 493

Ecuador

Ecuador is a major player in the EPO, with vessels fishing under its flag being responsible for nearly half
of the total EPO tuna catch.494 In the WCPO, a handful of Ecuadorian-flagged purse seine vessels operate
in the region, but only in the waters of Kiribati. 495 Ecuador is home to several large canneries, with tuna
caught in the WCPO often being transshipped to Ecuador for processing. For several years, Ecuador has
actively sought to elevate its status within the WCPFC from cooperating non-member to full member –
with hopes that member status would afford its vessels to the rights to fish on the high seas of the WCPO.
To date, Ecuador’s request has been rebuffed by WCPFC members. 496

Philippines

With around 150,000 mt of tuna being harvested within its EEZ on an annual basis, the Philippines ranks
fourth among coastal States in terms of tuna production from national waters within the WCPO (Figure
39). Much of the catch is landed by small-scale artisanal fishing gears such as handline, hook and line,
and ringnet; however, there are also purse seine fishing vessels that fish on the high seas (high seas pocket
1 in particular).497 The majority of the tuna landed in the Philippines comes from purse seine fishing
activity, with only a very small percentage of the State’s tuna catch deriving from longline vessels. The
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Philippines also has eight tuna canneries that collectively represent nearly seven percent of global canned
tuna production. 498
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Figure 39: Average tuna catch in national waters of Indonesia, Philippines (2013-2015)
Source: SPC Data tables. Figure made by author
Indonesia

Indonesia is a major tuna fishing nation, with most of the State’s catch taken within its national waters
(Figures 39). The geographic location of Indonesia is such that it lies both within the Indian and Pacific
Oceans. Comprised of over 17,000 islands, Indonesia has extensive archipelagic waters that are fished by
a wide range of gears including purse seine, longline, handline, pole and line, troll, gillnet, as well as
other artisanal gears. Data collection and catch verification have posed a consistent challenge in Indonesia
and there have been dedicated efforts to improve the situation through the West Pacific East Asia Oceanic
Fisheries Management Project. 499

498

Greenpeace. (undated). Tuna cannery ranking: Indonesia and Philippines. Retrieved from
http://m.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/710346/Tuna_Cannery_Ranking.pdf
499
For more information on the West Pacific East Asia Oceanic Fisheries Management Project, see
https://www.wcpfc.int/west-pacific-east-asia-oceanic-fisheries-management-project.

152

5.2.3 Scientific Organizations
Secretariat of the Pacific Community

The SPC, which recently changed its named to The Pacific Community, is an international
development organization based in Noumea, New Caledonia with membership comprised of 26
country and territory members. 500 The Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) provides scientific
services concerning primarily tuna fisheries for member countries and territories. The OFP is
involved in fishery monitoring, data management, ecosystem and biological research and stock
assessment for HMS stocks occurring in the WCPO. The SPC OFP is also formally recognized
as the scientific sciences provider for the WCPFC and provides services related to: a) data
management and statistical analyses, b) stock assessment, c) management analysis and
performance monitoring, and d) other advisory and technical services. 501 The OFP conducts the
stock assessments for key species managed by the WCPFC including the tropical tuna stocks
(skipjack, yellowfin, and bigeye) and albacore. As identified by the important services provided
above, the SPC-OFP plays a significant role in the management of HMS stocks within the
WCPO.

International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific
Ocean
The ISC was established in 1995 for the purposes of enhancing cooperation and conducting
scientific research on HMS of the North Pacific Ocean. ISC membership is comprised of seven
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Pacific-rim countries, four non-voting members, and one cooperating non-member.

502

The ISC

conducts stock assessments for HMS stocks that occur in the North Pacific Ocean, which
principally occur north of 20°N, otherwise known as ‘northern stocks.’ The ISC has formed
working groups covering: a) North Pacific albacore, b) Pacific bluefin, c) billfish, and d)
sharks. 503 Due to its role as providing stock assessments and compiling fisheries statistics for
‘northern stocks,’ the ISC is an important scientific contributor to the management of Pacific
HMS stocks.

5.2.4 Environmental and Fishing Industry Non-Governmental Organizations and
Academic Institutions

The management of HMS stocks are of significant interest to civil society which is often
represented through non-governmental organizations typically focused on environmental issues
and sustainability concerns. For such organizations to attend and participate at WCPFC
meetings, they must first be accredited as ‘observers’ by approval of WCPFC members. Some of
the larger WCPFC-accredited organizations include Pew Charitable Trusts, World Wildlife Fund
for Nature, Greenpeace, Environmental Defense Fund, The Nature Conservancy, Birdlife
International, and the Marine Stewardship Council. Environmental organizations play an
important role in the management of HMS stocks in the Pacific, often advocating various policy
positions and producing outreach materials. Although their voice is regularly muted with regards
to negotiations, their presence and interests cannot be denied.
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Fishing industry trade organizations also attend WCPFC meetings, primarily to participate in
meetings and to ensure that the interests of their members are being tended to by CCM delegates.
Examples of industry formed organizations that participate in WCPFC meetings include the
American Tunaboat Association, the Organization for Responsible Tuna Fisheries, World Tuna
Purse Seine Organization, Pacific Island Tuna and Industry Association, and the International
Seafood Sustainability Foundation. Some of these organizations comprise a roster of major,
globally-connected industry players involved in catching and processing tuna. Their presence is
visible as is their influence undeniable at WCPFC meetings.
Representatives of academic institutions and programs also attend WCPFC meetings as
observers including Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, the
International Law Project affiliated with Lewis and Clark College Law School, and the
University of the South Pacific. In addition, at any given WCPFC meeting, there are a handful of
graduate school students and academic researchers collecting information and networking. 504

5. 3 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

The WCPFC, which came into effect in 2004, was born out of the Honolulu Convention. To develop the
Honolulu Convention, interested States, territories and sub-regional organizations participated in a series
of MLHC between 1997 and 2000.
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5.3.1 Multilateral High-Level Conferences

The first MHLC was convened by the FFA in Honiara, Solomon Islands, in December 1994. It was
attended by FFA countries and several DWFNs. 505 The objective of the meeting was technical in nature,
primarily relating to cooperation on data collection and enforcement issues with respect to HMS stocks in
the region. It was not, as expressed by the Chairman of MHLC1, Mr. Robin Yarrow of Fiji, a conference
to discuss broader issues related to the management of HMS stocks that occur within the WCPO.506 This
is because at that time, the UNFSA conference was ongoing and MLHC1 participants recognized the need
to avoid getting ahead of that process.

At MHLC1, the rapid increase in WCPO tuna catches during the previous 15 years was noted, with
bigeye tuna reported to be subject to fishing mortality at levels exceeding those associated with MSY. 507
Substantial discussion occurred at the MHLC1 on the need to obtain quality fisheries data for stock
assessments. Existing consultative forums were duly noted, such as the Standing Committee on Tuna and
Billfish, the Western Pacific Yellowfin Research Group, and the South Pacific Albacore Research Group.
However, it was highlighted that the type of detailed information required for robust stock assessments
was lacking due to the non-participation of major DWFNs in these consultative groups. 508 The most
significant gaps in fisheries data (as reported at the time), included high seas logbook data for longline
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fisheries and aggregate data for some longline and purse seine fleets. 509 Japan made an assertion to the
effect that it provides fisheries information to organizations to which it is not a member, such as the
SPC. 510 The Japan delegate emphasized that the data problem is caused by a lack of formal arrangements
between the SPC and some DWFNs, and that the only way to address this issue in the long-term is
through formal arrangements governing the collection and dissemination of fisheries data, as well as the
carrying out of stock assessments by scientists from all States involved with the fisheries concerned. 511
Following MHLC1, there were three technical consultations - one on the collection and exchange of
fisheries data, tuna research and stock assessments, and two consultations on vessel monitoring
systems. 512

The Second MHLC, which was held in Majuro in 1997, set the course for developing a broader
international framework for managing WCPO tuna stocks. Harnessing the momentum of the recently
concluded UNFSA (1995), Ambassador Nandan (Fiji) was named chair of the meeting, again finding
himself at the helm of a substantial international effort related to the conservation and management of
HMS, albeit this time on a regional level. In his opening remarks at MHLC2, Ambassador Nandan
suggested that although developing an appropriate regional organization would be a challenge, the
recently agreed UNFSA would serve as a guide, giving practical effect to the provisions of UNCLOS. 513
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He further noted that UNFSA provides a step-by-step approach towards the implementation of the various
duties of coastal States and DWFNs with respect to regional cooperation.514

A significant outcome of MHLC2 was agreement on the Majuro Declaration, which committed parties to
work for a period of three years on establishing a formal agreement in accordance with UNCLOS and
UNFSA for the conservation and management of WCPO HMS stocks. 515 Although the type of
mechanism to bring about this result was not defined in detail in the Majuro Declaration, the document
recognized the need to facilitate cooperation between the participants for the long-term sustainability of
HMS stocks throughout their range. 516

The Majuro Declaration committed MHLC2 participants to ensuring that conservation and management
measures for fish stocks within areas of national jurisdiction and on the high seas were compatible. 517
With respect to the discussion of the Principle at MHLC2, the opening statement made by Mr. Dennis
Renton of Papua New Guinea was the most specific. Mr. Renton stated that UNFSA is clear that existing
sub-regional or regional measures must be taken into account when developing compatible measures.518
This statement signaled that PICs would exercise their rights to establish management measures for their
EEZs, for which compatible high seas measures would then need to be established. 519

Following two intercessional technical consultations, one on the use of precautionary limit reference
points, and the other on Monitor, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) issues, the third MHLC was held in
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June 1998 in Tokyo. To facilitate discussion at MHLC3, Chairman Nandan introduced a working paper
that contained the first draft articles of the regional agreement for consideration.520 As stated by Chairman
Nandan, the draft articles utilize the provisions of UNFSA and UNCLOS as a starting point. 521

In total, seven MHLCs were held, with the last four being held in Honolulu and the final MHLC
concluding in September 2000. MHLC7 culminated in a total of 24 countries, participating territories522
and fishing entities 523 voting on whether to adopt the Convention on the Conservation and Management
of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The result of the vote was 19
in favor, two against (Japan and the Republic of Korea), with three abstentions (China, France and
Tonga). 524 The following section provides a review of the MHLC negotiations with respect various
provisions of the Honolulu Convention.

5.3.2 Honolulu Convention

The following sections describe the major articles of the Honolulu Convention. Where appropriate, an
overview of the negotiations that occurred on a particular subject applicable to this thesis during the
MHLC process is included. The Honolulu Convention was the first RFMO established after the adoption
of UNFSA and contains several identical or similarly formulated articles. The fact that Ambassador
Nandan chaired both the UNFSA and the MHLCs is a likely cause for this outcome.
520
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5.3.2.1 Convention Area

The Convention’s area of application is provided in Article 3 and is bounded longitudinally on its eastern
edge at 150° longitude west and 130° longitude west. The latter area is shared jurisdiction between the
WCPFC and the IATTC (Figure 40). The Convention Area is also bounded in the south Pacific at 55°
latitude south; however, the Convention Area is not bounded to the north or west, thus leaving some
uncertainty in the Convention’s area of competence in the northern and western Pacific Ocean.

Figure 40: Map showing the Convention Area
Source: http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/dip-wcpcf-cppoc-eng.htm
Note: Red line bordering blue shaded area delineates WCP-Convention Area. The WCPFC Secretariat is
located in Pohnpei, FSM.
During the MHLC process, there was significant debate over the area for which the Convention would be
responsible. While there was consensus that the Convention Area should be sufficiently large to
encompass the range of managed HMS stocks, defining those boundaries with respect to political
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circumstances and biological considerations was challenging. The first draft articles circulated by Nandan
at MHLC3 contained two approaches for establishing the Convention Area. The first was a set of
coordinates that would serve as the regulatory area, which was proposed as extending from 130° W to
131° E and from 40°S to 23° 30ˈN. This proposal was criticized on the basis that the boundaries were too
small to encompass the full range of HMS stocks. 525 The second approach was to leave the geographic
area of competence undefined and instead establish regulatory areas for various species and fisheries,
depending on fish movement patterns and connectivity. It was acknowledged that such an approach could
be feasible from a biological point of view, but could also pose problems from an administrative
perspective, particularly where regulatory areas with differing management measures overlap. 526

At MHLC4, there was agreement in principle to establish a set of geographic coordinates for the proposed
Convention Area, subject to further consideration being given to the northern and western boundaries.527
During the course of the negotiations on the Convention Area, China expressed concern over the western
boundary extending into the South China Sea – an area fraught with ongoing maritime jurisdictional
claims by several countries in the region (including China itself). 528 Japan asserted that the Convention
Area should simply cover the entire migratory range of HMS stocks, regardless of the legal or political
status of particular areas, and further, that if China’s concern held sway, then the northern boundary of the
Convention Area should be limited to 20° N so as to avoid splitting Japan’s EEZ and “causing shameful
treatment” to Japan. 529
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As has been noted, Article 3 does not include western and northern boundaries, which is evidence that
MHLC4 was unable to reach consensus on this matter. To remedy the situation, Article 3(3) states that the
Convention applies to all highly migratory fish stocks within the Convention Area, and further, that
conservation and management measures shall be applied throughout the range of the stocks. 530 After the
signing of the Honolulu Convention at MHLC7, Nandan clarified that the Convention applies to waters of
the Pacific Ocean but not to waters in South-East Asia (which are not part of the Pacific Ocean) or to
those of the South China Sea. 531 Although the management measures adopted by the WCPFC do not
apply within the South China Sea, the SPC-OFP is compiling data and reporting on tuna fisheries that
occur within these waters. Agreement on this approach was made at the Twelfth Meeting of the Standing
Committee on Tuna and Billfish, creating the WCPF Statistical Area, which for a western boundary
include the coastlines of Australia and Asia. 532

While the Convention states that the area of application includes “all waters of the Pacific Ocean”
followed by a series of coordinates, consistency with UNCLOS effectively limits the application of
conservation and management measures to EEZs and the high seas. 533 This is because under UNCLOS,
archipelagic and territorial waters are considered to be subject to the sovereignty of coastal States,
whereas coastal States are accorded sovereign rights over their EEZs. 534 The Honolulu Convention
explicitly states in Article 4 that “nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction, and
530
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duties of States under [UNCLOS] and the [UNFSA].” This implies that the application of the convention
does not extend to sovereign waters (i.e., archipelagic waters; territorial sea). As such, archipelagic waters
and territorial seas are off limits to the WCPFC; however, nothing prevents coastal States from
implementing compatible measures within their archipelagic waters and territorial sea.

The issue of archipelagic waters not being subject to Commission management measures is an important
one with regard to the application of the Principle. There are seven archipelagic States in the WCPO: Fiji,
Indonesia, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.535 Collectively, there is a
substantial amount of tuna harvested within the archipelagic waters of these countries which is outside the
management purview of the WCPFC (Figure 41). With respect to compatibility, there could be situations
where high catches in one coastal State’s archipelagic waters are substantial enough to affect catches in
waters under the national jurisdiction of an adjacent coastal State. Further, the harvesting of fish in
archipelagic waters could involve spawning aggregations which, if left unregulated, could later become
depleted, impacting both the stock and the ability of adjacent States to maintain their own domestic EEZ
measures. In addition, archipelagic waters can serve as essential habitats for juvenile tuna, and if these
habitats were to become degraded or overexploited, stock effects would likely be observed, including
local depletion.

535
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Figure 41: Catch of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna in the WCPO, 2010-2016
Source: SPC unpublished. Pers. Comm., Peter Williams, SPC. Figure made by author
Note: The catch of tuna in archipelagic waters within the WCPO represents around 20% of the total
WCPO tuna catch.

5.3.2.2 Management Scope

As stated in Article 2, the primary objective of the Convention is the long-term conservation and
sustainable use of HMS fish stocks in the WCPO in accordance with UNCLOS and UNFSA. 536 Article 5
provides the following measures to be adopted by the Commission: (a) measures to ensure the long-term
sustainability of highly migratory fish stocks and their optimum utilization; b) measures that use the best
scientific evidence available and which are designed to maintain or restore stocks to be able to produce
MSY, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors; c) measures that apply the
precautionary approach; d) measures that assess the impacts of fishing on other activities and
environmental factors; e) measures to minimize waste and bycatch including impacts to protected species;
f) measures to protect biodiversity; g) measures to prevent overfishing and eliminate excess fishing

536

It is worth noting that the first paragraph of the convention’s preamble links long-term conservation with
sustainable use, and in particular the use of fishery resources for for human consumption. The incorporation of
human consumption highlights the importance of tuna fisheries and its relationship to food security within Oceania
and the larger WCPO.
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capacity; h) measures that take into account artisanal and subsistence fishers; i) the need to collect and
share timely fisheries data; and j) measures to promote effective MCS. 537

5.3.2.3 Precautionary Approach

The precautionary approach in fisheries management was a hot topic in the early 1990s, and was
advanced internationally through several fora at the time, including UNFSA. 538 However, at MHLC2 in
1997, it was acknowledged that the application of the precautionary approach to highly migratory fish
stocks was unclear. 539 Facing potential controversy on this issue, MHLC2 sought scientific advice from
the Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish (SCTB). 540 The SCTB acknowledged the need to base the
application of the precautionary approach on the provisions of UNFSA, including Annex II of that
agreement. 541 It was further recognized that the precautionary approach supports the development of
limit reference points and stock assessments that incorporate uncertainty and associated risk levels.542
Utilizing the advice derived from the SCTB consultation, the draft articles introduced by Nandan at
MHLC3 contained several provisions related to the precautionary approach.543 These provisions remained
unchanged throughout the subsequent MHLC meetings and were adopted as Article 6 of the convention.

Article 6 provides details on how the Commission is to apply the precautionary approach, such as
requiring the WCPFC to apply the guidelines listed in Annex II of UNSFA on the use of reference points.
Other considerations to take into account as they relate to the precautionary approach include: a)
537
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uncertainties related to the size of stocks; b) impacts on dependent or associated species; and c)
environmental and socio-economic conditions.544 Article 6 instructs members to ensure, inter alia, that
when reference points are approached, that they are not exceeded, and if exceeded, that action is taken
without delay to restore the stocks. 545

Annex II of UNFSA describes two types of precautionary reference points - target and limit reference
points. According to the guidelines, limit reference points are used to constrain harvests so that stocks can
produce MSY. Target reference points, on the other hand, are used to meet management objectives. 546
Annex II further lists FMSY and BMSY as minimum standard limit reference points, with the former being
associated with fishing mortality and the latter with stock biomass. 547

5.3.2.4 Compatibility of Conservation and Management Measures

Article 8 is dedicated to the Principle. It largely replicates Article 7 of UNFSA, but with a few notable
differences. Unlike Article 7(1) of UNSFA, Article 8(1) does not restate the UNCLOS-associated rights
and obligations of States with respect to national waters and the highs seas.548 Indeed, this is because
alignment with UNCLOS is already stated in Article 4. Article 8(1) does, however, mirror UNFSA
Article 7(2), such that in order to ensure the conservation and management of HMS fish stocks in their
entirety, measures established for the high seas and adopted for areas under national jurisdiction are to be
compatible. Article 8(1) then replicates six UNFSA considerations that the Commission is required to
take into account. These include: a) the biological unity of the stocks, fisheries, and geographic
particularities of the region; b) the need for measures established for the Convention Area to not
544
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undermine the effectiveness of measures adopted and applied in accordance with UNCLOS Article 61 for
waters under national jurisdiction; c) previously agreed high seas measures; d) previously agreed
measures adopted by sub-regional organizations; e) the respective dependence of coastal States and high
seas fishing States; and f) ensuring that measures do not harmfully impact living marine resources as a
whole.

Article 8 also includes two provisions not found in Article 7 of UNFSA. The first is Article 8(3), which
requires coastal States to ensure that measures adopted for national waters do not undermine the
effectiveness of Commission adopted measures. The inclusion of this provision is significant and appears
to rebalance the scale in terms of the rights accorded to various States. As discussed in Chapter 3, some
commenters had suggested that UNFSA tilted the scales in favor of coastal States, whereas other
commentators had cautioned against placing too much emphasis on the non-parity between UNFSA
Article 7(2)(a) and (b) with respect to high seas measures not undermining the effectiveness EEZ-based
measures. 549 Secondly, Article 8(4) adds an additional consideration in that it instructs the Commission to
pay special attention to ensuring compatibility between high seas areas entirely surrounded by EEZs of
Commission members - i.e., high seas pockets. Also, unlike UNFSA, Article 8 does not reference the
need to agree on compatible measures within a reasonable amount a time. Nor does it provide provisions
related to the settlement of disputes with respect to the Principle.

At MHLC3, Chairman Nandan stated that the issue of compatibility was important and required a delicate
balance to be struck, and further, that the heart of the issue was ensuring a seamless regime for
conservation and management throughout the region.550 Nandan provided the example of a TAC limit
with regard to the balance of rights, noting that the main issue would be how coastal States exercise their
“prerogatives” with respect to fish catches in their zones coupled with the rights of fishing nations to fish
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on the high seas. According to Nandan, both sets of rights have to be exercised within the limits set for
the region as a whole. 551

The issue of compatibility played an important role in the negotiations at MHLC3. As evidenced in the
opening statements of several PICs, their view of compatibility centered on the ‘EEZ first’ mentality,
whereby management measures adopted by the Commission for the high seas would need to be
compatible with measures established for EEZs by coastal States in the exercise of their sovereign
rights. 552 Japan, itself a coastal State, acknowledged the sovereign rights of coastal States over HMS
stocks in their waters, but added that the ‘EEZ first’ concept should not be construed as coastal States
having exclusive rights to management of these stocks, and further, that the ‘in-zone management comes
first’ concept with respect to establishing compatible measures would be totally unacceptable. 553

At MHLC3, Chairman Nandan introduced the first draft articles of the regional agreement, which
included an Article 8 on ‘Compatibility of conservation and management measures.’ As mentioned
above, Nandan took several paragraphs from Article 7 of UNFSA in their entirety for the purpose of
compiling draft Article 8. Nandan did, however, shift paragraph (d) in UNFSA Article 7, which
references the need to account for the biological unity of stocks, to paragraph (a) in draft Article 8.
Chairman Nandan did not explain in his paper introducing the draft articles why he reordered some of the
paragraphs; however, with the issue of managing fish stocks throughout their range being an important
matter for MHLC participants, bringing the issue of biological unity forward was likely an attempt to
reflect the importance of this issue.

At MHLC4, which was held in February 1999 in Honolulu, two more provisions were added to draft
Article 8. The first was the inclusion of UNFSA Article 7 paragraph 2 in draft Article 8(1), which
551
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instructs States to cooperate in the establishment of compatible measures, and further, that conservation
and management measures “established” for the high seas and those “adopted” for areas of national
jurisdiction are to be compatible. The second was the inclusion, in draft Article 8(4), that where there are
high seas areas in the Convention Area surrounded by EEZs (i.e., high seas pockets), that the Commission
shall pay special attention to the establishment of measures for high seas pockets that are compatible with
those established for the surrounding EEZs. These amendments to draft Article 8 were initiated by PICs,
with the representatives of these countries suggesting that the amendments provide for a greater
recognition of the rights and interests of coastal States, and further, that the amendments reiterate the
obligation to establish high seas measures that are compatible with those established for areas under
national jurisdiction. 554 Following on from MHLC4, no further amendments or additions were made to
Article 8 of the draft convention.

5.3.2.5 The Commission and its Functions

Article 9 formally establishes the Commission and further elucidates its capacity as an internationally
recognized RFMO. 555 Article 9 instructs the Commission to meet at least annually and to elect a chairman
and vice chairman. 556 It goes on to state that contracting parties shall determine the location of the
Commission’s headquarters and arrange for the appointment of an Executive Director.557 Article 9 also
directs the Commission to adopt (by consensus) rules of procedure for its meetings and the meetings of its
subsidiary bodies. 558

Article 10 describes the functions of the Commission; however, the chapeau of Article 10(1)
acknowledges that the functions of the Commission shall be without prejudice to the sovereign rights of
coastal States for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing HMS stocks in areas
554
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under their national jurisdiction. The inclusion of the “without prejudice” clause in Article 10 has been
cited as critically important to PICs during the negotiation of the Convention, as it recognizes their
sovereign rights with regard to the functions of the Commission. 559

Article 10(1)(a) describes the fundamental function of the Commission from a resource management
perspective – that is, to determine the TAC or total level of effort for HMS stocks within the Convention
Area, as well as the ability to adopt other conservation and management measures to ensure the long-term
sustainability of such stocks. Other major stated functions in that appear in paragraphs (b) through (l) of
Article 10(1) are: (b) the promotion of cooperation and coordination among Commission members to
ensure compatibility; (c) the establishment of measures for non-target, dependent, or associated species;
(d) the adoption of data collection standards for the collection, verification and timely exchange and
reporting of HMS fisheries data; (e) the compiling and dissemination of accurate and complete statistical
data; (f) obtaining and evaluating scientific advice, reviewing status of stocks, and promoting relevant
scientific research; (g) developing, when necessary, criteria for allocation of TAC or effort; (h) adopting
standards for the responsible conduct of fishing operations; (i) establishing mechanisms for effective
monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement, including a vessel monitoring system; (j) obtaining
and evaluating economic and other fisheries related data; (k) agreeing on means by which the fishing
interests of new members may be accommodated; and (l) promoting the peaceful settlement of
disputes. 560

To accomplish the Commission’s functions, the Commission is aided by the establishment of four
subsidiary bodies: 1) the Scientific Committee; 2) the Technical and Compliance Committee; 3) the
559
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Northern Committee; and 4) the Finance and Administrative Committee. The Scientific Committee was
created to ensure that the Commission obtains the best scientific information available for its
consideration. 561 Its main functions are to report its findings or conclusions to the Commission on the
status of target, non-target, or associated or dependent stocks, and to make recommendations to the
Commission concerning the conservation and management of, and research on, such stocks. 562

The Technical and Compliance Committee’s primary functions are to provide technical advice and
recommendations to the Commission on the implementation of, and compliance with, conservation and
management measures. 563

Article 11 authorizes the Commission to form a committee to make recommendations on the
implementation of conservation and management measures for the area north of the 20º N parallel, as well
as recommendations on the formulation of measures that apply to stocks which mostly occur in this area.
Based on this provision, the Northern Committee was established. Only members whose national waters
occur in the north Pacific north of 20º N latitude, or who have fishing vessels operating in the area north
of 20º N, are entitled to form part of the Northern Committee. 564

The Commission and its subsidiary committees are supported by a Secretariat whose functions are to: 1)
receive and transmit the Commission’s official communications; 2) facilitate the completion and
dissemination of data necessary to accomplish the Convention’s objectives; 3) prepare administrative
reports for the Commission and its subsidiary bodies; 4) administer agreed MCS arrangements and
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provide scientific advice; 5) publish decisions of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies; and 6)
perform treasury, personnel, and administrative functions. 565

5.3.2.6 Resolutions and Conservation and Management Measures

In developing compatible measures for the management of HMS stocks in the WCPO, adopted
agreements under the Commission can take one of two forms: 1) Resolutions; or 2) Conservation and
Management Measures (CMMs). Resolutions describe non-binding statements and recommendations
addressed to members of the Commission and cooperating non-members. CMMs describe binding
decisions of the Commission on members and cooperating non-members.

CMMs are generally composed of an introductory preamble which contains recitals and references to the
Convention and other related information. The applicable provisions of CMMs ordinarily take the form of
numbered paragraphs. Proposed CMMs and/or Resolutions are either drafted by CCMs or by the
Secretariat for consideration by the Commission at regular meetings. Proposed CMMs are to be submitted
and made available to CCMs at least 30 days prior to a Regular Commission meeting. 566

5.3.3.7 Allocation of Catch or Effort Limits within the Convention Area

Article 10(3) instructs the Commission to consider several factors when developing criteria for the
allocation of a TAC or total effort levels. The allocation of fishing rights is undoubtedly one of the most
contentious issue in any fisheries management setting, and the situation is no different within the
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Honolulu Convention Article 15(4).
Prior to submitting draft CMMs for consideration by the WCPFC, CCMs are required to evaluate the impact of
the proposal on SIDS and territories in the Convention Area. See WCPFC CMM 2013-06, which includes a list of
questions which CCMs are, at a minimum, to consider when evaluating the potential for the CMM to transfer a
disproportionate conservation burden onto SIDS.
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Commission. Given the primacy of this issue, Nandan expressed at MHLC3 that the allocation of a TAC
was fundamental in establishing compatible measures.567

The MHLC did consider allocations in some detail. One of major issues which was considered at the time
was the authority of the Commission to allocate a TAC, and whether the allocation would apply in the
EEZ of coastal States or whether the Commission could only allocate a TAC with respect to the high
seas. 568 Coastal States were in in favor of the Commission only having the authority to set quotas for the
high seas, whereas DWFNs wanted the Commission to be able to set quotas through the range of the
stock, including in the EEZs and on the high seas 569 Following MHLC3, an ad-hoc expert working group
was formed to consider how allocations had been dealt with in other RFMOs. 570 The working group
found that in other tuna-RFMOs, the respective conventions authorize parties to make legally-binding
decisions regarding catch allocations, and further that allocations cover both high seas areas and EEZs. 571
The report of the working group also asked several questions of MHLC participants, including whether
the Convention should prescribe a detailed allocation scheme or simply provide guidance in this area. In
addition, the report asked whether or not the Convention should make it clear that allocations do not
confer or prejudice any special rights to fishery resources.572

Answers to the two questions above can be viewed in the Convention Text. With regard to the latter
question on rights, Article 10 paragraph 1 of the Convention emphasizes that the function of the
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Commission is without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, and conserving and managing, HMS stocks within areas under national jurisdiction. 573

With respect to developing an allocation scheme in the convention, MHLC participants did not reach
agreement. Instead, the convention suggests that when developing criteria for the allocation of a TAC, the
Commission should take into account several issues. In Article 10(3), 10 issues are listed to help guide the
Commission when developing allocation criteria, including the status of the stocks, the historical catch in
the area, the special requirements of (SIDS), the provision of accurate data, as well as compliance issues
(among others). 574

5.3.2.8 Decision Making: Consensus and Voting

Article 20 instructs the Commission to strive for consensus on matters as a general rule, but if consensus
cannot be achieved, voting on questions of procedure is to be taken by a majority of CCMs present and
voting. However, all decisions related to allocation of TAC or total effort levels, including decisions
related to the exclusion of vessel types, are to be made by consensus. 575 Amendments to the convention
also require consensus among members. 576

Procedural questions or decisions on questions related to substance, as noted above, can be resolved
through voting if all efforts to reach a decision by consensus have been exhausted. The convention
prescribes a procedure whereby there are two chambers, one consisting of FFA members and the other of
non-FFA members. For a decision to pass, a three-fourths majority in each chamber must be achieved. 577
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The “without prejudice” clause in Article 10 did not appear in Nandan’s first draft articles but surfaced after
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Moreover, in order to defeat a measure that is being considered in a vote, there must be more than two
CCMs in any of the two chambers that oppose approval.578

The provisions of the convention related to decision making stirred significant debate within the MHLC
process, with one commentator calling it the most intractable of issues before the MHLC. 579 For example,
some participants were of the belief that all decisions required consensus, while others were in favor of
voting mechanisms which sought to overcome issues that had reached an impasse. 580 Nandan’s first draft
articles introduced at MHLC3 included a decision making process that involved both consensus and
voting mechanisms. 581 The draft articles stated that if efforts to reach consensus were exhausted, then
decisions by voting on procedural issues required a majority of members participating, and decisions by
voting on substantive issues required a three quarters majority of members present and voting. 582 By
including both consensus and decision making, Nandan wanted to avoid situations that had occurred in
other RFMOs – situations where a consensus had not been reached and the organization became
deadlocked. 583 However, given that there were more Pacific Island coastal Sates participating in MHLC
than distant water fishing States, participants from several DWFNs voiced strong opposition to a
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convention decision making process that included voting procedures, with these countries instead
preferring decisions to be based on consensus only. 584

Nandan countered the ‘consensus-only’ view supported by DWFNs by articulating that UNFSA Article
10 paragraphs (j) and (k) instruct members of RFMOs to agree on decision making procedures that
facilitate the adoption of measures in a timely and effective manner, as well as providing for the peaceful
settlement of disputes. 585 In addition, Nandan included in the draft articles related to the decision making
process a mechanism whereby if a member disagreed with a majority decision, or was not present at the
time of voting, the member could request a third party review of the decision. 586 The concept of a review
panel was new to international fisheries organizations and was used to counter the inclusion of “opt-out”
provisions that were supported by some DWFNs during the MHLC process. 587

During MHLC5, the draft article on decision making was revised to include different procedures on issues
where consensus would be required versus others matters where a voting mechanism could be invoked.
For example, the following language was added: “Except where this Convention expressly provides that a
decision shall be made by consensus…” 588 In addition, a conciliation requirement was included to
address deadlocks on matters that require consensus (e.g., allocation), such that the Commission could
584
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appoint a conciliator for the purpose of reconciling the differences in order to achieve consensus on the
matter. 589

At MHLC6, there was still opposition to the decision making article as drafted, and little progress was
made. Going into MHLC7, the matter of decision making was one of the more unsettled issues that
required agreement. To appease the delegations of Japan and Korea, the United States proposed a twochambered voting system, with one chamber being FFA member States and other, non-FFA States. While
there was opposition to the chambered voting system, it was maintained in the adopted convention text. 590

5.3.2.9 Dispute Resolution

Procedures for the settlement of disputes, along with several other matters, were identified in the Majuro
Declaration as issues to be addressed during the MHLC process. 591 A review of MHLC records indicates
that negotiators focused more on dispute settlement in terms of decision making rather than discussing
procedures for settling disputes between contracting parties. For example, the Honolulu Convention
incorporates by reference the dispute settlement provisions of UNFSA and UNCLOS; however, as
previously discussed, the Honolulu Convention added procedures for disputes related to Commission
decision making, including the appointment of a third party conciliator, rather than focusing on disputes
among members. 592

Under the Honolulu Convention, dispute resolution on questions of jurisdiction and other matters (e.g.,
member non-compliance) would follow the procedures identified Article 31, which points back to Part
VIII of UNFSA. Consistent with its linkages with UNCLOS, UNFSA similarly points back to Part XV of
589
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UNCLOS. As such, there are high levels of consistency with regard to the dispute settlement provisions
of the Honolulu Convention, UNFSA and UNCLOS. Recalling the so-called high seas fishing crisis of the
early 1990s, procedures for the peaceful settlement disputes was deemed a pillar of UNFSA, even though
the agreement replicated, for the most part, the existing dispute provisions of UNCLOS. 593 Indeed, it
appears that neither UNSFA negotiators nor those countries participating in the MHLC process were keen
on ‘reinventing the wheel.’

It is worth reiterating that both UNCLOS and UNFSA maintain that compulsory dispute resolution does
not apply to fisheries disputes relating to the rights and obligations of coastal State for activities within
their national waters. 594 UNCLOS Article 297(3) provides that coastal States are not obliged to accept
compulsory dispute settlement relating to their sovereign rights with respect to living resources in their
EEZs. 595 On the other hand, for disputes relating to high seas fishing matters, any decision by a third party
arbiter would be binding on the parties involved. 596

Dispute resolution is critical to the concept of compatible measures. While compulsory adjudication of
fisheries disputes does not apply to areas of national jurisdiction, third party conciliation is an option that
States may pursue with respect to settling disputes on issues of compatibility between high seas and EEZ
593
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management regimes in the WCP-Convention Area. However, binding dispute resolution procedures can
be invoked for disputes with regard to high seas fishing in the WCP-Convention Area.

5.3.2.10 Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance Provisions

The convention provides a comprehensive MCS framework to promote vessel and CCM compliance and
support enforcement activities, as appropriate. During the MHLC process, however, not all countries were
favor of such detailed provisions. Japan, for example, expressed concern at MHLC3 that the draft
convention text placed too much emphasis on MCS provisions.597

Article 24(a) designates the duties of flag States. In the context of the present discussion, it is noteworthy
that flag States are to ensure that vessels flying their flag comply with CMMs, and further, that all vessels
fishing on the high seas have been authorized to do so by their respective flag State. 598 Furthermore,
Article 24(1)(b) requires members to ensure that vessels flying their flag do not conduct illegal and
unauthorized fishing within areas of national jurisdiction of any other contracting party. Article 24(4)
requires each CCM to keep a record of vessels flying its flag and authorized to fish in the Convention
Area beyond its area of national jurisdiction.

Article 24(8) instructs CCMs to require their vessels fishing for HMS stocks on the high seas of the
Convention Area to use a near real-time position-fixing transmitter, which is commonly referred as a
vessel monitoring system (VMS) unit. In the mid-1990s, VMS units were becoming popular in fisheries
management for MCS purposes. 599 The application of VMS in the region was discussed in detail at
MHLC1, with general support from all countries indicating that VMS technology could be an effective
tool for fisheries enforcement. However, it was also noted that the implementation of a regional VMS
597
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program posed great challenges from a legal, technical and cost perspective. 600 Subsequently, two MHLC
technical consultations were held on VMS prior to MHLC2.

Ultimately, however, the challenges posed by VMS issues were overcome, with the Honolulu Convention
requiring CCMs in Article 24 paragraph 8 to ensure that vessels flying their flag on the high seas are
equipped with VMS units installed to the specification and standards developed by the WCPFC. 601
Similarly, Article 24 paragraph 9 instructs CCMs that have vessels fishing in the national waters of a
coastal State to require such vessels to carry VMS-type units that meet the specifications of the coastal
State. 602 Article 24 paragraph 10 instructs CCMs to cooperate so that VMS systems that apply within
EEZs and on the high seas are compatible.

Whenever two computer systems are linked, avoiding ‘crossed wires’ is important. Indeed, this is
particularly true in the case of VMS units, transmission pathways and data storage systems. During the
MHLC process, there was a clear need to ensure that VMS applications used in waters under national
jurisdiction and on the high seas were compatible in order to: 1) reduce the regulatory burden on fishing
vessels; and 2) ensure the utility of VMS for MCS purposes, regardless of whether the vessel is fishing in
an EEZ or on the high seas.

Another MCS issue that received substantial attention during the MHLC process was the high seas
boarding and inspection scheme – itself a contentious topic within the UNFSA negotiations. There were
several delegations, for example, that wished to modify the UNFSA text that was incorporated by
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reference. 603 To appease the concerns of several delegations, the Honolulu Convention included a
mechanism that allowed for the development of alternative boarding and inspection procedures that take
into account regional issues. However, if no agreement on alternative boarding and inspection measures
has been adopted after two years, the boarding and inspection provisions as laid out in UNFSA would
apply. 604

The Honolulu Convention also prescribes the development of a regional observer program. 605 The
observer program consists of independent and impartial observers that serve two main functions: a) to
collect catch data and other scientific information; and b) to monitor the implementation of conservation
and management measures. 606 Under the convention, observers are required on vessels that fish
exclusively on the high seas, as well as vessels that fish in waters under the jurisdiction of one or more
coastal States. The convention also instructs the regional observer program be coordinated with other
regional, sub-regional, and national observer programs. 607

5.3.2.11 Special Requirements of Developing States

Like other provisions in the Honolulu Convention, the article that pertains to the special requirements of
developing States is nearly identical to the UNFSA text on the same topic. 608 The MHLC process
recognized that the special requirements of these countries needed to focus on two general themes: 1)
fisheries development aspirations to support long-term economic growth; and 2) assistance to SIDS in
order to support their participation in the conservation and management of HMS stocks in the region.609
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Article 30 of the Honolulu Convention provides that the WCPFC shall recognize the vulnerability of
developing States parties, in particular SIDS and Participating Territories, which are dependent on the
exploitation of marine living resources, including for meeting the food security needs of their
populations. 610 In addition, Article 30 identifies the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access
to fisheries, by subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and fish-workers. 611 Likewise in UNFSA,
Article 30 includes the requirement that conservation and management measures not result in transferring,
directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States parties, and
territories and possessions. 612

With the objective of supporting the participation of SIDS in the conservation and management of shared
HMS stocks within the region, the Honolulu Convention establishes a fund to mainly support the travel
costs of SIDS representatives so that they can attend meetings of the WCPFC and its subsidiary bodies.613

5.5 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has shown that there are three main categories of nations with fishing interests in the WCPO
region, including: a) PICs; b) DWFNs; and c) other countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia. Since
the 1970s, PICs have organized themselves sub-regionally and formed the FFA and PNA. Both FFA and
PNA members have established domestic measures applicable to their national waters, whereas the
former controls over 80% of the purse seine catch in the region and is managed under the VDS. Several
non-Pacific Island countries in the region are also coastal States within the Convention Area, including
several Asian countries, the United States and France, but can also be considered DWFNs based on the
operations of their fleets. The Philippines and Indonesia constitute a separate category of countries with
large archipelagic waters and significant artisanal fleets catching a substantial amount of tuna within their
610
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national waters. When combined, the fishing interests of these countries represent the world’s largest
tuna fishery.

To effectively managed HMS resources in the region, countries with an interest in WCPO tuna fisheries
cooperated to establish a binding international agreement through a series of MHLCs. There were seven
MHLCs held in total, with the final meeting in 2000 culminating in the signing of the Honolulu
Convention. The convention was negotiated to be consistent with UNFSA and UNCLOS, with several
articles directly replicating or incorporating by reference the provisions of the former. With regard to the
Principle, the Honolulu Convention largely replicates the related UNFSA provisions, but with two
additional considerations: 1) EEZ based measures are not to undermine the effectiveness of the measures
adopted by the Commission; and 2) special attention should be paid toward compatibility and high seas
pocket areas.

Given the unique mosaic of EEZs scattered throughout the Convention Area, the significant economic
dependence of PICs on fisheries, as well as the substantial global interest in the world’s largest tuna
fishery, the application of the Principle by the Commission is an issue ripe for evaluation.
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Chapter 6: Evaluating the Application of the Principle in WCPFC
Conservation and Management Measures
6.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the application of the Principle and associated Article 8 provisions of the Honolulu
Convention by the WCPFC. To evaluate the application of the Principle, a scoring system is utilized that
assesses performance against a set of criteria. This assessment builds upon similar scoring systems which
have been used to evaluate the performance of RFMOs. 614 As described in Section 1.6, the criteria
employed in the assessment relate to the application of the Principle and consideration of Article 8
provisions in the development and adoption of WCPFC CMMs.

To assess the application of the Principle within individual CMMs, a review of the measure is conducted,
including its various provisions and elements related to the Article 8, against a set of standards and
criteria (listed in the following tables). These elements include, but are not limited to, reference to Article
8 in the measure, measures already established for waters under national jurisdiction, the area of
application (i.e., the high seas vs EEZs) as well the stock status for the particular stock under management
by the WCPFC.
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Table 1: Standard 1: Reference to the Principle - Article 8 in general

Standard 1:
Article 8 in
general

Article 8(1): Conservation and management measures established for the high seas
and those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to
ensure conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in their
entirety. To this end, the members of the Commission have a duty to cooperate for
the purpose of achieving compatible measures in respect of such stocks.
Criteria
Does the measure reference
Article 8?

Justification
Whether the measure references Article 8 is
important, as the article acknowledges the
Principle in the development and application of
the measure.

Table 2: Standard 2: Existing Measures - Article 8(2)(b)(i-ii) and (c)

Standard 2:
Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and (c)

Article 8(2)(b): In establishing compatible conservation and management measures
for highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area, the Commission shall take
into account:
i: the conservation and management measures adopted and applied in accordance
with article 61 of the 1982 Convention in respect of the same stocks by coastal
States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures established
in respect of such stocks for the Convention Area as a whole do not undermine the
effectiveness of such measures;
ii: previously agreed measures established and applied in respect of the same
stocks for the high seas which form part of the Convention Area by relevant coastal
States and States fishing on the high seas in accordance with the 1982 Convention
and the Agreement;
Article 8(2)(c): previously agreed measures established and applied in accordance
with the 1982 Convention and the Agreement in respect of the same stocks by a
subregional or regional fisheries management
organization or arrangement.
Criteria
Does the measure recognize
measures established for EEZs
or prior measures established
for the high seas?

Justification
Reference to those measures adopted for national
waters, as well as previous measures adopted for
the high seas, is important. This is because the
Commission should have an understanding of
what EEZ measures are in effect or under
development, in addition to what measures have
already been agreed to within the high seas of the
Convention area.
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Table 3 Standard 3: Biological Unity - Article 8(2)(a)
Article 8(2)(a): take into account the biological unity and other biological
characteristics of the stocks and the relationships between the distribution of the
stocks, the fisheries and the geographical particularities of the region concerned,
including the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national
jurisdiction;
Standard 3:
Article 8(2)(a)

Criteria

Justification

What is the extent of the
measure’s area of application
and does it take into account the
biological unity of the stocks
concerned and associated
fisheries?

The area of application of a WCPFC measure is a
basic element which should be consistent with the
distribution of the stock, while taking into account
other biological characteristics such as spawning
and movement.

Table 4: Standard 4: Respective Dependence -Article 8(2)(d)
Article 8(2)(d): take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and
States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned.
Criteria
Standard 4:
Article 8(2)(d)

To what extent are
considerations of respective
dependence on the stocks
concerned taken into account?

Justification
In the development of compatible measures, the
records of the negotiation or the measure would
note the respective dependence of members on the
stocks concerned. Data collection requirements of
a particular CCM could be viewed as supporting
information gathering that will aid in identifying
respective dependence.

Table 5: Standard 5: High Seas Pockets - Article 8(4)
Article 8(4): Where there are areas of high seas in the Convention Area entirely
surrounded by the exclusive economic zones of members of the Commission, the
Commission shall, in giving effect to this article, pay special attention to ensuring
compatibility between conservation and management measures established for such
high seas areas and those established in respect of the same stocks in accordance
with article 61 of the 1982 Convention by the surrounding coastal States in areas
under national jurisdiction.
Standard 5:
Article 8(4)
Criteria
Justification
To what extent are
considerations for high seas
pockets provided for in the
CMM?

Due to the mosaic of EEZs that make up the
WCPO, there are several high seas pockets within
the Convention area. According to the Honolulu
Convention, these areas should be afforded
special attention with regard to compatibility.
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Table 6: Standard 6: Sustainable Stocks - Article 8(2)
Article 2: The objective of this Convention is to ensure, through effective
management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish
stocks in the western and central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982
Convention and the Agreement

Standard 6:
Article 2

Criteria

Justification

What is the status of the
stock(s) concerned given the
collective obligation to ensure
long-term conservation through
effective management?

The fundamental objective of the Honolulu
Convention is to ensure the long-term
conservation of WCPO HMS stocks. If fishing
pressure is too high and/or biomass levels are too
low, management controls will need to be applied
to fisheries that impact the stock. The allocation
of those controls between EEZs and the high seas
has linkages to the Principle.

A scoring system is used to rate the consistency with each standard and associated criteria, and when the
scores are combined, each CMM is assigned a compatibility rating. 615 For each criterion, a numerical
range between 0 and 1 is used as follows: 0 = not consistent; 0.25 = partially consistent; 0.5 = moderately
consistent; 0.75 = nearly consistent; and 1 = fully consistent. The performance against each standard is
evaluated and then totaled as a percentage, providing a compatibility score for each CMM (Table 7).

615

The rating system utilizes evaluative approaches similar to: Alder et al. (2001).
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Table 7: Compatibility assessment matrix
Standard

Criteria

Scoring Range

1. Article 8
in general

Does the measure reference Article
8?

2. Article
8(2)(b)(i-ii)
and (c)

Does the measure recognize prior
measures established for EEZs or the
high seas?

3. Article
8(2)(a)?

What is the extent of the measure’s
area of application and does it take
into account the biological unity of
the stocks concerned and associated
fisheries?
To what extent are considerations of
respective dependence on the stocks
concerned taken into account?

0 = no reference
0.5 = partial consideration
1 = includes reference
0 = no reference
0.25 - 0.75 = partial
consideration
1 = includes reference
0 = no consideration
0.25 - 0.75 = partial
consideration
1 = full consideration

4 Article
8(2)(d)

5. Article
8(4)

To what extent does the CMM
accommodate considerations for high
seas pockets?

6. Article 2
Stock Status

What is the status of the stock(s)
concerned given the collective
obligation to ensure long-term
conservation through effective
management?

0 = no consideration
0.25 - 0.75 = partial
consideration
1 = detailed consideration
0 = no consideration
0.25 - 0.75 = partial
consideration
1 = full consideration
0 = severely overfished
0.25 - 0.75 = overfished and
overfishing is occurring
1 = healthy

Max
Score
1
1

1

1

1

1

Total =
(6/6)
100%
Note: For stocks that do not occur in areas of the WCPO where there high seas pockets, these CMMs are
not assessed against Article 8(4).
To support the evaluation of CMMs against the standards presented herein, this Chapter provides a
detailed account, to the extent practicable, of the developmental history of CMMs. The analysis is
centered on the records of Commission meetings, including proposals by CCMs and other relevant
information. A description of the various negotiating positions relating to the development of a particular
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measure is provided, but subject to such information being available in the records of WCPFC
meetings. 616

Since its First Regular Session in 2004, and through 2017, the WCPFC has adopted 87 CMMs, with 44 of
these subsequently being replaced with newer versions.617 Of the 44 that remain in effect today, eight
apply to catch or effort limit restrictions on managed HMS. With regard to the Principle and Article 8, the
Honolulu Convention does not differentiate between the types of conservation and management measures
that are required to be compatible - i.e., the convention leaves unstated whether the compatibility
provisions apply to all measures or only for those concerned with catch or effort allocations. However, it
can reasonably be argued that the main focus of compatible measures is input or output fisheries
management controls. Such controls are concerned with who is catching what, how much is caught, with
what type of fishing gear, as well as where the catches are made. In this regard, the compatibility
assessment contained in this chapter evaluates CMMs that establish catch or effort restrictions for
managed species.

6.2 Tropical Tunas (Skipjack, Yellowfin and Bigeye tuna)

The Commission’s CMM on tropical tunas is arguably its marquee measure, involving three stocks that
collectively represent over 90% of the combined total catch in the Convention Area. 618 Skipjack, which at
67% of the total 2016 catch comprises the bulk of the WCPO tuna fishery, is followed by yellowfin at
24% and bigeye at 6% of the total catch. 619

616

The WCPFC Secretariat maintains the following website that contains the summary reports of each WCPFC
Regular Session and associated meeting documents. See: https://www.wcpfc.int/meeting-folders/regular-sessionscommission
617
The WCPFC Secretariat also maintains an on-line repository of conservation and management measures. See:
http://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-and-management-measures
618
SPC. (2017). Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2016. Oceanic
Fisheries Programme, Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Noumea, New Caledonia. 140-142.
619
Williams et al. (2017) at 2.
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The first CMM with regard to tropical tunas was agreed in 2005, and focused on bigeye and yellowfin,
which at the time were believed to be subject to overfishing. 620 The measure, however, mainly applied to
purse seine and longline fisheries, which also harvest skipjack and other species.621 CMM 2005-01 was
the first WCPFC measure to identify Article 8 and refer to the implementation of compatible measures.622
Specifically, CMM 2005-01, paragraph 9, states that the Commission “shall implement compatible
measures as required to ensure that purse seine effort does not exceed 2004 levels on the high seas in the
Convention Area or that the total fishing capacity will not increase in the Convention Area.”623

Paragraph 9 of CMM 2005-01 was problematic for several reasons. First, the paragraph states that “the
Commission” shall implement compatible measures instead of clearly articulating that it is incumbent on
each CCM to limit their high seas purse seine effort to 2004 levels. This drafting formulation lacks
specificity by placing no distinct obligation on CCMs to ensure that their high seas effort for flagged
purse seine vessels does not exceed 2004 levels. Additionally, while paragraph 9 restricts fishing
capacity, it is not clear on the metric to measure fishing capacity, such as the number of fishing vessels,
vessel size, or the well space of the vessel. 624

Although paragraph 9 of CMM 2005-01 lacked specificity, the measure did apply to both national waters
and the high seas, as evidenced in paragraph 8, which states that CCMs “shall take necessary measures”
to ensure that purse seine effort levels do not exceed 2001 to 2004 average levels or 2004 levels for
waters under their national jurisdiction. 625 The measure further specifies that FFA member countries who

620

WCPFC SC. (2005). Report of the First Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee. 8-19 August
2005. Noumea, New Caledonia. 25.
621
WCPFC. (2005). Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean (CMM 2005-01). Adopted at the Second Regular Session of the WCPFC. 12-16 December
2005. Pohnpei, FSM. In CMM 2005-01, “other commercial fisheries” include hand-line, pole and line, purse seine
fisheries north of 20°N or south of 20°S, ring-net, troll, as well as unclassified fisheries.
622
Ibid at 2.
623
Ibid. Unfortunately, the Summary Report of the WCPFC2 does not contain information on the negotiation
positions of CCMs relevant to the development of CMM 2005-01. Nor is there discussion in the records of which
CCM introduced the measure that was eventually adopted at that meeting.
624
Ibid at 2, paragraph 9.
625
Ibid.
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are members of the PNA will implement EEZ-based effort limits under the VDS by 1 December 2007,
with measures under the Palau Arrangement to remain in force until that time. 626 Other non-PNA
members were required to reduce their purse seine effort limits in their national waters to either 20012004 average levels or 2004 levels. 627

CMM 2005-01 also spatially confined the applicability of purse seine measures to 20°N to 20°S. 628 For
longline fisheries, however, no spatial distinction was prescribed, and each CCM was required to limit
their bigeye longline catch – regardless of where they fish in the Convention Area – to 2001-2004 average
levels or 2004 levels. 629 For those CCMs with annual longline bigeye catches of less than 2,000 mt, the
measure required them to not exceed 2,000 mt per year. 630

CMM 2005-01 also instructed the Commission’s Executive Director to develop a proposal for
consideration at the following year’s annual meeting with regard to temporary closures for the purse seine
fishery, with the direction that such a proposal be consistent with IATTC arrangements. 631 Although the
intent of CMM 2005-01 was to limit catch and effort for bigeye and yellowfin tuna, the measure, by using
2001-2004 average levels or 2004 levels as the baseline, effectively limited purse seine fishing effort and
the longline catch of bigeye with reference to the highest historical catch and effort levels ever

626

Ibid at 2, paragraph 10(i).
Ibid at 2, paragraph 10 (ii). Further evidence that the measure applied to national waters is the provision in
paragraph 13 that required CCMs to develop management plans for the use of FADs within waters under national
jurisdiction (CMM 2005-01 paragraph 13).
628
Ibid at 2, paragraph 7. Notably, Japan’s coastal purse seine fisheries, which caught mostly Pacific bluefin and to
lesser extent skipjack, would be exempted. For further reading on Japan’s tuna fisheries, see Annual Report Part 1
submitted to the WCPFC Scientific Committee: https://www.wcpfc.int/meeting-folders/scientific-committee.
629
Ibid at paragraph 17. As identified in the measure, only the United States and China were allowed to use 2004
catch levels as the baseline for their bigeye catch limits.
630
Ibid at 3, paragraph 18.
631
Ibid at 2, paragraph 11.
627
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recorded. 632 Consequentially, CMM 2005-01 was unlikely to achieve conservation objectives of
eliminating bigeye and yellowfin overfishing.

At the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC in 2006, it was identified that in order to eliminate bigeye
and yellowfin overfishing, a 25% and 10% respective reduction in bigeye and yellowfin fishing mortality
was required. 633 The Executive Director of the Commission, with assistance from the WCPFC Scientific
Services Provider, presented a paper that analyzed several purse seine closure options. 634 The options
presented applied to both national waters and the high seas, and as such, could be viewed as being in
accord with the Principle. While the terms of reference for the Executive Director’s paper were limited to
purse seine options, the paper also included a discussion of longline management measures (e.g., catch
limits). 635 As the analysis revealed, if the purse seine fishery were to meet the conservation objectives for
bigeye alone (i.e., in the absence of further longline limits), purse seine fishing effort on FADs would
need to be reduced by 75% over baseline levels.636 Recognizing that this would be unacceptable to CCMs
that have a strong purse seine interest, the paper included longline high seas catch limit options as a
means of mitigating the impact on the stocks by the respective fishing gears.637 The paper also described
“key considerations” with regard to evaluating purse seine closure options, which included several issues
such as: a) fairness and burden sharing; b) the relative importance of FAD associated fishing to various
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WCPFC. (2006). Proposal in respect of paragraph 11 of Conservation and Management Measure 2005-01.
Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2006. Apia, Samoa. WCPFC3-2006/16 Rev.1. By including
2004 as a baseline year for purse seine fishery effort, CMM 2005-01 provided for approximately a 15% increase in
purse seine effort relative to the 2001-2003 average. Similarly, including 2004 in the baseline for longline catches
resulted in a 15% increase over 2001-2003 average levels.
633
WCPFC. (2006). Summary Report of the Second Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 718 August 2006, Manila, Philippines. v.
634
Ibid.
635
After the paper was presented at the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC, Japan commented that the options
presented went beyond the Executive Director’s mandate and requested that the paper be recalled due to bias. Japan,
Korea, and Chinese Taipei stated their objection to the option that included reductions in longline bigeye catch. See:
WCPFC. (2009). Summary Report of the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2006. Apia,
Samoa.19.
636
Ibid.
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CCM purse seine fleets; and c) that the benefits flowing from a measure to reduce the catch of juvenile
bigeye will mostly accrue to fisheries targeting adult bigeye (i.e., longline fisheries).638

With the Executive Director’s options paper serving as a guide, the Commission considered revisions to
CMM 2005-01 but ultimately failed to adopt a stronger measure, such as closing any high seas purse
seine fisheries. The Commission did, however, amend the measure to include “other fisheries” that catch
bigeye tuna. Specifically, CMM 2006-01 required CCMs to take action to ensure that the total capacity of
their respective other commercial tuna fisheries for bigeye and yellowfin (excluding artisanal fisheries),
does not exceed 2001-2004 average levels or the level in 2004. 639 Another modification found in CMM
2006-01 was that it required CCMs with vessels that fish beyond their national waters to develop
management plans for the use of FADs in areas beyond their national jurisdiction.640 Recall that in CMM
2005-01, CCM’s were required to develop FAD management plans for waters under their national
jurisdiction. However, under CMM 2006-01, such plans required development by CCMs for both waters
under their national jurisdiction and on the high seas.

CMM 2006-01 was reviewed by the Commission in 2007, with the FFA tabling a proposal that included,
inter alia, provisions for a three-month FAD closure and a 25% reduction in longline bigeye catches for
CCMs with catches more than 2,000 metric tons (mt).641 The FFA proposal also included a provision that
would exempt certain CCMs from the FAD closure (insofar as it applied to their national waters),
provided they could demonstrate that more than 20% of their government revenue derived from purse
seine fishing access fees. 642 Certain CCMs stated that this proposal would be ineffective in achieving
638

Ibid at 18. To this day, these considerations are still at the forefront of bigeye conservation within the WCPFC,
forming the basis for the tension between purse seine interests and longline interests within the WCPFC.
639
WCPFC. (2006). Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuan in the WCPO (CMM
2006-01). Adopted at the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. Apia, Samoa. 11-15 December 2006. 2.
640
Ibid.
641
FFA. (2007). Draft Conservation and Management Measure for bigeye and yellowfin tuna in the Western and
Central Pacific Region. Submitted to the Fourth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-7 December 2007. Guam, USA.
WCPFC4-2007-DP12.
642
Ibid at 2. Although not referenced in report, such provisions could related to the ‘respective dependence’
provisions under Honolulu Convention Article 8(2)(d).
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conservation objectives, while others said that the potential FFA member exemption would result in the
FAD closure applying only to the high seas and not to national waters within the Convention Area. 643 In
this regard, it was apparent that some CCMs believed that the consistent implementation of the purse
seine FAD closure between the high seas and national waters was important to ensure compatibility.

The proposal, however, was not adopted due to a lack of consensus, but there was general agreement to
defer action until the following year with the understanding that a new stock assessment had been
scheduled. 644 Moreover, the Commission agreed that developing compatible measures for fishing on the
high seas was a priority work area for 2008. 645 The Commission directed the SC and the Technical and
Compliance Committee (TCC) to provide advice and recommendations to support the adoption of a new
measure - one which would take into account bigeye and yellowfin stock status, technological solutions,
issues related to fairness and equity, as well as the implementation of MCS measures.646

As the Commission delayed agreement on a new bigeye and yellowfin measure, the stock condition of
bigeye worsened and overfishing increased. Based on the 2008 WCPO bigeye stock assessment
conducted by the SPC, the SC concluded that a 30% reduction in bigeye fishing mortality was needed to
eliminate overfishing, as compared to the 25% reduction that had been forecast in 2006. 647 The TCC
meeting in 2008 reviewed various papers related to purse seine catch retention and FADs, including FAD
closures and how other RFMOs address FAD management issues. 648 At this meeting, compliance with the
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WCPFC. (2007). Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-7 December 2007. Guam,
USA. 36.
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Ibid at 38.
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Ibid at 9. The Commission Chair further clarified that the development of compatible measures for the high seas,
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those measures applicable to the PNA members of the Commission, which is consistent with paragrapahs 9 and 10
of CMM-2005-01. Ibid at 48, paragraph 353.
646
WCPFC4 (2007) at 287.
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WCPFC. (2008). Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 1122 August 2008. Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. xi.
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WCPFC. (2008). Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the Technical Compliance Committee
Meeting of the WCPFC. 2-7 October 2008. Pohnpei, FSM. 21.
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existing measure was also reviewed generally by the Secretariat, and there were calls for the development
of a compliance monitoring scheme that included sanctions for non-compliance. 649

In 2008, while momentum was building for a new tropical tuna measure, the PNA agreed to its Third
Implementing Arrangement – establishing new MTCs for all foreign fishing agreements and licensing
agreements for vessels fishing in the EEZs of PNA-member countries. 650 The Third Implementing
Arrangement did not involve issues associated with implementation of the VDS, but rather included: 1) a
catch retention requirement for all purse seine vessels fishing for skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin.
Excluded from this requirement, however, was fish unfit for human consumption and situations where
well space was limited at the end of a trip and the catch exceeded storage capacity; 2) a three-month
seasonal FAD closure to be implemented from 1 July to 30 September 30 each year; 651 3) a prohibition on
setting on whale sharks; 4) the closure of the two western high seas pockets; and 5) one hundred percent
observer coverage levels for all foreign purse seine vessels, with observers sourced from PNA member
nations or an existing sub-regional observer program.

652

With the implementation of the VDS and agreement on the Third Implementing Arrangement in 2008,
PNA members transitioned the management of the purse seine fishery occurring in their national waters,
setting the stage for the Commission to establish compatible measures for other portions of the
Convention Area. At the Commission meeting in 2008, the Secretariat presented a paper that considered
options to limit purse fishing effort on the high seas with regard to the establishment of compatible
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Ibid. The TCC, at its Fourth Regular meeting, also noted that failure to provide information to the Commission
constitutes a failure to comply with the measure in question. A CMM to establish a Compliance Monitoring Scheme
was adopted two years later, in the form of CMM 2010-03. This CMM has been amended several times since.
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PNA. (2008). Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Additional Terms and
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measures. 653 The following options were presented: 1) an Olympic allocation for the high seas; 2) a high
seas limit based on historical (2001-2004) effort levels; 3) a total high seas effort limit with a percentage
reserved for SIDS development aspirations; and 4) a total high seas limit of 500 days assigned to the
Commission and managed by the Secretariat through a funding scheme to support fisheries research.654

With the Commission primed to take action at WCPFC5 in 2008, the Commission received a review of
the Principle and Article 8 by the Commission’s legal advisor, Dr. Martin Tsamenyi. One of the main
issues identified by Dr. Tsamenyi related to the area of application of CMMs with respect to national
waters, and whether CMMs apply within a country’s territorial, archipelagic or internal waters. As noted
in the report of the meeting, there was no consensus on how the term “areas under national jurisdiction”
should be interpreted and applied with respect to compatible measures. It was further noted that the issued
would require further consideration and clarification among members. 655

As was expected going into the meeting, WCPFC5 proved to be pivotal with regard to the management of
tropical tunas in the WCPO. After significant debate on a wide range of proposals and revisions thereof,
as well as consideration of scientific information and advice provided by the SPC, SC and TCC, the
Commission adopted a multiyear CMM for bigeye and yellowfin (CMM 2008-01). 656 Like its
predecessors, CMM 2008-01 covered purse seine, longline, and other fisheries that target bigeye and
yellowfin.
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CMM 2008-01 includes reference to Article 8 and the Principle in several instances. First, Article 8 is
identified in the chapeau section of the measure, serving as reminder that the Convention requires the
compatibility of conservation and management measures between the high seas and waters under national
jurisdiction. 657 Second, the Principle is referred to in paragraph 1 of the measure in the ‘Objectives’
section, which states that compatible measures for the high seas and EEZs are to maintain stocks at levels
capable of producing MSY, as qualified by relevant factors. 658 Third, the Principle is mentioned in
paragraphs 12 and 18, such that non-PNA CCMs shall implement compatible measures to reduce purse
seine fishing mortality on bigeye tuna in their EEZs for years 2009 and 2010 to 2011, respectively. 659
Lastly, the Principle is mentioned in paragraph 21 in regard to the provision that directs the Commission
to consider the development of a high seas VDS, and further to ensure that reductions in fishing effort on
the high seas and in adjacent EEZs are compatible.660

CMM 2008-01 included a package of measures that applied to purse seine vessels, longline vessels, and
other fisheries that target, either directly or incidentally, skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin. The main
conservation objective was to eliminate bigeye overfishing, with paragraph 8 of CMM 2008-01
identifying the objective of reducing purse seine bigeye fishing mortality by 30% over a 3 year period. 661
As a result, purse seine vessels were subject to the following four new provisions under CMM 2008-01:
1) a seasonal FAD closure; 662 2) the imposition of catch retention for all tunas; 3) a high seas pocket
closure; and 4) one hundred percent observer coverage. 663 Notably, all four provisions were also
contained in the PNA’s Third Implementing Arrangement, which signifies the importance of domestic
measures in formulating compatible high seas measures by the Commission.
657

Ibid at 2.
Ibid.
659
Ibid at 4-5.
660
Ibid at 6.
661
Ibid at 4.
662
CMM 2008-01 required a two-month FAD closure (August through September 2009) and applied to the high
seas and EEZs. For 2010 and 2011, CMM 2008-01 required a three-month FAD closure for the highs seas and EEZ
waters. See CMM 2008-01, paragraphs 11, 13, 17 and 19.
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The objective of the seasonal FAD closure was to reduce the purse seine catch of bigeye, which in the
context of this fishery, was composed predominately of juveniles that aggregate to drifting FADs. 664 The
seasonal FAD closure was an important measure agreed to by the Commission, not only with respect to
bigeye conservation, but also with respect to the adoption of compatible measures. As opposed to the
FFA’s 2007 proposal which provided an exemption for SIDS, the Commission endorsed a two-month
seasonal FAD closure for 2009 and a three-month FAD closure for 2010 and 2011. During the closure, it
was anticipated that PNA members would implement their “domestic processes and legislation.”665 The
Commission also adopted a high seas seasonal two-month FAD closure for 2009 and a three-month FAD
closure during 2010 and 2011. 666 The Commission, however, chose not to apply a seasonal FAD closure
for EEZ waters of non-PNA members, but rather instructed these CCMs to implement compatible
measures to reduce purse seine fishing mortality in their EEZs. 667 The records of the meeting do not
explain why these CCMs were not required to implement a FAD closure. Nor did the Commission specify
what types of measures would constitute compatible measures. As such, CMM 2008-01 required a FAD
closure for the high seas and the EEZs of eight CCMs (PNA members), but not for the EEZs of non-PNA
members such as the Philippines or Indonesia, which have purse seine fisheries operating within their
EEZs with average effort levels of approximately 5,600 and 6,500 vessel days per annum respectively. 668
The United States, which also falls under the non-PNA category and has EEZ areas within the core
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The significant increase in purse seine catch of mostly juvenile bigeye has been demonstrated to reduce the
potential yield from the stock. If the catch of juvenile bigeye were reduced, greater yields of larger bigeye would
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tropical purse seine region (e.g., Howland and Baker Islands), chose to implement a seasonal FAD
closure for its national waters in response to the requirement to establish compatible measures.669

Another major component of CMM 2008-01 was the closure of the two Western High Seas Pockets to
purse seine fishing - an important measure with respect to the application of Article 8 and the Principle
(Figure 42). Recall that Article 8(4) instructs the Commission to pay special attention to high seas pockets
with respect to compatibility.

Figure 42: Map of WCP-CA showing high seas pockets
Note: Western High Seas Pockets 1 and 2 shown as shaded black areas in rectangular box.
Source: CMM 2008-01
The Commission’s decision to adopt the high seas pocket closure was significant in that it represented a
conscious choice to privilege the conservation of stocks and/or other factors over the ‘freedom to fish on
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Requirements in Purse Seine Fisheries. Final Rule. Federal Register. 4 August 2009. 74 FR 38544. For 2009, the
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2008-01.
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the high seas’ and historical fishing effort in these areas. Prior to closure, the two Western High Seas
Pockets represented approximately 14% of the total effort in the WCPO. 670

The meeting records of the 5th Regular Session do not provide specific details on the rationale for the
Commission adopting the highs seas pocket closure, but the issue is identified in the records as being
linked to the establishment of a high seas VDS.671 The consideration of management measures for high
seas pockets, however, was not new to the Fifth Regular Session, but rather a concern FFA members had
been voicing for at least a decade prior (including in the meetings of the MHLC).672 In 2008, PNA
members closed the high seas pockets to vessels that fish in their waters as part of the Third Implementing
Arrangement. 673 The ecological rationale for closing the high seas pockets included reducing pressure on
overexploited tuna resources (e.g., bigeye and yellowfin), and supporting more effective controls over
illegal fishing. 674 Thus, it can be argued that the Commission chose to close the high seas pockets in
CMM 2008-01 for a variety of reasons, including to support Article 8 and the development of compatible
measures.

With respect to the management of bigeye catches by longline fisheries, CMM 2008-01 included the
objective of reducing bigeye fishing mortality by 30% over the course of three years.675 CMM 2008-01
paragraph 33, for example, required CCMs with longline fisheries catching more than 2,000 mt annually
to reduce their baseline quota (as established by the 2001-2004 average or 2004 levels in the case of the
670

SPC. (2012). Review of the implementation and effectiveness of CMM 2008-01. Eight Regular Session of the of
the WCPFC. 25-29 March 2012. Guam, USA. WCPFC8-2011-43-Rev.1. 6.
671
WCPFC. (2008). Summary Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 208. Aqorau (2009) suggests the
following reasons for closing the high seas pockets: (i) it reduces IUU fishing by eliminating safe havens in the high
seas; (ii) it reduces fishing mortality and effort; (iii) it provides a sanctuary both for target and non-target species;
(iv) it increases the economic value of EEZs; (v) it reinforces other efforts to conserve marine biodiversity. Aqorau.
T. (2009). Current legal developments: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. The International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 24, 737-746, at 742.
672
See Summary Report of MHLC3. Statements made by Kiribati and Papua New Guinea.
673
PNA (2008) Third Implementing Arrangement at 3, paragraph 3.
674
Hampton J. (2010). Tuna Fisheries Status and Management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.
Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Noumea, New Caledonia. 19.
675
Notably, CMM 2008-01 did not specify the baseline year from which the purse seine fishery was supposed to
reduce bigeye catches by 30%.

200

United States and China) by 10% each year between 2009 and 2011. 676 These longline limits applied both
within EEZs and on the high seas. Exemptions, however, were provided for CCMs that caught less than
5,000 mt per year and which landed fresh fish for their domestic markets, such that these fisheries only
had to reduce bigeye catches by 10% of their baseline levels as opposed to the 30% reduction required by
other longline fisheries. 677 Exemptions to longline bigeye limits were also provided to SIDS and
Participating Territories, such that no bigeye catch limits were placed on the longline fisheries of these
CCMs provided they were undertaking responsible development of their domestic fisheries.678

CMM 2008-01 also applied to “other fisheries” targeting bigeye and yellowfin, such that CCMs were to
implement measures to ensure that the total capacity these fisheries did not exceed their respective
average levels for the period 2001-2004 or 2004. 679 The term “other fisheries” includes artisanal fisheries
and the following gear types: gillnet, handline, pole and line, ring-net, purse seine (non-tropical), troll and
unclassified gear. The catch of yellowfin, skipjack and bigeye by these “other fisheries” represented
approximately 25%, 16% and 10% respectively of the total WCPO catch of these stocks.680 The
Commission chose to exclude artisanal fisheries and other fisheries taking less than 2,000 mt of bigeye
and yellowfin per year from the catch and effort restrictions. 681 The Commission did not define “artisanal
fisheries” in the measure.

The recognition that other fisheries apart from purse seine and longline fisheries contribute to bigeye and
yellowfin fishing mortality is important and supports the application of the Principle. However, the
676
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Commission decided not to impose catch limits for these fisheries, instead applying capacity limits. The
vessel capacity provision was problematic because it did not define the metric that CCMs should use
when implementing fishing capacity restrictions, e.g., the volume of vessel well space or the number of
vessels, etc. In addition to total capacity restrictions, the Commission also required CCMs to provide
estimates of fishing effort to the SC, or proposals for the provision of effort data for these fisheries.682

In exempting artisanal fisheries and other fisheries taking less than 2,000 mt of bigeye and yellowfin per
year, the Commission appeared to dismiss these fisheries as insignificant. However, without providing a
definition of what constitutes “artisanal fisheries,” the decision ultimately rests with individual countries,
with the result that there may be substantial variation in the way the term is interpreted. For example, the
FAO definition of “artisanal fishing” includes traditional fisheries involving fishing households (not
commercial companies) using relatively small vessels. However, the FAO definition also recognizes that
depending on the country (developed vs undeveloped), artisanal fishing may include commercial fisheries
involving vessels over 20 meters in length and using longline and purse seine gear. 683 The catch of
bigeye, for example, by artisanal fleets operating in mostly archipelagic waters of Indonesia and the
Philippines and territorial waters of coastal Japan represent approximately 3-7 percent of the total WCPCA catch (in weight). 684 If going by the number of fish, then the artisanal fisheries of Indonesia and
Philippines take nearly the same amount of juvenile bigeye as the purse seine fishery, with most of the
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catch within the 10 cm to 50 cm size class.685 The reasons for exempting artisanal fisheries from the
measure may be that most of the catch from Indonesia and Philippines fisheries occur within archipelagic
waters, and further, that these countries have demonstrated a lack of effective monitoring and control over
their fisheries. 686 CMM 2008-01 included a provision that encouraged CCMs to ensure that the
effectiveness of the relevant measures is not undermined by a transfer of effort into archipelagic waters
and territorial seas. 687

By way of contrast, the tropical tuna measure explicitly encouraged coastal States to take measures to
reduce fishing mortality on juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tuna in archipelagic waters and territorial seas.

The use of 2,000 mt as the standard for establishing restrictions for non-artisanal fisheries – i.e., if the
catch exceeds this weight, then any excess catch is restricted, but if the catch is below the threshold, then
additional catches up to 2,000 mt are permissible – seems to have been applied with little evaluation by
the Commission. Why, for example, should countries that catch less than 2,000 mt be allowed to increase
their catch to that level, when other countries are forced to reduce their catches?688 An alternative view is
that these countries have contributed very little in terms of bigeye exploitation in comparison to the fleets
of other members, and so they should be afforded the ability to catch increased, albeit restricted,
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quantities of fish. 689 In reviewing WCPFC records, which consist of meeting reports and other available
information, there is scant explanation of why 2,000 mt is used as a threshold figure within the
Commission. For example, why not use 1,000 mt as the limit? However, it is reasonable to conclude that
these fisheries, even when their catches are combined, represent a minor percentage of total catches for
yellowfin and bigeye, and thus they should not be viewed as a major factor in the consideration of
conservation and management measures.

CMM 2008-01 was an important achievement for the Commission, representing a multiyear measure
developed with the objective of establishing compatible measures for the high seas and EEZs to ensure
that bigeye and yellowfin tuna stocks were maintained at levels of capable of producing MSY. The
measure included a range of management provisions that applied in EEZs and on the highs seas, such as:
a) purse seine effort restrictions; b) a seasonal FAD closure; and c) flag-based longline catch limits that
were subject to a phased reduction over the course of the measure. While CMM 2008-01 was an
important step in supporting conservation and management objectives, its effectiveness is questionable.

In 2011, the SPC completed a new bigeye stock assessment indicating that bigeye overfishing was still
occurring. 690 The SC reviewed the assessment and concluded that a 32% reduction in fishing mortality
from 2006-2009 average levels was needed to eliminate bigeye overfishing. 691 As CMM 2008-01
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included purse seine and longline provisions that applied only through 2011, and the stock assessment
indicated that bigeye overfishing was continuing, it was anticipated that the December 2011 Commission
meeting would feature another round of intense negotiations on the tropical tuna measure.

The Secretariat circulated a paper just prior to the 2011 meeting of the TCC to serve as a starting point for
the development of a new bigeye and yellowfin CMM.692 While the paper contained a similar mix of
CMM 2008-01 provisions for purse seine, longline and other fisheries, as well as maintaining the
objective of establishing compatible measures, the paper was ambitious in many respects. Some of the
major changes from the 2008-01 CMM were: 1) the inclusion of skipjack tuna within a potential measure;
2) the establishment of interim target reference points; 3) a total allowable catch limit of 1.556 million
tons for skipjack tuna; 4) catch limits to be capped at 2010 levels for skipjack tuna in EEZs and on the
high seas; and 5) restrictions on the percentage of juvenile tuna caught by purse seine vessels, with
monetary penalties for overages of the determined percentage.693 Reactions by CCMs to the Secretariat’s
paper at TCC7 were mixed. Most CCMs favored the adoption of reference points, but they also
recognized that the development of reference points was part of the upcoming Management Objectives
Workshop (and thus an inappropriate decision to have been made at the time). 694 FFA members
expressed, inter alia, that they would have liked to have seen the area of application for purse seine
vessels be extended beyond 20°S and 20°N, while Japan and the United States indicated their preference
for spatial management provisions to apply to longline fisheries. 695 The Philippines expressed that the
closure of the Western High Seas Pockets had resulted in increased fishing pressure within their national
waters, which they identified as being a nursey and breeding ground for tropical tunas.696 For this reason,
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the Philippines advocated for lifting the high seas pocket restriction.697 PNA members, on the other hand,
argued that they would continue to restrict high seas fishing as a part of their licensing conditions, and
further, that any purse seine effort limits should be for the purpose of optimizing skipjack utilization,
rather than for bigeye conservation. 698 Indeed, for PNA members, the purse seine FAD closure provision
was the provision that addressed bigeye conservation, and this provision was preferable to a total closure
in their view. 699 Discussion occurred among CCMs on the compatibility of measures with regard to the
high seas and EEZs, but the records of the meeting state that there was insufficient time to properly
pursue such issues at the meeting. 700

Going into WCPFC8 in 2011, it was known that several important elements of CMM 2008-01 were due
to expire, and thus there was a general understanding among members that the Commission would have
to agree to either to extend the provisions found in CMM 2008-01 or adopt a new measure. 701 Proposals
for a new tropical tuna measure were submitted by FFA members and the EU. 702 The main difference
between the EU proposal and the FFA proposal centered on FADs. Whereas the EU favored a seasonal
total closure similar to IATTC measures, the FFA supported the status quo in the form of a seasonal FAD
closure. The EU stated that a seasonal total closure would enhance compliance and better control fishing
effort to mitigate increasing vessel capacity. 703 The FFA, on the other hand, indicated that total closure
would result in major economic impacts on FFA members, with such a closure reducing skipjack and
697

Ibid.
Ibid.
699
Ibid. Since 2006, the IATTC has been managing purse seine bigeye catches through the imposition of a 62-day
total purse seine closure. For further information on IATTC resolutions, see:
https://www.iattc.org/ResolutionsActiveENG.htm
700
Ibid.
701
WCPFC8 was postponed until March 2012 because Palau, which was scheduled to host the meeting in 2011,
suffered a national power generation breakdown. This forced the meeting to be postponed and rescheduled for
March 2012 in Guam.
702
FFA. (2011). FFA members proposal for a CMM for bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin tunas. Eighth Regular
Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. WCPFC8-2011-DP/09.11. See also: European Union. (2011). EU
proposal for a CMM for the conservation and management of tropical tunas (bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack) in the
WCPFC Convention Area. Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. WCPFC8-2011-DP/24. 10.
703
European Union (2011) at t 4. At the time, there was supporting evidence that there were compliance issues with
the seasonal FAD closure, such as observer reports indicating FAD fishing taking place during the FAD closure, as
well as an increased use of vessel aggregation lights during the FAD closure.
698

206

yellowfin catches by approximately 500,000 metric tons annually. 704 Moreover, scientific advice at the
time had focused on the need to reduce impacts of the purse seine fishery on juvenile bigeye rather than
the total catches of yellowfin and skipjack. 705

The Chairman of the Commission, Dr. Charles Karnella, also tabled a paper in CMM-form that built upon
the Secretariat’s paper submitted to TCC7. 706 Although not a full proposal covering tropical tuna stocks,
the PNA submitted a proposal for the Commission to prohibit purse seine fishing not just for the Western
high seas pockets, but for the entire remaining high seas within the Convention Area.707 The PNA
proposal referenced the 2010 amendment to the PNA’s Third Implementing Arrangement, which
established that purse seine vessels licensed to fish in PNA EEZs would be prohibited from fishing on the
high seas. 708 Recall that prior to the 2010 amendment to the PNA’s Third Implementing Arrangement, the
PNA prohibited fishing in the Western High Seas Pockets as a condition for fishing access to PNA
waters. 709 Similar to what transpired in 2008 with the closure of the Western High Seas Pockets by the
PNA for vessels licensed to fish in their waters in 2008, the PNA again requested the Commission adopt
compatible measures in line with its restrictions on high seas fishing as a condition for access to PNA
waters. 710
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Nauru also submitted a proposal that the Commission adopt a measure to prohibit distant-water longline
fishing within fully closed high seas pockets between 10°N and 20°S of the Convention Area.711 Nauru’s
stated reason for this closure was that longline fishing in the high seas was not subject to adequate
controls (i.e., the fishery had low levels of observer coverage), and the closure was needed to ensure a
higher degree of compliance with Commission conservation and management measures. 712

CCM views on the various proposals were mixed. The EU, for example, suggested that the FAD closure
would be ineffective and thus argued for a total seasonal closure.713 Japan expressed concern over
skipjack range contraction and urged the Commission to take stronger action in tropical waters.714 The
Philippines stated that the closure of the Western High Seas Pockets had caused fishing effort to shift in
the Philippines EEZ, resulting in greater impacts on spawning stocks and juveniles. 715 As such, the
Philippines proposed that 36 of their purse seine ice boats be allowed to fish in WHSP1. 716

At WCPFC8, the SPC provided an evaluation of CMM 2008-01. According to the evaluation, if 2009
bigeye catch and purse seine effort levels were projected 10 years into the future, fishing mortality for
bigeye tuna would remain well above MSY levels.717 However, it was noted that 2010 purse seine FAD
effort was lower than in previous years (by 32%) which also led to a reduction in the catch of bigeye by
purse seine vessels. 718 In 2010, there was also a 33% reduction in the catch of bigeye by Indonesian and
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Philippine fleets compared to 2009 levels.719 When the SPC projected 2010 catch and effort levels 10
years into the future, in combination with recent bigeye recruitment estimates, bigeye overfishing was
eliminated and biomass was at levels above MSY. 720 This finding might have dissuaded stronger action,
because the Commission did not reach consensus on most of the proposals to revise the measure. Instead,
the Commission chose to simply extend CMM 2008-01 with a few significant changes.

The most notable change adopted at WCPFC8 was the creation of High Seas Pocket 1 Special
Management Area (HSP-1 SMA), and the exemption provided to the Philippines for their purse seine
vessels to fish within the otherwise closed area. 721 As a result of this exemption, 36 Philippines-flagged
traditional fresh/ice purse seine vessels (that were noted to operate as a group) were allowed to fish in
HSP-1SMA. These vessels were further required to submit entry/exit notification reports to the
Commission, carry an observer from a regional observer program, and be equipped with VMS units. 722
The measure extended the CMM 2008-01 closure of HSP2 to all members, including the Philippines.
Some of the other main features of CMM 2008-01 which were maintained included the three-month
seasonal FAD closure and the respective flag-based longline limits. 723

The exemption provided for the Philippines is worthy of further consideration as it relates to the
implementation of compatible measures. The Philippines argued that the prohibition on fishing in HSP1
had a major impact on their purse seine fleet, and further, that allowing their ‘traditional fresh/ice chilling’
purse seine vessels to fish in HSP1 was actually a conservation measure because it displaced effort to the

719

Ibid.
Ibid.
721
WCPFC. (2012). Conservation and management measure for the temporary extension of CMM 2008-01 (CMM
2011-01). Adopted at the Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, USA.1.
722
Ibid.
723
Ibid.
720

209

high seas that otherwise would have occurred in the Philippines’ EEZ – an area which the Philippines
maintained was a tuna spawning and nursery ground. 724

To bolster their position, the Philippines provided the Commission with a report on fish catch and size
class from operations within their EEZ, which was compiled during the high seas FAD closure period
(July-September). Recall that under CMM 2008-01, the seasonal FAD closure only applied to waters of
PNA members and the high seas - other CCMs such as the Philippines were required to implement
compatible measures for their national waters.725 In 2010 the Philippine government’s Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources (an agency under the Department of Agriculture), promulgated an administrative
order that required purse seine and ring net vessels fishing in the Philippines’ EEZ during July 1 and
September 30 (the same period as the WCPFC FAD closure) to reduce their net depth by 30 meters to a
maximum of 125 meters stretched net depth.726 According to the Philippines, ensuring that the net depth
is shallower in the water column results in the bigeye incidental catch to be approximately 0.5% of the
total catch – a figure which is lower than the typical 2% incidental bigeye catch.727 Instead of showcasing
their achievement in reducing bigeye incidental catches, the Philippines suggested that the displacement
of fishing effort from HSP1 led to increased fishing on juvenile tuna by its vessels fishing in the
Philippines EEZ - thus having a greater impact on bigeye than if the Philippine vessels had been allowed
to fish in the HSP1. 728
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The Philippines exemption to HSP1 is an interesting case as it relates to compatible measures. It is
important to state from the outset that the shifting of fishing effort from HSP1 to the national waters of
the Philippines under CMM 2008-01 had adverse conservation effects was a position asserted by the
Philippines but never demonstrated quantitatively. However, assuming the argument made by the
Philippines is accepted, a state of affairs which can only be described as ironic emerges. The irony lies in
the fact that the Commission closed HSP1 for various reasons, including conservation objectives and
consistency Article 8(4) of the Honolulu Convention. In doing so, however, it displaced effort out of the
high seas pocket and into the Philippine’s EEZ, thus undermining conservation objectives (as presented
by the Philippines). The result was that the Philippines, and only the Philippines, was provided a special
exemption to fish in HSP1 under CMM 2011-01.

Another important change included in CMM 2011-01 was the treatment of purse seine effort levels and
what was accepted as the new ‘baseline.’ CMM 2011-01 recognized that PNA members “intended” to
implement the VDS in their EEZs to no greater than 2010 levels. 729 The Commission’s recognition of
2010 levels as the PNA’s fishing effort baseline is important with respect to evaluating the application of
the Principle. For example, recall that CMM 2008-1 limited purse seine effort in PNA waters under the
VDS to 2004 levels, which was 30,587 days (excluding archipelagic waters). 730 In 2010, the total number
of days fished in the EEZs of PNA members was 44,033, a 44% increase in effort since 2004. 731 One of
the reasons that PNA waters saw an increase in effort was because of the closure of HSP1 and HSP2. 732
The displaced effort into PNA waters was one of the main reasons why the closure of HSP1 and HSP2
was ineffective as a conservation measure. Indeed, rather than decreasing fishing effort, the closure
729
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simply moved such effort to a different location.733 As effort shifted to the national waters of adjacent
Pacific Islands, it could be argued that the high seas pocket closures served purposes other than
conservation, such as reducing the disproportionate burden of conservation on Pacific Islands by
increasing access fee revenue.

In accepting a 44% increase in purse seine fishing effort in PNA waters only three years after much lower
effort limits were endorsed under CMM 2008-01, it was clear that the members of the Commission had
acquiesced to the PNA ‘setting the pace’ for purse seine fishing effort management in the region. Such
action, however, should not come as a surprise, as PNA waters hold most of the skipjack resource and
PNA management measures such as the Palau Arrangement have shaped the WCPO purse seine
management landscape for decades. The identification of fishing effort (or catch) limits between national
waters and the high seas can be viewed as one of the most basic requirements with regard to the
application of the Principle. By authorizing higher purse seine effort levels for the waters of PNA
members, the Commission had to consider corresponding effort limits for the high seas. Indeed, the
Commission sought to ensure that the purse seine effort levels authorized for the high the seas (outside of
the HSP1 and HSP2) were compatible with the level of fishing effort established in PNA national
waters. 734

How then did the Commission respond in light of the increasing purse seine effort occurring within
waters under national jurisdiction? 735 The Commission chose not to make a downward adjustment for
high seas effort limits under CMM 2011-01. Rather, the Commission maintained the existing high seas
purse seine effort limits as identified in CMM 2008-01, which required CCMs to limit high seas effort to
733
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either the 2004 level or 2001-2004 average effort levels. As a result, the Commission authorized
increased levels of purse seine fishing effort within the Commission Area, which was contrary to
scientific advice and arguably not congruent with tropical tuna conservation objectives. 736 The
Commission also agreed that high seas effort limits would continue to apply to non-SIDS only, thereby
leaving open the potential for further increases in purse seine fishing effort within the Convention Area.
Notwithstanding such considerations, CMM 2011-01 was only adopted as a one-year deal.

At the 2012 meeting, management measures for WCPO tropical tuna fisheries was again the main focus
of negotiations, but this time there was a heightened sense of a ‘duty to act.’ 737 Prior to the December
2012 Commission meeting, the SC had concluded the following: 1) the need to strengthen control of FAD
activities; 2) the importance of harnessing the apparent success of some fleets in reducing their
dependence on FADs to achieve greater control of FAD activity outside the closures, including control of
the number of FADs set throughout a year instead of FAD time-closures; 3) reducing the total number of
FAD sets to levels no greater than those in the fishery in 2010; 4) clarifying the definition of limits on
purse-seine effort that are applicable in different areas; 5) reducing fishing mortality on bigeye tuna from
the longline fishery; and 6) adopting management measures that apply to all sectors of the fishery. 738

With the Commission deferring the adoption of a new multiyear tropical tuna measure in 2011 to 2012,
there was pressure to adopt a long-term measure at WCPFC9. Leading up to the Commission meeting,
several members submitted proposals as well as the Chair.739 Like in year’s past, members were
negotiating on a package of elements that served both conservation purposes and their own varied
736
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interests. 740 With respect to members’ varied interests (most notably between purse seine and longline
interests), it was reported by the SPC at WCPFC9 that the 2011 purse seine catch of bigeye surpassed the
longline catch of bigeye for the first time on record.741 Prior to 2011, it was regularly reported that
longline fisheries were having the largest impact on bigeye in the WCPO; however, that changed with the
large incidental purse seine catch of bigeye in 2011. 742

At WCPFC9, the Commission adopted CMM 2012-01, which applied throughout 2013 only and was
labeled an interim measure.743 The single, substantive change to the status quo effected by this CMM
related to the purse seine fishery. Specifically, CMM 2012-01 required CCMs to apply an additional
month to the existing three-month FAD closure (from July through October). Alternatively, a CCM could
chose to implement the three-month FAD closure (July through September), while ensuring that FAD sets
for its purse seine vessels remained below the specified level of two-thirds of their 2001-2011 average for
non-SIDS, or eight-ninths of their particular 2009-2011 average for SIDS. 744 The existing flag-based
longline bigeye catch limits were maintained at 2011 levels, which frustrated some members (e.g., PNA
members) that had greater purse seine interests in comparison to longline interests. 745

The frustration expressed by PNA members was articulated through their decision to invoke Article 30 of
the Honolulu Convention, which requires the WCPFC to ensure that adopted measures do not result in
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transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing
States, territories and possessions. As was the case with the FAD closure, some SIDS members with
substantial purse seine interests felt that the extension of the FAD closure from three months to four
months came at a significant, disproportionate cost to SIDS, with the benefits of bigeye conservation
accruing to developed countries with longline fisheries and bigeye sashimi markets. 746 Indeed, the
national waters of some States are considered to have higher dependence on FAD fishing than free school
fishing (e.g., Tuvalu). 747 In this regard, the FAD closure period has been suggested to make access to
waters under the national jurisdiction of SIDS less valuable. PNA members have argued that, as a result
of the FAD closure, a disproportionate conservation burden was placed upon them, resulting in lost
revenue. Therefore, PNA members affirmed that they would only agree to an additional month of FAD
closure if compensation was provided. PNA members, which generally have greater purse seine fishing
interests as compared to longline fishing, further argued that since the FAD closure was for the purpose of
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conserving bigeye, they would receive little to no benefits from additional bigeye conservation measures
(e.g., an additional month of FAD closure). 748

Similar to past years, the interests were varied among members, and the Commission failed to adopt a
multiyear measure at WCPFC9. It worth noting that at WCPFC9, the tropical tuna measure was
negotiated in a small working group by heads of delegation members and not within the full plenary.
Furthermore, the working group was chaired by Mr. Masanori Miyahara of Japan, and not the
Commission’s chair, Dr. Charles Karnella. Members also agreed that a working group meet prior to
WCPFC10 and endorsed Japan’s offer to host the meeting. 749

An intersessional meeting of the WCPFC Working Group on Tropical Tuna was held in Japan in August
of 2013. The objective of the workshop was to advance discussions on a new multiyear tropical tuna
measure prior to WCPFC10 (to be held in December the same year). For the workshop, the SPC prepared
a paper that identified various longline bigeye catch levels which, when combined with a particular purse
seine FAD closure period or FAD set level, demonstrated that bigeye overfishing would be eliminated by
2018. 750 While the workshop facilitated the exchange of views on how to achieve bigeye conservation,
there was no agreement among participants on a clear path forward. Rather, the outcome of the workshop
was a letter circulated by the Commission chair, Dr. Charles Karnella, requesting consideration and
comments on a joint proposal submitted by PNA members, the Philippines and Japan. 751 The workshop’s
outcome letter commended workshop participants in working constructively, but clearly the joint proposal
from PNA, the Philippines and Japan would face significant opposition from other members in
forthcoming negotiations. For example, the proposal included a provision that required payments by non-
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SIDS totaling up to $15 million per additional month of FAD closure. The payments would go into a fund
as transfer payments to SIDS proportional to the average FAD sets in the additional month(s) in each EEZ
between 2010 and 2012. 752 The concept of side payments was new to the Commission and received little
support. 753

While the issue of disproportionate conservation burden started to simmer within the Commission at
WCPFC9, it was not until WCPFC10 that the issue reached boiling point.754 Leading up to WCPFC10,
FFA and PNA members submitted two papers on the concept of disproportionate conservation burden,
which included an evaluation of the proposed tropical tuna measure tabled by PNA members, the
Philippines and Japan. 755 As noted earlier, the crux of the matter for FFA and PNA members with regard
to the tropical tuna measure was that the FAD closure provided a disproportionate conservation burden on
them. This was because the closure had the effect of reducing their potential resource rents from purse
seine fishing while providing them with little to no benefit in terms of bigeye conservation. Indeed, it was
generally believed that bigeye conservation benefits as a result of purse seine measures would only accrue
to longline bigeye fisheries. The FFA and PNA offered examples of provisions that would help alleviate
any disproportionate conservation burden, including: a) a high seas FAD closure; b) reductions in
longline bigeye catch limits; c) high seas purse seine limits; d) a high seas longline seasonal closure; and
e) cash side payments. 756 While non-FFA and PNA CCMs acknowledged the efforts of FFA and PNA in
clarifying their position on the issue of disproportionate burden, some members were of the opinion that
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the concept exceeded their authority to comment upon. 757 Given the need to adopt a new measure,
WCPFC10 was setting up to be a contentious forum. 758

Like the previous year, the negotiations on a new tropical tuna measure at WCPFC10 were held within a
small working group that limited participation to a ‘head of delegation plus 1’ format. After some
wrangling argument, observers to the commission, which included globally-active, environmental nongovernmental organizations (E-NGOs) such as World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace and Pew Charitable
Trusts, were allowed to select one person among them to attend the working group, but he or she would
not be allowed to participate in the negotiations. 759 The E-NGO observers begrudgingly accepted the
offer. 760

Negotiating key conservation and management measures within small working groups allows for only
limited participation and is not a transparent way of conducting business. 761 While it is understandable to
hold a small working group in order to facilitate the free exchange of views in a less formal setting, on a
high-stakes measure such as the tropical tuna measure, it was incredibly frustrating for the other 400 or so
people in attendance at the regular session to be excluded from the discussions. Closed-door small
working groups are especially taxing on fishing industry participants. Indeed, for these particular
participants, there must be a sense that their livelihoods are being secretly brokered by government
bureaucrats, the majority of whom have very little operational fishing experience.762

Nonetheless, the tropical tuna working group at WCPFC10 did produce a multi-year measure through to
2017, applicable to purse seine, longline and other fisheries. Even so, the working group’s CMM was rife
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with exemptions. The Commission did, however, endorse the working group’s proposal, and adopted
CMM 2013-01. New provisions applicable to purse seine fisheries operating between 20°N and 20°S
included a fifth month of FAD closure for 2015 and 2016, as well as a FAD set limit, or a three-month
FAD closure and associated FAD set limit. For 2017, the Commission agreed to a high seas purse seine
FAD closure. 763 Longline fisheries catching bigeye were provided scheduled reductions through 2017,
with such reductions applying to Japan, Taiwan, Korea, China and the United States. Indonesia was
provided a longline bigeye catch limit, but without scheduled reductions. Other non-SIDS CCMs, such as
the European Commission, Australia, New Zealand and France, which caught less than 2,000 mt, were
required to not exceed 2,000 mt of bigeye per year. The flag-based longline bigeye limits apply to both
EEZs and the high seas within the Convention Area, and without any spatial delineation, as opposed to
provisions applicable to the tropical purse seine fishery. 764 Similar to CMM 2012-01, SIDS and
Participating Territories (PTs) were exempt from longline bigeye limits under CMM 2013-01. 765

Like its predecessor measure, CMM 2013-01 included reference to Article 8(1), which requires
compatibility between conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those
adopted for areas under national jurisdiction. CMM 2013-01 also made reference to Article 8(4), which
requires the Commission to pay special attention to the high seas in the Convention Area that are
surrounded by EEZs. 766 CMM 2013-01 established conservation measures that applied to the high seas as
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well as within waters under national jurisdiction (e.g., purse seine effort limits). 767 A major change from
CMM 2012-01 was the Commission’s agreement to establish CCM-specific high seas purse seine effort
limits for non-SIDS members. 768 By way of comparison, CMM 2012-01 prevented non-SIDS CCMs from
increasing purse seine effort levels on the high seas, but no baseline period was identified and no specific
effort limits by CCM were listed in the CMM. 769

Under CMM 2013-01, the Commission adopted specific, flag-based high seas purse seine effort limits,
but only for non-SIDS fleets. As described previously, the high seas limits could be viewed as supporting
the application of the Principle because CMM 2013-01 also endorsed purse seine effort limits for EEZ
waters of PNA members and other coastal States members. 770 Based on values reported by the SPC, but
not specified in the measure, the combined members EEZ effort limit was set at the 2010 level of 44,065
days. Similarly, the EEZ limit for non-PNA members, based on the 2006-2010 average, was set at 2,826
days. The high seas purse seine limit for non-SIDS was collectively capped at 6,899 days. When
combined, purse seine effort in the Convention Area confined to EEZs and the high seas was (tentatively)
restricted to 53,790 days (Figure 43). 771
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Figure 43: Purse seine effort limits within Convention Area
Source: SPC 2016 (CMM 2015-01 Data Summaries). Figure made by author

The purse seine effort limits established for EEZ waters equate to approximately 87% of the total effort
allowed, as compared to 13% for the high seas. 772 Indeed, these percentages demonstrate that the bulk of
the purse seine fishing effort is occurring within waters of national jurisdiction, with only a relatively a
small amount of effort agreed for the high seas.773 As indicated earlier, high seas effort limits were one of
several management options that PNA countries were seeking to address in the context of their stated
disproportionate conservation burden resulting from the FAD closure.774

CMM 2013-01 and Disproportionate Conservation Burden

According to CMM 2013-01, the scheduled implementation of the fifth month FAD closure in 2015 (and
beyond) was conditional upon arrangements being adopted by the Commission to ensure that the closure
did not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto
SIDS. 775 In other words, the agreed fifth month FAD closure could only be implemented if the
Commission took additional action to alleviate the disproportionate conservation burden identified by
772
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SIDS members. The topic of disproportionate conservation burden played heavily at WCPFC10. The
Commission went as far as adopting a FFA-initiated conservation and management measure that required
CCMs to conduct a disproportionate burden analysis prior to submitting CMM proposals. 776 Guiding this
evaluation were eight central questions, including “who is required to implement the proposal,” and “what
mitigation measures are included in the analysis.” The measure was criticized on the basis that, in order to
conduct a proper analysis, the proposing CCM would need to work closely with FFA countries to
determine the potential disproportionate burden impact - a difficult task given the nature and timing of
developing proposals. 777 Moreover, given the level of information needed to conduct a rigorous
disproportionate analysis, most of the CMM 2013-06 required analyses that have accompanied
subsequent conservation and management proposals by non-SIDS members have been cursory at best. 778

Recognizing that the issue of disproportionate conservation burden was a primary factor in deterring
further bigeye conservation measures for purse seine fisheries, there was an interest in 2014 to delve
deeper into the issue. Two workshops were held on the issue of disproportionate burden. The first was
convened by the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council (WPRFMC), which is based in
Honolulu and has jurisdiction over US fisheries operating out of Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and
the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands. 779 The WPRFMC workshop was held in September
2014 and attended by FFA staff, representatives of some WCPFC CCMs, economists, academics, as well
as other interested participants. The WPRFMC workshop identified that, unlike the concept of
776
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proportionality, which is well established as a metric for equity and fairness, the concept of
disproportionality is not well defined in international law. 780 Proportionality involves each country paying
a fair share of the costs of meeting a conservation goal; thus, disproportionality can be defined as the
deviation from proportionality. 781 In the context of the WCPFC, for example, if the cost to a CCM from
the implementation of a management measure exceeds its proportional share of costs in relation to other
CCMs, the particular measure would potentially be identified as transferring a disproportionate
conservation burden. The WPRFMC workshop further concluded that whether the magnitude of the
deviation is sufficiently large to be viewed as an actual disproportionate burden is a decision for the
Commission. 782 However, determining one’s fair share of a conservation goal is not always easy, and thus
the workshop identified various concepts to be considered in this context, such as: a) the ‘beneficiary
pays’ principle, whereby the States that stand to benefit the most from the CMM should pay the highest
proportion of the costs involved; b) the ‘polluter pays’ principle, whereby those States that are responsible
for the damage or loss caused to other States should bear the associated costs; and c) a ‘means-based’ test,
which dictates that those States that can afford to pay for the CMM should, in fact, pay. 783

The second workshop on the issue of disproportionate conservation burden was held in 2014 and
convened by the WCPFC Secretariat a few days prior to WCPFC11. 784 At this workshop, participants
included representatives from CCMs and various fishing industries, as well as WCPFC observers such as
the major E-NGOs. The main focus of the workshop was to understand the concept of disproportionate
conservation burden and how to avoid it.785 The views of FFA members weighed heavily at the
workshop, as only these members were claiming a disproportionate burden within the WCPFC. The FFA
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affirmed that there are two types of disproportionate burden: a) administrative burdens, which stem from
the cost of implementing a measure; and b) outcome burdens, whereby a CMM results in direct or indirect
losses to a small island developing State or group of members. 786 The main outcomes of the WCPFC
workshop included: a) general agreement for the continuation of prior analyses for proposals under CMM
2013-06; and b) a recognition that formal, independent assessments of disproportionate burden (as
recommended by the WPFMC workshop) represent one analytical tool, but that such a high degree of
formality may not be required in every circumstance.787

Linkages between the concept of disproportionate conservation burden and the Principle do exist. For
example, FFA members have identified that a reduction in high seas effort or catch is one means to
alleviate a disproportionate burden. 788 Noted examples include the previously proposed high seas longline
closure to be equivalent to the purse seine FAD closure, the existing high seas purse seine effort limits,
and 2017 high seas FAD closure. 789 The proposed seasonal high seas longline closure was to apply to
longline fleets that did not offload at SIDS ports, which arguably, could serve a dual purpose with respect
to compatibility and addressing disproportionate burden. First, it was suggested that the high seas longline
fishery is poorly monitored and responsible for significant catches of bigeye. Therefore, further restriction
was necessary for bigeye conservation and for applying compatible measures with those that occur within
EEZs. 790 Second, the proposal targeted longline fleets that operate mostly on the high seas, including high
seas transshipments which do not land their catch in the ports of FFA members. By restricting effort on
the high seas, fishing effort would be either removed from the fishery (serving a conservation objective),
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or displaced to the EEZs of FFA members. The latter would result in economic benefits from access fees,
port landing charges and customs duties, thus helping to mitigate disproportionate conservation burden
effects resulting from the seasonal FAD closure. For PICs that rely heavily on foreign fishing access fees
to support national budgets, high seas restrictions make fishing within their national waters more
attractive to foreign fleets. In this regard, PICs have an economic interest in the establishment of high seas
restrictions for DWFN fleets, and it is in this way that the Principle and the concept of disproportionate
burden can be used to support further limits on the high seas, leading to higher demand for fishing in EEZ
waters and increased revenue in the form of access fees. 791

CMM 2014-01

While there was a greater understanding of the issue of disproportionate burden as a result of the two
workshops in 2014, there remained a divergence of opinion going into WCPFC11 over how to properly
address the issue. There was also a lack of agreement on whether the existing tropical tuna measure
needed to be strengthened, as the multiyear measure had only been adopted the previous year. FFA
members, for example, believed there was a need to modify the purse seine provisions, including the FAD
and high seas effort limits, to reduce effort creep, ensure reductions in longline bigeye catch and effort,
and to address the issue of disproportionate burden. 792 Japan, recognizing the decline in bigeye and
skipjack stock conditions, expressed concern over the number of FAD sets recorded in 2013, which was
significantly higher than the number recorded in 2010.793 The United States and the European Union, on
the other hand, noted that the existing measure was only recently adopted and thus it was too early to
gauge its effectiveness. For these reasons, the United States and the European Union maintained that
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reopening the entire suite of measures was not warranted. Even so, they did concede that there was value
in examining the disproportionate burden issue, as well as capacity management, the elimination of
exemptions, and other small improvements. 794

The SPC presented information on 2013 fisheries performance, reporting that: 1) purse seine effort in
2013 was the highest on record; 2) FAD sets were at their all-time highest levels; 3) purse seine bigeye
catch was the highest on record; 4) FAD sets during the FAD closure occurred in archipelagic waters and
the WCPFC/IATTC overlap area; and 5) longline bigeye catches dropped in 2005 and have since
remained consistent with 2007 levels, but with lower CPUE and higher effort in the core tropical longline
area. 795 Given this information, there was concern over the potential further degradation of bigeye stock
health. It should be noted, however, that CMM 2013-01 was a multiyear measure that included more
restrictive FAD closures, effort limits, and longline bigeye catch limits. If these provisions were applied
through 2017 and beyond, the SPC’s analysis indicated that: a) the risk of breaching the Commissionadopted limit reference point (LRP) (set at 20% of the recent average spawning biomass in relation to
unfished biomass) would only be 4%; b) spawning biomass depletion would increase from 24% to 30%
of the recent average unfished level; and c) median fishing mortality would be reduced to approximately
MSY level (and thus the stock would no longer be experiencing overfishing).796

Notwithstanding the somewhat optimistic outlook of the SPC evaluation, PNA members introduced their
proposal to replace CMM 2013-01, which they viewed as part of a package of improvements to the
existing measure. 797 The PNA proposal focused on DWFN high seas longline fleets, which they cited as
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being ineffectively managed and monitored, and for whom bigeye conservation ultimately benefits. 798
The proposed measure also attempted, inter alia, to specify EEZ-based purse seine effort limits, impose
an Olympic-style high seas limit of 531 days per quarter, prohibit the transshipment of frozen, longline
caught bigeye on the high seas, and require the submission of operational data.799 Note that at the time,
the CCMs not providing operational data were Japan, China, Chinese Taipei, Korea, the Philippines and
Indonesia. 800

Like in years past, further negotiations on the tropical tuna measure at WCPFC11 were held out of the
public domain and within a small working group. After reporting back to the plenary on the small
working group’s progress (or lack thereof), the chair advised the group to focus on addressing
disproportionate burden, capacity issues and yellowfin management. 801 The attempt to narrow the focus
of the working group was futile, as consensus on any substantive modifications to CMM 2013-01 was not
achieved. However, in a surprising turn of events (at least according to some delegations), Japan
introduced a proposal that it had developed with Korea, China, Chinese Taipei, the Philippines, Indonesia
and FFA members. Under this proposal, CCMs which were not providing operational level data would be
required to do so within three years. 802

The submission of operational data is important when considering compatible measures as it provides
fine-scale resolution of the location and composition of catches and fishing effort, i.e., within EEZs or on
the high seas, retained and discarded species, as well as level of fishing effort. The EU expressed concern
over the proposal, noting that the provision of operational data by CCMs is already required (unless
798
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contrary to domestic law), and that the three year grace period basically runs through the end of the
measure, making the benefits of the amendment questionable. 803 In response, Japan affirmed that the data
proposal was being offered in good faith for the purposes of stock management and to accommodate
SIDS in support of Article 30 of the Honolulu Convention. 804 Japan noted, however, that only future
operational data would need to be submitted under the proposal, not historical data, even though the
provision of historical operational data is required under the Data Provision rules.805

The Commission adopted the operational data proposal with only minor changes (these changes
concerned some dates appearing in the measure). Although not a significant change to the text of the
measure, the Commission also agreed to rollover the high seas purse seine effort limit – as established in
CMM 2013-01 – for 2014 only (with the effect that the effort limit would also apply in 2015). The
Commission adopted these changes and agreed on CMM 2014-01, maintaining 2017 as the expiration
date of the measure. 806

In examining the records of WCPFC11 and CCM proposals for that meeting, the issue of whether
compatibility was being achieved with respect to the management of tropical tunas within the high seas
and waters under national jurisdiction was not a major topic of discussion. However, as indicated in the
summary report of WCPFC11, one CCM noted that the purse seine FAD effort during the FAD closure
period in archipelagic waters was a problem. 807 The apparent lack of management consistency between
archipelagic waters and other areas of the Convention Area is a topic ripe for further consideration in
terms of how the Principle is being applied. Even so in this instance the concerned CCM did not engage
the Commission in such a debate.
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The continuation of high seas effort limits could also be viewed through a compatibility lens. For
example, it is believed purse seine bigeye catch per unit effort (CPUE) increases from west to east in the
WCPO. 808 Due to the geographic composition of WCPO, a greater proportion of the fishing grounds in
the central Pacific (north of the equator and east of 175° E) are comprised of the high seas, as opposed to
the mosaic of EEZs in the central western Pacific.809 For this reason, maintaining high seas effort limits
could be viewed as serving bigeye conservation objectives, as opposed to having no such effort limits in
place. In other words, greater impacts could occur to bigeye without high seas effort limits. This is
because as PNA vessel day prices increase, there is a greater incentive to fish on the high seas and thus
avoid the costs associated with fishing in the waters of PNA members (which have increased rapidly since
implementation of the VDS). Indeed, it is in this way that, high seas effort limits help promote the
conservation and management of tuna stocks (e.g., bigeye) in their entirety.

Maintaining high seas effort limits for non-SIDS also ensures that the effort of these vessels is not
displaced to the high seas. Such displacement would certainly impact the government revenue stream of
SIDS in a negative way, with a high proportion of such revenue deriving from access fees from purse
seine fleets in their waters. In this regard, high seas purse seine effort limits also have linkages to reducing
the disproportionate conservation burden that is claimed by SIDS as a result of the tropical tuna measure
FAD closure. It is also important to recognize that even though SIDS fleets were exempt from the high
seas effort limits, the PNA proposal to establish an Olympic-style, quarterly total high seas limit, suggest
that PNA governments would rather have their own flagged vessels fishing in PNA waters than the high
seas. 810 A rationale for this position could be that EEZ effort is more tightly controlled, and hence more
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easily restricted to ensure target effort levels are achieved. 811 Another rationale is that PNA flagged
vessels are still required to pay for VDS days – albeit at typically discounted rates – and associated
revenue is important for some PNA members. 812 Regardless of the rationale, high seas purse seine effort
controls can be viewed as important in achieving compatible purse seine measures in the WCPO, taking
into account existing effort limits established for waters under national jurisdiction. Surprisingly, there is
little in the records of the meetings and submitted proposals that would allow for the drawing of such
clear linkages.

CMM 2015-01

Although WCPFC11 did not adopt any modifications to CMM 2013-01 that would have changed the
status quo with respect to purse seine and longline fisheries, there was again some interest in revisiting the
measure at WCPFC12 held in 2015. 813 Notwithstanding the apparent interest held by several CCMs to
revisit the measure, PNA members (including Tokelau) were, like the previous year, the only CCMs to
submit a draft proposal to modify the tropical tuna measure. 814 The PNA proposal, as acknowledged in
the submission, was largely a redraft of the major provisions tabled by PNA members at WCPFC11,
which together formed a package of measures including a prohibition on high seas longline
811
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the focus of the 2012 Management Objectives Workshop. Since 2012, four Management Strategy Workshops have
been held prior to the annual Regular Sessions of the Commission. For more information, see:
https://www.wcpfc.int/harvest-strategy.
812
Marko Kamber. WCPO purse seine vessel owner. Personal Communication. September 2015.
813
The author, on behalf of the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council, coordinated two internationally
attended WCPO bigeye management workshops in 2015 - the first being convened in Honolulu, and the second in
Majuro. One of the major themes of the workshops was the evaluation of purse seine measures that would be more
effective at mitigating purse seine bigeye catches than the seasonal FAD closures. The workshops served to advance
a more robust understanding of potential purse seine management options, including technological remedies (e.g.,
instrumented FADs) to reduce incidental purse seine bigeye catch, to market-based solutions including a bigeye
quota for individual vessels. However, no ‘silver bullet’ was ultimately identified. Leading up to WCPFC12, some
CCMs remained concerned with the potential lack of effectiveness of the tropical tuna measure, including that no
resolution had been reached on the SIDS disproportionate burden issue and the fifth month FAD closure. See:
MIMRA and WPRFMC. (2015). WCPO Purse Seine BET Management Workshop II (Majuro) report for TCC11.
Eleventh Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee Meeting of the WCPFC. 23-29 September
2015. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-TCC-2015-IP11.
814
PNA and Tokelau. (2015). Proposed revisions to the tropical tuna measure (CMM 2014-01). Twelfth Regular
Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia. WCPFC12-2015-DP12.

230

transshipment, a high seas longline seasonal closure equivalent to a FAD closure, a high seas purse seine
total effort limit, effecting minor changes to purse seine fishery provisions, and a reconsideration of issues
related to fishing capacity. 815 The PNA proposal highlighted that the existing measure, even with high
seas effort limits having been imposed, had led to a 30% increase in purse seine bigeye catches on the
high seas. 816

Like in years past, negotiations over the tropical tuna measure at WCPFC12 were confined to a small
working group that involved a ‘Head of Delegation plus 1’ format. Negotiations deteriorated rather
quickly, with Asian CCMs refusing to accept a high seas longline fisheries seasonal closure and
transshipment ban. Moreover, as the PNA proposal was a ‘package deal’, the minor purse seine
provisions were similarly not accepted by PNA members.817 While revisions to the tropical tuna measure
floundered, an agreement on an interim target reference point of 50% of the unfished biomass for skipjack
tuna emerged on the final day of the meeting. 818

The establishment of target reference points is an important component of the Commission’s Harvest
Strategy, which is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.819 Given the mix of EEZ-based effort
limits and high seas effort limits, whereby approximately 80% of purse seine fishing effort occurs within
815

Ibid at 1.
Ibid. The draft CMM, like the previous year’s proposal, sought to cap high seas effort limits at 531 days per
quarter. However, the submission lacked any analysis on how an Olympic-style, quarterly total effort limit would
improve tropical tuna conservation. At WCPFC13, PNA members asserted that their longline and purse seine
measures formed part of a ‘package deal’, not an ‘option buffet’ where measures could be mixed and matched. The
PNA proposal lacked scientific analysis and Japan asked how PNA members viewed the package of measures in the
context of comparing longline provisions to purses seine provisions - e.g., longline high seas closure vs ban on predawn purse seine sets. The PNA were not to able answer Japan’s question by comparing the effects of the various
provisions.
817
Author’s observations and experience from attending WCPFC12.
818
WCPFC. (2015). Conservation and management measure on a target reference point for WCPO skipjack tuna
(CMM 2015-06). Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 August 2015.
819
Target reference points, and harvest strategies more generally, represent components of third party eco-labeling
standards, which can lead to price premiums being paid for eco-certified fish in some markets. In 2011, the PNA
achieved Marine Stewardship Certification (MSC) for its branded canned label, Pacifical, which is sourced from
FAD-free caught yellowfin and skipjack. In addition to their commercial interests deriving from their MSC certified
canned tuna brand, PNA members have economic interests associated with a skipjack TRP and revenue generated
from fishing access agreements. This is because in order to achieve the skipjack TRP, purse seine fishing effort
needs to be capped at current (2012) levels.
816

231

the EEZs of PNA countries, the skipjack Target Referent Point (TRP) ensures that existing effort levels
are commensurate with current effort levels or vessel days in PNA waters. Moreover, the Principle and
Article 8 of the Convention could be invoked by PNA members to maintain the current mix of EEZ and
high seas effort limits in order to maintain the TRP. In this regard, the adopted skipjack TRP can be
viewed as promoting conservation as it is precautionary relative to other potential target references points
closer to those commensurate with MSY. Additionally, the skipjack TRP can be viewed as important in
promoting compatibility with the existing mix of effort occurring within national waters and on the high
seas.

6.2.1 Findings on Tropical Tunas

The Commission has a record of supporting the Principle as a general objective across successive tropical
tuna CCMs. As early as 2005, for example, the Commission adopted a CMM that instructed members to
implement compatible measures in relation to limiting purse seine effort on the high seas and in EEZs to
2004 levels. The Principle was again referenced in CMM 2008-01 and maintained as an objective in
subsequent measures such as CMM 2013-01 through 2017.

With respect to existing measures in place for national waters and Article 8(b)(i-ii), the Principle has
mostly been applied to the establishment of high seas purse seine fishing effort limits for waters under the
national jurisdiction of PNA. For example, when fishing effort increased within the waters of PNA
members to record levels in 2010, high seas effort limits were established and subsequently ratcheted
down over subsequent years. The adopted skipjack TRP also indirectly serves to promote the Principle, as
it serves to maintain current levels of purse seine effort, which today, is heavily skewed towards waters
under national jurisdiction (e.g., 93.5 % in waters under national jurisdiction vs 6.5% in international
waters in 2014).
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Also, with regard to Article 8(2)(b), one of primary management measures applicable to the purse seine
fishery is the seasonal FAD closure, which was first instituted by the PNA in 2008 for their national
waters. The Commission followed suit and adopted a seasonal FAD closure for the high seas, but nonPNA members were to establish compatible measures in their national waters. The Commission later
revised the measure, such that the seasonal FAD closure is applicable to EEZ waters of non-PNA
members as well.

With respect to Article 8(2)(a), the biological unity of the stocks and associated fisheries have been taken
into account in the tropical tuna measure, with the relevant measures having been applied throughout the
Convention area. However, territorial and archipelagic waters are excluded from Commission
management, and while the catch of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye taken in archipelagic waters is small
compared to the total catch for these stocks, it is not insignificant and requires monitoring. The tropical
tuna measures have explicitly encouraged coastal States to ensure that the effectiveness of these measures
is not undermined by a transfer of effort into archipelagic waters and territorial seas, and that action be
taken to reduce fishing mortality on juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tuna in archipelagic waters and
territorial seas. The measure has spatially delineated purse seine management to 20°N and 20° S, which
covers most of the tropical tuna purse seine effort, but not all (e.g., Japan and New Zealand have national
waters outside of 20°N and 20°S). Longline fisheries for bigeye have been restricted with catch limits that
apply in EEZs and on the high seas. Other fisheries such as troll, handline, as well as pole and line, have
been subject to effort limits, but comprehensive information on these fisheries is generally lacking.

Concerning the development of compatible measures and linkages to respective dependence on CCM
fisheries (Article 8(2)(d)), there has not been detailed consideration of this issue by the Commission. Nor
do the rules governing data provision require the furnishing of economic or other information (e.g.,
employment, food security, etc.) that would help illustrate respective dependence. The issue of
disproportionate conservation burden, however, has garnered significant discussion within the
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Commission, such that some SIDS members have detailed their dependence with respect to selling fishing
access rights within their national waters to purse seine vessels in association with FADs. Moreover, the
tropical tuna measures have been replete with exemptions for both SIDS and developed members, which
could be viewed as having linkages to ‘respective dependence’ considerations. Taken as a whole,
however, the wide range of exemptions within the measures could also be viewed as weakening the
effectiveness of the measures, including those relating to compatibility between EEZs and the high seas.

Regarding the consideration of fully enclosed high seas areas (Article 8(4)), the Commission did restrict
purse seine fishing between 2009-2011 in the two Western High Seas Pockets. The Commission
subsequently lifted that restriction for the Philippines in 2012, and for all members in 2014. The PNA,
however, has continued to restrict fishing in the two High Seas Pockets as a condition of access to their
national waters by foreign vessels. Moreover, high seas purse seine effort limits in CMM 2013-01 are so
low for many non-SIDS members that fishing in these areas (and subject to the stated limits) are likely of
minimal concern. The only exception in this regard is the Philippines, which has been provided fishing
access to High Seas Pocket 1 (but not 2) commensurate with average historic levels.

The primary driver for the WCPFC’s tropical tuna measures was to address bigeye stock status, which
was assessed as having been experiencing overfishing since the early 2000s. The 2017 bigeye stock
assessment revealed that bigeye is no longer overfished or experiencing overfishing. However, it is
unknown if recent increases in catch rates are due to effective management measures that have reduced
fishing mortality or due to environmental factors. Yellowfin is no longer experiencing overfishing, but
certainly is exploited at relatively high levels. Skipjack is also considered to be in a healthy condition,
with biomass levels well above those associated with the LRP. The objective of the skipjack TRP is to
hold skipjack spawning biomass and fishing effort at current levels.
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6.2.2 Compatibility Rating
Table 8: Compatibility assessment for tropical tunas
CMM on Tropical Tunas
Standard
1. Article 8 in
general

Criteria
Does the measure
reference Article 8?

2. Article
8(2)(b)(i-ii)
and (c)

Does the measure
recognize measures
established for EEZs or
prior measures
established for the high
seas?

3. Article
8(2)(a)

What is the extent of
the measure’s area of
application and does it
take into account the
biological unity of the
stocks and fisheries
concerned?

4. Article
8(2)(d)

To what extent are
considerations of
respective dependence
on the stocks concerned
taken into account?

5. Article 8(4)

To what extent does the
CMM accommodate
considerations for high
seas pockets?

Justification
Yes, Article 8 has been referenced in every tropical
tuna measure since 2005 (with the exception CMM
2011-01, which was a temporary extension of
CMM 2008-01).
Yes, but principally for PNA management
measures associated with the VDS. Purse seine
fishing is responsible for nearly 80% of the total
catch, so effort limits are not an insignificant issue.
Prior high seas measures are not referenced.

Score
1

For the most part, the tropical CMMs have taken
into account the biological unity of the stock as
they apply in EEZ waters and on the high seas.
Archipelagic waters and territorial seas remain
outside of Commission CMMs, but catches of
skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye in these waters is
not insignificant. The amount of catch taken in
archipelagic waters and territorial seas are believed
to around 25% of the total catch of skipjack,
yellowfin and bigeye.
Explicit consideration of the individual respective
dependence on fisheries is not found in the CMMs
or in the records of negotiations on tropical tuna
measures. However, deliberations on the issue of
disproportionate conservation burden have
revealed the importance of FAD closures to some
SIDS members, which could point towards
respective dependence considerations. The
measures are also replete with exemptions which
could be viewed as reducing the impacts on some
members which otherwise would be
disproportionately burdened due to their respective
dependence on the fishery; however, specific
information is largely missing with regard to
economic and or other factors such as food security
and employment.
The Commission restricted purse seine fishing
between 2009-2011 in the two Western High Seas
Pockets. The Commission subsequently lifted that
restriction for the Philippines in 2012, and for all

0.75

0.75

0.25

0.50
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6. Article 2
Stock Status

members in 2014. The PNA, however, has
continued to restrict fishing in the two High Seas
Pockets as a condition of access to their national
waters by foreign vessels.
What is the status of the None of the three tropical tuna stocks are
stock(s) concerned
overfished or experiencing overfishing as of 2017.
given the collective
However, bigeye was considered to be
obligation to ensure
experiencing overfishing since the early 2000s.
long-term conservation
through effective
management?

1

Total Score
(4.25/6)
71%
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6.3 South Pacific Albacore

South Pacific albacore is targeted by surface fisheries (e.g., troll) as juveniles in temperate latitudes, and
caught as adults with longline gear (generally at depths between 100-300 meters) in the sub-tropical and
tropical waters of the South Pacific. Indeed, it is the principle target species for many domestic longline
fisheries of PICs, and targeted on the high seas and in the EEZs of PICs by vessels flagged to DWFNs.
The development of domestic longline fisheries of PICs occurred in the early 2000s, resulting in increased
catches that remained stable until approximately 2008, when a rapid expansion of catches occurred. The
recent expansion is mostly attributable to new, heavily subsidized Chinese longline vessels which have
entered the fishery. 820 Due to the importance of the fishery to domestic vessels flagged to some PICs and
Territories (e.g., Tonga, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, the Cook Islands and American Samoa), as
well as increased catches from the high seas in recent years, management of the fishery by the
Commission is contentious.

The Commission adopted CMM 2005-02 for South Pacific albacore in 2005. 821 At the time, the stock was
not considered to be overfished or experiencing overfishing; however, there were concerns that any
increased fishing effort would only provide modest increases in yields, whereas CPUE would be reduced
and local depletion in some areas would occur.822 The controlling provision of CMM 2005-02 was the
CCM obligation to: a) prevent any increase in the number of their vessels fishing for South Pacific

820

During the mid-2000s, the number Chinese longline vessels increased rapidly. The Chinese government provided
subsidies, which continue today, for vessel construction, fuel and labor. -- Ilakini J. and R Imo. (2014). Fisheries
subsidies and incentives provided by the Peoples Republic of China to its distant water fishing industry. Prepared for
the Forum Fisheries Agency. Honiara, Solomon Islands. -- Hongzhou Z. (2015). China’s Fishing Industry: Current
Status, Government Policies, and Future Prospects. China as a “Maritime Power” Conference. July 28-29
2015.Arlington, Virginia.
821
WCPFC. (2005). Conservation and Management Measure for South Pacific Albacore (CMM 2005-02). Adopted
at the Second Regular Session of the WCPFC. 12-16 December 2005. 1.
822
WCPFC. (2005). Report of the First Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 8-10 August
2005. Noumea, New Caledonia. 179.

237

albacore in the Convention Area south of 20°S; and b) not exceed 2005 fishing effort levels or historical
levels between 2000 and 2004. 823

Catches of South Pacific albacore are regularly reported for areas north of 20°S; thus, CMM 2005-02 did
not cover the entire range of the stock. One reason for limiting the measure to 20°S was that most of the
Convention Area north of 20° S is comprised of the mosaic of EEZs belonging to PICs. The restriction on
the number of CCM vessels as mandated by the measure could be interpreted as supporting the Principle,
as theoretically this should have halted any expansion of effort and catch in the high seas.

In 2010, some members expressed concern over the lack of compliance with the measure, and also that
South Pacific albacore catches were not being reported in a comprehensive manner. 824 In that year, the
Commission adopted CMM 2010-5, with the only change from CMM 2005-2 being a new provision that
required CCMs to report the catch levels of their fishing vessels that target South Pacific albacore, as well
as the number of vessels that catch South Pacific albacore as bycatch.825

The events that transpired should serve as a lesson to the Commission with regard to establishing
conservation and management measures that do not cover the range of the stock. Not only was lack of
compliance with reporting vessel limits an issue, but a few years after the adoption of CMM 2010-05, the
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catch of South Pacific albacore increased by approximately 30%. 826 Moreover, the increase was not
geographically specific, taking place both in the high seas south of 20° S, and also in the EEZs of PICs,
north of 20° S. 827

The increase in catch of South Pacific albacore across the range of the stock led to reductions in longline
catch rates for domestic longline fleets. 828 In addition, at WCPFC8 FFA members tabled a CMM proposal
that would have limited the catch (for all fishing gears) of South Pacific albacore in the high seas to 2005
or 2000-2004 levels. 829 Importantly, the FFA proposal would have provided an exemption to SIDs and
PTs from the high seas catch limits.830 It is also noteworthy that the FFA proposal referenced the need to
address economic impacts on domestic fleets due to falling catch rates - impacts which would be
exacerbated if catches increased to MSY levels. 831 In this regard, the FFA was signaling that MSY should
not be the target for this stock, because such a target would mean that the domestic fisheries of FFA
member countries would be negatively impacted from reduced CPUE levels. Like CMM 2010-05, the
FFA proposal also failed to specifically identify Article 8 or the Principle, which is a glaring omission. 832
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CCMs opposed to the FFA proposal questioned the relationship between the high seas limits and the
status of the stock, which at the time was not considered overfished or to be experiencing overfishing. 833
Other CCMs questioned the need for the proposal to expand the limits to all gears (e.g., troll), the
rationale for the baseline periods selected, and the effectiveness of imposing limits for the high seas
only. 834

The FFA proposal failed at WCPFC8, but the Commission did agree that South Pacific albacore was a
priority issue for WCPFC9. 835 The SPC conducted a stock assessment for South Pacific albacore in 2012,
finding that the stock was not overfished or experiencing overfishing. 836 In fact, the 2012 assessment
provided similar, but more optimistic results with regard to stock health than the previous assessment in
2009. 837 The 2012 assessment did, however, identify that the exploitable biomass for longline fisheries
(which target adult sized fish) could be as low as 25% to 35% of unfished levels, suggesting the sub-adult
biomass was bolstering the stock results. 838 It was further predicted that catch rates for longline vessels
would decline by 10-15% in the short term if catches of South Pacific albacore remained at then current
levels. 839

The WCPFC SC recommended that, given the recent expansion of the fishery and recent declines in the
exploitable biomass due to longline fisheries, longline fishing mortality be reduced to support
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economically viable catch rates. 840 Reduced catch rates and concomitant economic impacts would likely
be felt the hardest by non-subsidized domestic longline fisheries of PICs, as opposed to the heavily
subsidized Chinese vessels.

At WCPFC9, no proposals were submitted to revise the existing South Pacific albacore measure. The
following year, at WCPFC10, New Zealand introduced a proposal on behalf of FFA members, noting that
improved management of the stock was critical to SIDS’ domestic longline fisheries. 841 The proposal,
which was not adopted at WCPFC10, would have established high seas catch limits within the
Convention Area for CCMs according to their average catch between 2006 and 2010. 842 Furthermore, it
would have instructed CCMs with waters under national jurisdiction south of the equator to establish
zone-based longline catch limits for South Pacific albacore applicable to their EEZs. For CCMs with
annual catches of South Pacific albacore in excess of 2,500 mt caught in their national waters, the
proposal would have allowed these CCMs to set annual longline limits equal to or less than their highest
historical catch levels. CCMs that caught less than 2,500 mt per year would have been required to not
exceed 2,500 mt in 2014. 843

As indicated earlier, the proposal did not achieve consensus at WCPFC10. Some members expressed
concern that the proposal would shift the measure’s area of application to the equator, as opposed to the
measure’s stated application area - south of 20°S. 844 Other members questioned the basis for limiting
catches to 2006-2010 average levels rather than establishing limits based on the latest stock assessment.845
China also opposed the FFA proposed measure; however, the specific reason for such opposition was not
identified in the records of the meeting. Even so, China did indicate that it was capping the number of
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fishing vessels that would be authorized to target South Pacific albacore at 400.846 While some members
thanked China for implementing such a cap, it was clear that the identified cap would allow for the
expansion of the Chinese fleet over existing levels. For example, the number of Chinese longliners that
were reported to have operated in the Convention Area at that time was 286.847

As the Commission failed to adopt a new CMM on South Pacific albacore at WCPFC10, reports
presented at the following year’s meeting highlighted poor catch rates and severe economic conditions
experienced by domestic longline fisheries of PICs. 848 This set the stage for South Pacific albacore
management to be a primary topic at WCPFC11. The fact that the meeting was held in Apia, Samoa,
which has a domestic longline fishery that targets albacore, added to the tension over the stock’s
management. 849

An important development occurred in 2014 leading up to WCPFC11 – the establishment of the Tokelau
Arrangement. 850 Finalized at the FFC’s 91st meeting in October 2014, the Tokelau Arrangement is
comprised of a sub-set of FFA members and provides a framework for the cooperative development of
EEZ-based management of South Pacific albacore fisheries.851 The Tokelau Arrangement was heralded as
a significant development with regard to South Pacific albacore because it involves the majority of South
Pacific countries with domestic fisheries targeting albacore in their respective EEZs (where the vast
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majority of albacore is caught). 852 The establishment of this sub-regional agreement has important
implications for the application of the Principle. In theory, Tokelau Arrangement members could
collectively cooperate to establish EEZ-based management measures that the WCPFC, in honoring the
Principle and Article 8, would have to take into account with respect to fishing on the high seas.

Coupled with the announcement that the Tokelau Arrangement had recently been established, the FFA
submitted a proposal to revise the South Pacific albacore measure at WCPFC11. Opening statements by
several Pacific Island CCMs indicated the dire situation of their domestic longline fisheries, as well as the
importance of the WCPFC taking action to improve the Commission’s management of the stock. 853 An
explanatory note to the FFA’s proposal stated that the existing measure did not cover the range of the
stock and failed to take into account recent major increases in catch and vessels targeting the stock. 854
Notable provisions of the FFA’s draft CMM to modify CMM 2010-03 included: 1) applying the measure
to encompass the entire range of the stock within the Convention Area; 2) establishing a TAC level
commensurate with MSY; 3) setting flag-based limits on the high seas according to a CCM’s average
catch between 2006 and 2013; 4) establishing a collective, but unspecified catch limit for South Pacific
albacore within the EEZs of Tokelau Arrangement members; 5) establishing unspecified, but compatible
catch or effort limits for non-Tokelau members with EEZs in the South Pacific; 6) requiring non-SIDS
CCMs to reduce high seas catches as fisheries are developed in the EEZs of SIDS and by SIDS on the
high seas; 7) developing longer-term reference points, including a formal harvest strategy for South
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Pacific albacore; and 8) implementing quarterly reporting against EEZ and high seas limits.855 Notably,
the FFA proposal did not reference Article 8.

Several CCMs opposed the measure, with China voicing the strongest opposition and expressing concern
over the approach taken by FFA members with respect to establishing a TAC and the lack of a recent
stock assessment. 856 Many other CCMs supported the measure, including the shift towards catch-based
limits and establishing limits for EEZs and the high seas. 857 Ultimately, however, consensus on the
proposed measure could not be achieved at WCPFC11, and thus the FFA proposal was not adopted. 858

In 2015, the SPC conducted a new stock assessment on South Pacific albacore - one which received
praise for incorporating significant improvements as compared to older assessments.859 The 2015
assessment estimated MSY at 76,800 mt, which was lower than the 2012 estimate of 99,085 mt. The
factors driving the lower MSY estimate were the exclusion of catches made outside the WCPFC
Convention Area, as well as a lower estimate of natural mortality (as compared to the 2012
assessment). 860 With the lower estimate of MSY, the catch of South Pacific albacore in the WCPConvention Area was estimated to be at or slightly less than MSY. However, fishing mortality on a stockwide basis was believed to be below the level associated with MSY. 861 If considering fishing mortality on
adult fish only, then the fishing mortality on this portion of the stock was much greater.862 Like previous
assessments, South Pacific albacore was determined not to be subject to overfishing, but increased fishing
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effort in the future is unlikely to result in greater yields, and further, catch rates are anticipated to
decrease, with concomitant impacts on fleets that target albacore. 863

In 2015, South Pacific albacore management was again before the Commission at WCPFC12. Like
previous years, FFA members led the way and submitted a proposed CMM for consideration. The 2015
FFA proposal to modify CMM 2010-05 was more tempered than in years past, with the primary changes
being: 1) to add an objective to the measure to ensure that longline fishing on the southern high seas of
the Convention Area does not contribute additionally to the risk of breaching the LRP for the stock; 2) to
define an ‘active vessel fishing for albacore’ as one that catches more than 5 mt per year; and 3) to
establish a requirement for those CCMs not submitting operational level data to enter into an agreement
with SPC to provide such data, beginning in 2000. 864

As in years past, the FFA proposal failed to achieve consensus and was not adopted as originally
submitted. The WCPFC did, however, agree to revise CMM 2010-5, and to this end adopted CMM 201502. This CMM required CCMs to report their annual catch levels of South Pacific albacore taken by each
of their fishing vessels (between 2006-2014) in the Convention area south of 20° S to the Commission. 865
CMM 2015-02 did not reference the Principle or Article 8.

The FFA also submitted a proposal at WCPFC12 to establish an interim TRP for South Pacific
albacore. 866 The FFA proposal would have established a TRP of 45%SBcurrent,F=0, which roughly correlated
with the ratio of existing assessed spawning biomass to that of unfished biomass (41%). However,
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scientific modeling indicated that a 41% reduction in catch would be required to achieve the TRP.867 The
proposed TRP of 45%SB current,F=0 was selected by FFA members because it corresponded to 2007- 2008
fishery conditions – a period during which the domestic fleets of FFA members were performing
reasonably well. 868 If the TRP was to be achieved, it was estimated that future CPUE would increase
above 2013 levels by at least 15%. 869

The FFA proposal also included a provision that would have established a 5% margin as the acceptable
risk margin of breaching the already established LRP of 20%SB current, F=0. 870 If the proposed TRP required
substantial reductions in catch, it is important to ask why it would have been in the best interests of FFA
member countries to support such a proposal, especially if many of their domestic longline fisheries were
dependent on South Pacific albacore.

FFA members acknowledged that the proposed TRP would result in reduced catches and undeniable
development impacts, but also that such cuts were needed to maintain the fishery at any level in the
future. 871 Establishing at TRP does indeed have implications with regard to the Principle. The FFA
proposal to establish a relatively conservative TRP (in terms of needed reductions in catch) could have
been used as a mechanism to ratchet down high seas catches by foreign vessels operating in the
Convention Area. In 2014, approximately 34% of the total South Pacific albacore catch was taken on the
high seas of the Convention Area. 872 Therefore, FFA countries could have reasonably argued, with the
provisions of Article 8 serving as supporting rationale, that catch reductions would have to come largely
from the high seas in order to be consistent with the Principle and to achieve the TRP. The establishment
of catch limits that apply to EEZs of Tokelau Arrangement members would have bolstered this argument.
867
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There is strong interest to reduce high seas fishing, as evidenced by the FFA’s Regional Roadmap for
Sustainable Pacific Fisheries (2015). Strategy 3, for example, is to “Progressively Restrict Fishing on the
High seas by Foreign Fleets.” 873 Notably, Strategy #3 proclaims that the expansion of foreign fishing in
the high seas is of no benefit to PICs. 874 For stocks such as South Pacific albacore, which are not
overfished or experiencing overfishing, establishing a TRP could be viewed as critical in order to achieve
compatibility. Based on the performance of the fishery, management measures such as catch limits could
be set according to the TRP, and ratcheted either up or down. If the South Pacific albacore fishery was at
or exceeding its TRP, then FFA countries would be in a stronger position to invoke the Principle, Article
8, as well as other provisions of the Honolulu Convention to support their position.

Like the failed FFA proposal to revise the South Pacific albacore CMM at WCPFC12, the Commission
also failed to reach consensus on the FFA proposal to establish a TRP. Negotiations on the matter were
conducted in a small working group and negotiating positions were not made across the floor in plenary.
As such, the records of the WCPFC12 meeting do not contain statements made by CCMs that were
opposed to the FFA’s TRP proposal. However, the records of WCPFC12 do identify that FFA members
were disappointed by the lack of consensus on an interim TRP, and further, that FFA members would
continue to develop collaborative zone-based management arrangements. 875

The issue of how best to achieve the cuts needed to meet the TRP remains, however, unresolved. Under
the Tokelau Arrangement, for example, members are allowed to set EEZ-based limits according to their
highest historical catch levels. 876 If the highest historical catch levels are eventually established for EEZs,
such levels would still exceed the total annual catch needed to reach the TRP. To date, Tokelau
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Arrangement members are yet to agree on collective EEZ-based catch limits for South Pacific albacore,
which has been a drawback of further advancing a TRP and a stricter CMM.

6.3.1 Findings on South Pacific Albacore

Although the stock condition of South Pacific albacore is relatively heathy, such that it is not overfished
or experiencing overfishing, the Commission has failed to effectively manage the South Pacific albacore
longline fishery. Currently, domestic fleets of PICs and PTs are facing economic collapse, even with
subsidized Chinese vessels having reduced their effort on the stock in 2016. 877 Around 70% percent of the
catch is taken within EEZs, with the remainder caught in international waters. It should be noted,
however, that this ‘remainder’ has varied between 26-51% over the last decade, which indicates that
considerations of compatible measures should be regarded as important in the conservation and
management of the stock. 878 However, none of three adopted CMMs applicable to South Pacific albacore
have referenced the Principle or Article 8. Reasons for this are unclear, especially given the composition
of fishing occurring across a broad range of the stock, including between EEZs and the high seas.

Furthermore, the Commission has provided no recognition of existing measures that apply either to EEZs
or the high seas with respect to Article 8(2)(b)(i-ii)-(c). This is surprising given that the Tokelau
Arrangement was formed in 2014 and heralded as a major sub-regional initiative that would substantially
shape international management of the resource. The Tokelau Arrangement has the potential to
collectively establish EEZ-based limits that could serve to drive the implementation of compatible
measures for the high seas. Even so, the Tokelau Arrangement has failed to agree on the most basic of
EEZ-based limits. Furthermore, to date, the Commission has failed to adopt a TRP for the stock, which if
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established, could serve to guide the achievement of compatible measures by establishing a benchmark
biomass target.

Regarding consideration of the biological unity of the stock in accordance with Article 8(2)(a), the first
CMM applicable to South Pacific albacore, and subsequent amendments in 2010 and 2015, failed to cover
the full range of the stock. The controlling provisions of the measure only applied south of 20° S, while
the stock is known to occur from the equator to around 40° S. Moreover, the measure failed to control the
number of fishing vessels targeting the stock (its main objective in 2005), and to restrict catches both on
the high seas south of 20° S and in EEZs north of 20° S.

With regard to respective dependence considerations consistent with Article 8(2)(d), the measures failed
to include any reference to the domestic longline fleets of PICs that target South Pacific albacore. The last
revision to the stock’s CMM occurred in 2015, and there were certainly several statements in the records
affirming the importance of the stock to the domestic fisheries of PICs. Even so, the substantive effect of
these statements is conspicuously absent from the CMM.

With respect to Article 8(4) and high seas pockets, the Commission has established an Eastern High Seas
Pocket Special Management Area (EHSPSMA), which covers a fully enclosed high seas pocket area
bordered by the EEZs of the Cook Islands, French Polynesia and Kiribati. 879 The EHSPSMA is not a
component of the South Pacific albacore measure, but given its location in the South Pacific (and that
most of the activity occurring in the pocket involves South Pacific albacore), its establishment is
important with regard to Article 8(4).
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The stock status of South Pacific albacore is still considered neither overfished nor subject to overfishing.
While that may sound promising, depletion levels of adult biomass are resulting in catch rates that cannot
be economically sustained for most fleets, especially those flagged to PICs and PTs.
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6.3.2 Compatibility Rating
Table 9: Compatibility assessment for South Pacific albacore
CMM on South Pacific albacore

Standard

Criteria

Justification

Score

1. Article 8 in
general
2. Article
8(2)(b)(i-ii)
and (c)

Does the measure
reference Article 8?
Does the measure
recognize measures
established for EEZs or
prior measures
established for the high
seas?
What is the extent of
the measure’s area of
application and does it
take into account the
biological unity of the
stocks and fisheries
concerned?
To what extent are
considerations of
respective dependence
on the stocks concerned
taken into account?

No, none of the three South Pacific albacore
CMMs reference the Principle or Article 8.
No, none of the three South Pacific albacore
CMMs reference EEZ-based measures or
previously agreed measures applicable to the high
seas. This is an unexpected outcome given that the
Tokelau Arrangement was established in 2014, and
the measure was amended in 2015.
The CMMs do not cover the entire range of the
stock.

0

3. Article
8(2)(a)

4. Article
8(2(d)

5. Article 8(4)

6. Article 2
Stock Status

No mention is made in the three CMMs to the
respective dependence of some members on South
Pacific albacore. There are numerous instances in
the meeting records of the Commission, however,
where PICs highlight their dependence on their
respective domestic longline fisheries.
To what extent does the The Commission did establish a special
CMM accommodate
management area for the eastern high seas pocket
considerations for high in the South Pacific. However, reference to that
seas pockets?
measure is not included in the South Pacific
albacore tuna measure(s). There are references in
the WCPFC meeting records to the catch of
albacore in the eastern high seas pocket and the
need for compatible measures.
What is the status of the The stock status of South Pacific albacore is
stock(s) concerned
considered neither overfished nor subject to
given the collective
overfishing. However, depletion levels of adult
obligation to ensure
biomass are resulting in catch rates that cannot be
long-term conservation economically sustained for most fleets, especially
through effective
those flagged to PICs and PTs.
management?

0

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.75

Total Score
(2.25/6)
37.5 %
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6.4 Pacific Bluefin

Like other highly migratory species that travel great distances, management of Pacific bluefin is complex,
involving multiple jurisdictions and requiring effective international cooperation. Pacific bluefin spawn in
the waters off Japan and migrate across the North Pacific Ocean to forage in the productive waters off the
West Coast of North America (mainly off the coast of Mexico). North Pacific bluefin are highly prized in
sashimi markets and subject to wild capture for mariculture grow-out called ‘tuna ranching.’ Pacific
bluefin spawning stock biomass is currently at less than 3% of unfished levels.880

As Pacific bluefin migrate between the WCPO and EPO, conservation of this species requires cooperative
and compatible management between the WCPFC and IATTC. 881 The Honolulu Convention makes
explicit in Article 22, paragraph 4, the need for cooperation with the IATTC in establishing a “consistent”
set of CMMs. 882 Note that the Honolulu Convention does not specifically state that ‘compatible’ measures
are required between the WCPFC and IATTC; rather, the term “consistent” is used. There is no
information in the records associated with the negotiation of the Honolulu Convention explaining why
“consistent” was used rather than the term ‘compatible.’

Although language specific to the Principle was not used in Article 22 of the Honolulu Convention, the
IATTC’s Antigua Convention does reference compatibility in Article XXIV relating to cooperation with
other organizations. Indeed, the Antigua Convention makes specific references to compatibility in Article
XXIV with regard to the overlap areas of shared jurisdiction, and also for stocks that migrate between
jurisdictions. 883 In 2006, the WCPFC and IATTC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),
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which was subsequently revised in 2009. 884 The MOU is mostly a reiteration of recitals found in the
respective conventions related to cooperation with other organizations. However, the following list is
included in the MOU as topic areas for cooperation: 1) data exchange; 2) research collaboration; and 3)
conservation and management measures for stocks and species of mutual interest.885 The manner of
cooperation between RFMOs is also prescribed, such that the meetings of both organizations are open to
the participation by member nations of each commission. 886

Due to their connectivity within the Pacific Ocean, there are several HMS fish stocks in the Pacific that
could also benefit from compatible measures between the WCPFC and IATTC, including bigeye and
yellowfin tuna, several species of billfish, as well as various non-target and dependent species such as
sharks and sea turtles. 887 With regard to compatibility, however, Pacific bluefin is a compelling case
study for several reasons, including: 1) the status of the stock is very poor; 2) the stock is caught in
significant amounts by only a few countries; 3) most of the catches are made in national waters and not on
the high seas; and 4) under the Honolulu Convention Pacific bluefin is designated a “northern stock,” thus
requiring the WCPFC’s Northern Committee to formulate the relevant conservation and management
measures to be adopted by the Commission.888

The WCPFC’s first CMM aimed at Pacific bluefin was adopted in 2009, with the IATTC’s first bluefin
resolution adopted in 2012. Although international management measures have only been established
recently, the stock status of Pacific bluefin has been discussed internationally within the International
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Science Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species (ISC) for over two decades.889 The ISC conducted a
stock assessment on Pacific bluefin in 2010, 2102, 2014 and 2016. 890
The 2009 WCPFC measure (CMM 2009-07) applied in 2010 only and required CCMs fishing north of
20° N to restrict total fishing effort directed at Pacific bluefin to 2002-2004 levels. 891 An exception was
provided for artisanal fisheries; however, like other WCPFC CMMs, the measure lacked a definition of
“artisanal.” 892 The measure applied to waters under national jurisdiction and on the high seas, with an
exception being made for fishing in Korea’s EEZ. 893 According to the meeting summary records for
WCPFC6, Korea requested this exemption so that it could have more time to study the catch of bluefin in
its national waters. 894 Korea also stated that it caught less than 1,500 mt of bluefin on an annual basis, and
by purse seine vessels primarily targeting mackerels.895 Several CCMs, including two that were members
of Northern Committee, expressed concern over Korea’s position and called for the measure to apply to
Korea’s waters in 2011. 896 Japan stated that it would implement a program to collect information on
bluefin imports from Korea. 897 The bluefin catch in Korea’s EEZ represented approximately 5 to 10
percent of the total catch, and given the poor status of the stock, the lack of application of the measure to
Korea’s EEZ could have been viewed as incompatible with the measures agreed to by other members. 898
It appears, however, that other members of the WCPFC were more concerned with putting a measure in
place than highlighting Korea’s exemption as being incompatible with the measure. In other words, the
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approach taken was ‘better to have a measure than not have one.’ In addition, the measure was only
agreed to for one year (2010), and thus it was expected that consideration to include Korea’s EEZ would
occur the following year.

At the same WCPFC meeting (WCPFC6), it was announced by IATTC staff that the IATTC would soon
consider a similar management measure for Pacific bluefin. 899 The Northern Committee chair also stated
that a joint meeting between the IATTC and the Northern Committee was being planned to discuss
coordinated bluefin management. 900

In 2010, at its 81st meeting, the IATTC was presented with the following IATTC staff conservation
recommendations for bluefin: 1) maintaining annual commercial catches in 2011 and 2012 at the 19972007 average; 2) allowing no greater effort by the sport fishery than the maximum observed between
2006 and 2010; and 3) requiring monthly reports on catches and effort by the sport fishery. 901 Although
there were indications at the 2009 WCPFC meeting that the IATTC would adopt a bluefin resolution, the
IATTC did not agree to a bluefin measure in 2010, as negotiations at its 81st meeting were more focused a
new tropical tuna resolution. 902 With Mexico being the only IATTC EPO coastal State member with any
significant bluefin catches (43% of the 2010 Pacific-wide catch), bluefin management was low on the 81st
IATTC agenda, which centered heavily on tropical tuna negotiations.903

The following year (2011) the IATTC again considered adopting a Pacific bluefin resolution at its 82nd
annual meeting held in June. However, this time the proposed resolution was submitted by several
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countries that were also members of the WCPFC’s Northern Committee.904 This was indeed significant as
it showed an interest by these countries to establish compatible measures across RFMO areas. The
proposal was to keep the 2012 and 2013 EPO catch of bluefin at 1994-2007 average levels, which was
about 4,500 mt. 905 Mexico did not agree with the proposal. 906 The reported bluefin catch of Mexicanflagged vessels the previous year was 7,700 mt, and thus substantial reductions in catch would have been
required from this particular State. According to the report of the meeting, the Mexican proposal came too
late in the meeting to allow for adequate consideration. 907 Six IATTC members submitted a joint
statement on the lack of consensus to adopt a measure.908 The statement reiterated the need for
“consistent” management measures throughout the Pacific, and further, that the absence of an IATTC
measure would not only harm bluefin sustainability, but also weaken the WCPFC measure. 909
The following year (2012), the WCPFC rolled-over its existing measure to apply in 2013. The measure
maintained the effort and catch limits associated with 2002-2004 levels. 910 With the WCPFC acting to
extend its CMM, pressure was again mounting on the IATTC to adopt compatible measures. The IATTC
responded and agreed on a bluefin resolution (C12-09), which restricted the total EPO catch in 2012 and
2013 to 10,000 mt, with no more than 5,600 mt to be caught in 2012.911
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The IATTC resolution, in combination with the WCPFC measure, was believed to support stock
recovery; however, that was short-lived. Information provided the following year (2013) by the ISC
indicated low recent recruitment and the likelihood of bluefin biomass declining to its lowest levels on
record. This prompted further international action, leading the WCPFC to adopt CMM 2013-09. The
WCPFC measure removed exemptions provided for artisanal fisheries and the Korean EEZ, and extended
the requirement that CCMs reduce 2014 catches by at least 15% of 2002-2004 levels. 912 In this regard, the
WCPFC took additional steps to strengthen its measure by removing the exemptions for artisanal fisheries
and fisheries occurring in Korea’s EEZ. Such action could be viewed as further developing compatible
measures, insofar as the application of the measure to the national waters of Korea and artisanal fisheries
contribute to a reduction in bluefin overfishing.

With regards to the effectiveness of the IATTC measure, Mexico reported that its 2012 catch was 6,668
mt. 913 Indeed, this figure exceeded the agreed 5,600 mt EPO limit for 2012 by over 1,000 mt. Although
the EPO catch limit was exceeded, the WCPFC catch reduced significantly in 2012 and 2013, with total
Pacific-wide catches for this two-year period being 14,840 mt and 11,325 mt respectively, significantly
less than the 2002-2004 average of 21,030 mt. 914 As catches were reduced from historical levels, one
could argue that the two RFMOs did implement compatible measures; however, any conservation gains
were most likely attributable to reduced catches in the WCPO.

While it appeared that bluefin conservation was heading in a positive direction with regard to Pacificwide management measures, the next bluefin stock assessment by the ISC in 2014 revealed continued
poor stock status and the need for additional measures. The 2014 stock assessment indicated that if the
912
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recent low recruitment persisted, and if the existing WCPFC and IATTC measures were maintained,
bluefin spawning stock biomass would not be capable of being rebuilt.915 The stock assessment further
concluded that substantial reductions in fishing mortality and juvenile catch over the whole range of
juvenile ages would reduce the risk of spawning biomass falling below its lowest historical level. 916

Both commissions responded and adopted new bluefin measures in 2014. First, the IATTC agreed on a
resolution that restricted the combined total catch for 2015 and 2016 to 6,600 mt. 917 Under the measure,
no country was permitted to land more than 3,500 mt in 2015, which for all intents and purposes was
Mexico’s (unassigned) catch limit. Other IATTC members and cooperating nonmembers (CPCs) with a
history of catching bluefin (excluding Mexico), were not to exceed a total catch of 600 mt, with no one
country allowed to take more than 425 mt in any one year (this was essentially the assigned catch limit for
the United States). 918 In addition to the total catch limits, CPCs were instructed to “endeavor” to reduce
the catches of bluefin weighing less than 30 kg to 50% of historical levels. Furthermore, IATTC Scientific
Staff were directed to report on the 2015 catch and the implementation of reducing the catch of juvenile
bluefin. 919 The resolution also required CPCs to limit sport fishing vessels catching bluefin in their
national waters to levels comparable with the catch limits provided to commercial fisheries. 920 The
measure, however, did not specify the “comparable levels of catch reductions” that the sport fishery was
to achieve. This is likely due to the sports fishery’s small impact on bluefin, which accounts for less than
10% of the commercial EPO bluefin catch. Therefore, the requirement for sport fish reductions to
comparable levels was likely more about achieving equity across fishing gears – that is, distributing the
impacts across all fishing gears, rather than producing material conservation benefits.
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The WCPFC, at its 11th Regular Session in 2014, also agreed on a new bluefin measure. In the lead up to
measure being adopted, Japan articulated that it was committed to bluefin conservation, providing an
overview of its recent unilateral efforts to reduce juvenile catches by 50% of historical levels and to
develop a comprehensive catch monitoring program. 921 The chair of Northern Committee also referenced
the need for compatible measures with the IATTC, noting that the IATTC recently adopted a bluefin
measure that aimed to reduce catch by 40%. Without much deliberation, the WCPFC adopted the
Northern Committee’s proposed bluefin measure, which included the following two main provisions: a) a
provisional multi-annual rebuilding plan starting in 2015, with the initial goal of rebuilding the spawning
stock biomass to the historical median (42,592 mt within 10 years with at least 60% probability; and b) a
50% reduction in catches of > 30 kg fish from 2002-2004 average levels. 922 The measure also instructed
the WCPFC Executive Director to communicate the CMM to the IATTC Secretariat and its contracting
parties whose fishing vessels engage in fishing for Pacific bluefin tuna, requesting that they take
equivalent measures in conformity with the CMM. 923 The following year (2015), the IATTC did not make
any adjustments to its existing bluefin measure (C-14-06), as it already applied through 2016.

At its 12th Regular Session, the WCPFC discussed bluefin management in considerable detail. The chair
of the Northern Committee, Mr. Masa Misahara, presented the report of the 11th meeting of the Northern
Committee, which included bluefin management issues. Even though the Commission had adopted a
bluefin measure the previous year, several Commission members expressed disappointment that the
Northern Committee did not consider a long-term rebuilding plan, criticizing the existing measures as
providing only minor conservation gains on a critically depleted stock. 924 The Northern Committee was
further criticized for not having a quorum to make decisions at its annual meeting, thus forcing the
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committee to hold a special session at the Commission’s meeting to adopt the report of its own
meeting. 925 As reported by the Northern Committee chair, the Northern Committee recommended that the
Commission amend the existing Pacific bluefin CMM to develop a rule in 2016 that would prescribe
emergency action if bluefin recruitment was observed to take a drastic reduction. 926

The Northern Committee chair also reported that the Northern Committee agreed to convene a joint
meeting with the IATTC. 927 The Commission supported the notion of a joint meeting, with several
members noting the importance of collaboration with the IATTC on the management of bluefin.928 At
WCPFC10, the Executive Director of the IATTC, Dr. Guillermo Compean, communicated the IATTC’s
commitment to participate in a joint meeting with the WCPFC in 2016, as well as to work bilaterally with
WCPFC members to rebuild the stock. 929 The Commission adopted the Northern Committee’s
recommendation for amending the bluefin measure to include a provision relating to the development of
emergency measures in 2016. 930 The emergency measure would involve pre-agreed actions in the event
that bluefin recruitment experienced a drastic drop from then-current levels. 931 Note that the Commission
did not consider what emergency measures could be taken, but directed the Northern Committee to
develop such measures in 2016. 932
At its 90th meeting held in June 2016, the IATTC received a report on the status of Pacific bluefin that
was based on a new stock assessment conducted by the ISC earlier in the year. According to this
assessment, which incorporated catch data up to 2014 as well as recent estimates of recruitment, the
Pacific bluefin stock remained at historically low levels. 933 For example, the ratio of ‘current’ spawning
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stock biomass to unfished spawning biomass was estimated at 2.6%, making it the most depleted tuna
stock on Earth. 934 Several IATTC members expressed concern and called for urgent action, as well as the
need to collaborate with the WCPFC in order to adopt compatible measures.935 Recalling C-14-06, Japan
asked if the IATTC staff were able to present information on whether the 50% reduction in fish weighing
less than 30 kg in 2015 was achieved. In making this request, Japan undoubtedly realized that data
demonstrating reduced juvenile catches in the EPO could use used domestically to require coastal
Japanese fishermen to implement similar catch reductions. 936 IATTC staff informed Japan that they were
not in a position to comment on the issue, not having the required information on hand.937 Mexico stated
that fishing operations and tuna ranches under its jurisdiction had endeavored not to catch bluefin smaller
than 30 kg, but no data was presented to confirm this assertion.938 Mexico also gave a presentation at the
meeting which centered on its tuna ranches and how it voluntarily established a catch limit of 2,750 mt
due to an overage of its 3,300 mt limit the previous year.939

Abiding by standard practice, which involves IATTC scientific staff providing conservation
recommendations, the 2016 scientific staff recommendation for bluefin was to extend the existing
measures in the IATTC resolution for two more years. 940 The recommendation also encouraged the
WCPFC to take additional measures to reduce the catch of adult fish, and thus reduce the risk of low
spawner abundance on recruitment. While chiefly directed at the WCPFC, the IATTC scientific staff’s
recommendation was supported by the EU. Even so, other CPCs that were members of the WCPFC
voiced opposition towards the need of the WCPFC to take additional action, instead suggesting that such
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issues be discussed in a joint WCPFC/IATTC workshop to be held in association with the Northern
Committee. 941

The IATTC adopted Resolution C-16-03 at its 90th meeting with regard to bluefin conservation. Like
previous bluefin resolutions, C-16-03 contained preamble language that recognized the importance of
collaborative and compatible measures between the WCPFC and IATTC in order to reduce bluefin
fishing mortality and rebuild the stock. 942 Moreover, C-16-04 referenced the impact of fishing on the
stock in the WCPO and EPO at 84% and 16% respectively. Indeed, this represented a statement by the
IATTC that it was limited in what action it could take to help rebuild the stock. 943 The 2016 resolution did
not contain additional measures to restrict catches in the EPO; rather, it prescribed how collaboration with
the WCPFC should occur. Specifically, the resolution directs CPCs to work with the WCPFC through
jointly-held annual meetings, beginning in 2016 and continuing until conservation objectives have been
accomplished. 944 The main objective of the collaborative meetings is to develop and reach agreement on a
Pacific-wide bluefin rebuilding plan that will return the stock to an agreed target reference point.945 The
resolution also specifies that the joint meetings will be used to develop harvest control rules that include
pre-agreed management actions, and further, that management strategy evaluation will be used to identify
the appropriate harvest control rule(s).946 The process and organization of the joint meetings were further
prescribed in the resolution, including the requirement that an IATTC member and a WCPFC member
serve as co-chairs. 947
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In early September 2016, the joint WCPFC/IATTC meeting occurred in the margins of the Northern
Committee meeting in Fukuoka, Japan.948 In a report to the WCPFC, the Northern Committee chair
indicated that the joint WCPFC/IATTC meeting had made good progress in discussing a Pacific-wide
management framework including a rebuilding strategy, precautionary management framework, catch
documentation scheme, emergency rule(s) and existing bluefin management measures.949 One of the main
outcomes of the joint meeting was agreement on the need for a second biomass target reference to be
achieved by 2030. The Northern Committee adopted the recommendations of the joint meeting,
incorporating them into a draft bluefin measure for consideration at WCPFC13.950

The Northern Committee’s bluefin recommendations were met with strong criticism by several members
and observers of the Commission at WCPFC13, with many statements suggesting that the management of
bluefin by the Northern Committee had been a failure. 951 Recall that under the Honolulu Convention, the
Northern Committee has an obligation to formulate CMMs for Northern Stocks managed by the
Commission. The Northern Committee’s recommendation for bluefin included the use of step-wise
rebuilding conservation targets; however, such targets were not identified. Also included in the
recommendation was the adoption of a rebuilding target by the IATTC, as well as the convening of a
stakeholders meeting in coordination with the IATTC in 2017. The Northern Committee did not agree on
emergency measures in the event of drastic reductions in bluefin recruitment, which was targeted for 2016
under CMM 2015-04. 952
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Strong opposition was voiced by some members who thought the Northern Committee’s recommendation
was too weak, did not include emergency measures, and lacked specificity regarding future step-wise
rebuilding targets. Taking these criticisms into account, the only existing recommendation that had been
agreed upon was a rebuilding target of 7% of the unfished spawning biomass to be achieved by 2024.953
The Commission members that were critical of the Northern Committee’s recommendation were left in a
quandary: either accept the recommendation in its current form or ask the Northern Committee to do
more. The latter won out and the Commission requested that the Northern Committee convene an
extraordinary meeting on the margins of WCPFC13, with the charge to consider recommending
additional measures to expedite bluefin rebuilding. 954 The Northern Committee did meet during the week
of WCPFC13, but no additional recommendations were produced due to a “lack of mandate by some
members to go further.” 955 Notwithstanding the lackluster result of the extraordinary meeting, Japan and
Korea agreed to impose voluntary measures. Japan offered to transfer a portion of its catch limit for fish
smaller than 30 kg to its catch limit for fish larger than 30 kg. 956 Korea indicated that it would make a
voluntary payback for its overharvest of bluefin larger than 30 kg. 957 Recognizing that the Commission
could not adopt stronger measures without the Northern Committee’s endorsement, the Commission (lead
by the EU and FFA) directed the Northern Committee to consider the following in 2017: 1) measures to
rebuild the stock to 20% SBF=0 levels by 2032; and 2) emergency measures that stipulate specific rules if a
drastic reduction in recruitment is observed.958

Clearly, there were several members of the Commission that sought stronger measures to reduce bluefin
catches, especially juvenile fish less than 30 kg. With most of the bluefin catch deriving from Japanese
vessels fishing in their national waters, it has proven difficult for the Northern Committee to agree on
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stricter measures. Furthermore, as the stock is so depleted, the management of bluefin is a significant
global concern and a test case in international management, including with respect to the application of
the Principle across RFMO jurisdictions. Generally, fisheries issues receive short shrift in the media, but
the high value of Pacific bluefin, combined with its poor stock status, has piqued global interest in the
conservation and management of the stock. Undoubtedly the world is watching and waiting to see what
action will be taken by the international community. 959
6.4.1 Findings on Pacific bluefin

The Principle is being applied in the form of management collaboration between the IATTC and WCPFC.
Measures to restrict catches throughout the range of the stock, in both the WCPO and EPO, have been
implemented. Although Article 8 is not referenced in the WCPFC measures, Article 22, which promotes
consistency between the IATTC and WCPFC, is referenced and has played a prominent role in
harmonizing Pacific bluefin management between the commissions. One could view such coordination as
being in support of the Principle, as management measures apply in both commission areas and within
national waters and the high seas.

With respect to Article (8)(2)(i-ii) and (c), recognition of existing measures that apply within national
waters or the high seas areas prior to commission management is not found in WCPFC measures. The
records do, however, mention the voluntary measures taken by Japan and Korea, suggesting that controls
being implemented within the national waters of these countries are independent of WCPFC measures.
Even so, there is little in the WCPFC meeting records on existing management measures applicable to
Pacific bluefin.
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Regarding the biological unity of stock in accordance with Article 2(a), the WCPFC and IATTC have
cooperated on the development of management measures that take into account the range of the stock as it
occurs in both the WCPO and EPO. In addition, management measures apply within national waters and
the high seas, further promoting the comprehensive management of the stock. The WCPFC measure also
applies to artisanal fisheries in Japan, which mostly occur within Japan’s territorial sea waters.

Concerning the respective dependence of CCMs on Pacific bluefin in accordance with Article 8(2)(d), the
WCPFC measures do not refer to any particular CCM. In the records of WCPFC meetings, however,
Japan has consistently affirmed the importance of bluefin to artisanal fishermen operating within its
coastal waters. Japan is the largest market for bluefin globally, with most of the bluefin caught in
Mexico’s waters destined for Japanese markets after being grown-out in offshore cages. Japan likely has a
higher dependence on Pacific bluefin with regard to consumption than any other CCM, but this
consideration is not mentioned in WCPFC measures.

Pacific bluefin is a northern stock that predominately occurs north of 20°N. For this reason, there is no
need to take into account special consideration of high seas pockets. With regard to the stock status of
Pacific bluefin, it is the most significantly depleted tuna stock subject to international management
(SB/SBF=0 = < 3%). The recent catches of bluefin in the WCPO and EPO are within the limits established
under both commissions, and if adhered to, will likely lead to the rebuilding of bluefin spawning stock
biomass to 7% SBF=0 by 2024.. As stated by several members of the WCPFC, however, a 7% spawning
biomass ratio represents the bare minimum as a conservation standard and should not be considered an
appropriate rebuilding target. To achieve greater stock conservation, such as 20% SBF=0, catches will need
to be further reduced from current levels. In this regard, the application of the Principle may be subjected
to further testing, as greater catch reductions will have to come from the major fishing nations of Japan
and Mexico in order to achieve such conservation objectives.
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6.4.2 Compatibility Rating
Table 10: Compatibility assessment matrix for Pacific bluefin
CMM on Pacific bluefin
Standard
1. Article 8 in
general

Criteria
Does the measure
reference Article 8?

2. Article
8(2)(b)(i-ii)
and (c)

Does the measure
recognize measures
established for EEZs or
prior measures
established for the high
seas?
What is the extent of
the measure’s area of
application and does it
take into account the
biological unity of the
stocks and fisheries
concerned?
To what extent are
considerations of
respective dependence
on the stocks concerned
taken into account?

3. Article
8(2)(a)

4. Article
8(2)(d)

5. Article 8(4)

6. Article 2
Stock Status

To what extent does the
CMM accommodate
considerations for high
seas pockets?
What is the status of the
stock(s) concerned
given the collective
obligation to ensure
long-term conservation
through effective
management?

Justification
No, none of the WCPFC bluefin measures
reference Article 8. However, Article 22 is
referenced which promotes consistency between
WCPFC and IATTC management areas.
No, none of the WCPFC bluefin measures
reference existing measures applicable to national
waters or prior measures for the high seas.

Score
0.5

The WCPFC measures apply within national
waters and the high seas. When these measures are
combined with IATTC measures, they cover the
range of the stock. The WCPFC measure also
applies to Japanese artisanal fisheries occurring
within Japan’s coastal waters.

1

References to the respective dependence of some
CCMs on Pacific bluefin are absent from WCPFC
measures. There are numerous instances in the
records of Commission meeting, however, where
the importance of the fishery to Japan is made
clear.
Pacific bluefin is a northern stock, and as such its
distribution is concentrated at latitudes greater than
the two equatorial high seas pockets.

0.5

Pacific bluefin is experiencing overfishing and is in
a severely overfished condition. However, given
recent recruitment and catch restrictions, the stock
is expected to rebuild to higher levels. Even so,
large gains in stock recovery may not occur.

0.25

0

Not assessed

Total Score
(2.25/5)
45%
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6.5 North Pacific Albacore

One of the first CMMs adopted by the Commission with regard to a targeted species was for North
Pacific albacore.960 At the time of adopting CMM 2005-03, it was believed that North Pacific albacore
was fully exploited or experiencing fishing mortality at levels not sustainable in the long term. 961 The
main objective of the measure is to ensure that fishing effort by CCM vessels does not increase beyond
“current” levels. 962 In addition, CCMs are obliged to report catches of North Pacific albacore to the
WCPFC every six months, with an exception being made for small coastal fisheries, which are required to
report on an annual basis. Annual reporting obligations also apply to CCMs with respect to their catches
and fishing effort on North Pacific albacore by each gear type.963

CMM 2005-03 applies throughout the Convention Area and does not specify any spatial differences in its
area of application between the high seas and EEZs. CMM 2005-03 also recognizes the need for
coordination and consultation between the WCPFC and IATTC, instructing the WCPFC Executive
Director to communicate with the IATTC on the need for both commissions to adopt uniform measures
with respect to northern albacore. 964 The use of the term “uniform” suggests that the two commissions
adopt identical measures. Had an alternative phrasing been used (such as “compatible” or “consistent”
measures), then this would have militated against the need for identical provisions or requirements. In this
case, however, the WCPFC and IATTC did adopt near identical measures. The IATTC adopted a
resolution in 2005 requiring that the total fishing level for North Pacific albacore in the EPO not increase
960

WCPFC. (2005). Conservation and Management Measure for North Pacific Albacore (CMM 2005-03). Adopted
at the Second Annual Session of the WCPFC. 11-16 December 2005. Pohnpei, FSM. As described in Chapter 4,
North Pacific albacore is a Pan-Pacific stock that occurs north of the equator within the Convention Area and the
IATTC area.
961
ISC. (2014). Stock Assessment of the Albacore Tuna in the North Pacific Ocean in 2014. Report of the Albacore
Working Group. International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean. 1621 July 2014.
962
CMM 2005-03 at paragraph 2. Fishing effort is to be reported, at a minimum, as the number of vessel-days fished
for North Pacific albacore. The CMM does not define what is meant by “current levels.”
963
Ibid at paragraph 4.
964
Ibid at paragraph 8.
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beyond current levels. 965 The IATTC resolution, like the WCPFC CMM 2005-3, requires members of the
IATTC to ensure that the level of fishing effort by their vessels fishing for North Pacific albacore does not
increase. 966

The latest stock assessment for North Pacific albacore, completed in 2017, indicates that the stock is
healthy and that current productivity is sufficient to sustain recent levels of fishing mortality. The
assessment also revealed the stock is not overfished relative to the LRP adopted by the WCPFC. 967
Notwithstanding the current health of the stock, CMM 2005-03 continues to apply today. The IATTC
revised its North Pacific albacore resolution in 2013 (C-13-03) to supplement its 2005 measure, with the
main modification being to define “current effort” and require members to provide catch and effort
information to the IATTC Secretariat.968 C-13-03 also provides that the IATTC will continue efforts to
promote compatibility with WCPFC measures for North Pacific albacore.969

The Northern Committee has also initiated an interim harvest strategy approach for North Pacific
albacore, with the management objective being to maintain the stock’s biomass around its current level,
with reasonable variability, in order to allow recent exploitation levels to continue with a low risk of
breaching the LRP. 970 The Northern Committee has also recommended conducting a Management
Strategy Evaluation to help determine a TRP for the stock. 971

965
IATTC. (2005). Resolution on Northern Albacore Tuna (Resolution C-05-02). Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission. 73rd meeting. Lanzarote, SP. 20-24 June 2005.
966
Ibid at paragraph 2. The IATTC later went on to adopt a clarifying resolution on how to define “current fishing
effort.” See IATTC. (2013). Supplemental Resolution on North Pacific Albacore (Resolution C-13-03). 85th Meeting
of the IATTC. 10-14 June 2013. Veracruz, Mexico.
967
ISC. (2017). Stock assessment for albacore tuna in the North Pacific Ocean in 2017. Report of the Albacore
Working Group. 12-17 June 2017. Vancouver, Canada.
968
IATTC. (2013). Supplemental resolution on North Pacific albacore. Adopted at the 85th meeting of the IATTC.
10-14 June 2013. Veracruz, Mexico.
969
WCPFC. (2005). Conservation and Management Measure for North Pacific Albacore. Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Adopted at the Second Regular Session of the WCPFC. Pohnpei, FSM. 12-16
December 2005.
970
WCPFC. (2017). Summary Report of the Thirteenth Regular Session of the Northern Committee. 28 August--1
September 2017. Busan, Republic of Korea. 49.
971
Ibid at 42.
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6.5.1 Findings on North Pacific albacore

With regard to the Principle in general, Article 8 is not referenced in CMM 2005-03. However, the
measure does reference Article 22 which recognizes the importance of consistent measures between
IATTC and WCPFC jurisdictions. In relation to Article 8(2)(b)(i-ii) and (c), prior measures for North
Pacific albacore applicable in either EEZs or international waters are not referenced. The existing
measure applies throughout the Convention Area, which signifies that the biological unity of stock and
associated fisheries have been taken into account. Moreover, and as previously mentioned, the measure
does reference Article 22 with regard to the need for consistent WCPFC/IATTC measures.

In relation to Article 2(d), there is no reference to the respective dependence of the stock by any CCM in
the measure. The measure, however, does require additional data reporting requirements, including data
covering small coastal fisheries. This information would be useful in any future consideration of
respective dependence by a CCM on the stock. As Northern Albacore is a northern stock, and there are no
high seas pockets north of 20° N, Article 8(4) does not apply. The latest stock assessment for North
Pacific albacore, completed in 2017, indicates that the stock is healthy and not overfished or experiencing
overfishing. An interim harvest strategy has been initiated to maintain biomass at its current level – an
action measure which should also reduce or prevent tensions between CCMs with respect compatibility.
However, this could change with regard to identification of a TRP as an outcome of the Management
Strategy Evaluation (MSE) process.
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6.5.2 Compatibility Rating
Table 11: Compatibility assessment for North Pacific albacore
CMM on North Pacific albacore
Standard
1. Article 8 in
general

Criteria
Does the measure
reference Article 8?

2. Article
8(2)(b)(i-ii)
and (c)

Does the measure
recognize measures
established for EEZs or
prior measures
established for the high
seas?
What is the extent of
the measure’s area of
application and does it
take into account the
biological unity of the
stocks and fisheries
concerned?
To what extent are
considerations of
respective dependence
on the stocks concerned
taken into account?
To what extent does the
CMM accommodate
considerations for high
seas pockets?
What is the status of the
stock(s) concerned
given the collective
obligation to ensure
long-term conservation
through effective
management?

3. Article
8(2)(a)

4. Article
8(2(d)

5. Article 8(4)

6.Article 2
Stock Status

Justification
No, the CMM does not reference Article 8.
Reference is made to Article 22 which recognizes
consistent management measures between the
WCPFC and IATTC.
No, none of the North Pacific albacore measures
reference existing measures in place for EEZs or
the high seas prior to the CMM.

Score
0.5

The WCPFC measures apply within national
waters and high seas, and when combined with
IATTC measures, cover the range of the stock.

1

No references to the respective dependence of
some CMMs on the stock are made within the
measure.

0

Since North Pacific albacore is a northern stock, its
stock distribution is concentrated at latitudes
greater than the two equatorial high seas pockets.

Not assessed

North Pacific albacore is not overfished or
experiencing overfishing. The Northern Committee
is initiating a harvest strategy for the stock,
including a MSE to help determine an appropriate
TRP.

1

0

Total Score
(2.5/5)
50%
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6.6 Southwest Pacific Striped Marlin

In 2006, the Commission adopted a CMM for Southwest Pacific striped marlin (CMM 2006-04). 972 At the
time, the advice from the SC was that there should be no increase in fishing mortality on the stock, as
fishing mortality was likely equal to or exceeded FMSY and ‘current’ biomass was at or below BMSY. 973
The Southwest Pacific striped marlin stock is distributed between the equator and 40ºS latitude and 140ºE
to 130ºW longitude. 974 Japanese longline vessels targeting bluefin and other pelagic stocks began
harvesting Southwest Pacific striped marlin in the 1950’s.975 In 1987, the New Zealand government
prohibited commercial fishing vessels from retaining striped marlin caught in New Zealand waters.976

CMM 2006-04 requires CCMs to limit the number of fishing vessels fishing for striped marlin in the
Convention Area south of 15ºS to a number in any one year between 2000-2004. 977 The measure does not
specify if the stated limits are to apply only on the high seas or within the EEZs of CCMs. Under the
measure, SIDS and PTs are afforded the ability to develop their fisheries, and as such they are not
restricted in the number of vessels that fish for striped marlin in the high seas or EEZ areas south of 15º
S. 978 The measure also exempts those CCMs that have already implemented measures that establish a
commercial moratorium on the landing of striped marlin caught within waters under their national
jurisdiction. 979 To facilitate compliance monitoring and the provision of data on striped marlin, CCMs are
required to nominate the maximum number of vessels that are allowed to fish for striped marlin south of
972

WCPFC. (2006). Conservation and Management Measure for Striped Marlin in the Southwest Pacific Ocean
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and wider southwest Pacific Ocean. New Zealand Fisheries Assessment Report. 2011/2012 6. 6.
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15º S. CCMs are also required to report annually to the Commission their catches of striped marlin as a
result of targeted fishing and as bycatch.980

6.6.1 Findings on Southwest Pacific Striped Marlin

With regard to the Principle, Article 8 is not referenced in the measure. However, the CMM explicitly
identifies that the measure does not apply to areas under the national jurisdiction of coastal States that
already have a commercial moratorium in place. This can be viewed as consistent with Article 8(2)(b)(i)
with respect to measures already in place prior to the CMM. Concerning the biological unity of the stock
under Article 8(2)(c), CMM 2006-04 is spatially limited to south of 15ºS within the Convention area;
however, the stock occurs north of 15º S to the equator. This indicates that the measure does not cover the
range of the stock in its entirety - a weakness with respect to Article 8(2)(a). Reasons for not extending
the measure to stock boundary (as delineated in the stock assessment) are not clear from the WCPCF
records. One reason may be that there is relatively little area of high seas north of 15ºS in the
Southwestern Pacific, as most of the ocean area is comprised of the EEZs of PICs. However, the measure
also provides exemptions to SIDS and PTs, so excluding their EEZs seems illogical with regard to how
the measure is formulated. In light of these factors, the Commission may not be appropriately taking into
account the biological unity of the stock with respect to developing compatible measures.

Regarding the relative dependence on the stock pursuant to Article 8(2)(d), CMM 2006-04 also requires
CCMs to nominate the total number of vessels fishing for Southwest Pacific striped marlin in the
Convention Area south of 15ºS between 2000 and 2004, and to report annually on the catch of this
species. These provisions support compliance monitoring but could also be used when considering the
respective dependence of CCMs on Southwest Pacific striped marlin in the future. The measure does not
mention the need to take special consideration of high seas pocket areas of the Southwestern Pacific

980

Ibid at 1, paragraph 4.
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Ocean; however, the EHSPSMA does occur within the range of stock and exit/entry vessel notifications
do apply The most recent stock assessment for Southwest Pacific striped marlin was completed in 2012,
indicating that overfishing is not occurring, but that the stock is approaching an overfished condition. 981

981

Davies, N., S. Hoyle, and J. Hampton. (2012). Stock assessment for striped marlin (Kajikia audax) in the
Southwest Pacific. Eighth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 7-15 August 2012. Busan,
Korea.WCPFC-SC8-2012/SA-WP-05.
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6.6.2 Compatibility Rating
Table 12: Compatibility assessment for Southwest Pacific striped marlin
CMM on Southwest Pacific Striped Marlin
Standard
1. Article 8 in
general
2. Article
8(2)(b)(i-ii)
and (c)

3. Article
8(2)(a)

4. Article
8(2)(d)

5. Article 8(4)

6. Article 2
Stock Status

Criteria
Does the measure
reference Article 8?
Does the measure
recognize measures
established for EEZs or
prior measures
established for the high
seas?
What is the extent of
the measure’s area of
application and does it
take into account the
biological unity of the
stocks and fisheries
concerned?
To what extent are
considerations of
respective dependence
on the stocks concerned
taken into account?
To what extent does the
CMM accommodate
considerations for high
seas pockets?
What is the status of the
stock(s) concerned
given the collective
obligation to ensure
long-term conservation
through effective
management?

Justification
No, the CMM does not reference Article 8.

Score
0

Yes, the CMM does reference existing measures in
place for those CCMs that already have a
commercial moratorium in effect.

1

The CMM does apply to the entire range of the
stock, as the area north of 15º degrees S is not
subject to the measure. The stock is believed to
extend to the equator.

0.5

No references are made to the respective
dependence on the stock by CCMs. However, the
measure does require some level of reporting,
which in the future could be used to identify
respective dependence.
There is no mention of high seas pockets in the
measure. However, the EHSPSMA does occur
within the range of stock and exit/entry vessel
notifications do apply.
Southwest Pacific striped marlin is not
experiencing overfishing, but it is approaching an
overfished condition.

0.25

0.25

0.5

Total Score
(2.5/6)
42%
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6.7 Southwest Pacific Swordfish

In 2006, the Commission adopted a conservation and management measure (CMM 2006-03) for the
swordfish stock occurring in the Southwest Pacific Ocean.982 The stock boundaries are believed to be
between 0º-50ºS latitude and 140ºE-175ºW longitude, with most of the catches occurring between 20 ºS
and 40 ºS. 983 At the time the measure was adopted, there were concerns that catch rates and the average
size of swordfish within the core harvest area were in decline.984 For example, if the 2004 level of effort
and catch continued, further declines in the stock’s biomass were predicted. 985

Prior to CMM 2006-03 being adopted, proponents argued that the measure was needed based on the SC’s
management advice and the precautionary approach; however, the EU questioned the science behind the
stock assessment and its results. 986 The Cook Islands asserted that the EU was rapidly expanding its fleet
of vessels that target swordfish, and that such expansion threatened the fishery development aspirations of
SIDS. 987 Although a small working group was formed, the records of WCPFC3 shed no further light on
the development of the CMM.

Nonetheless, the Commission adopted the measure, with CCMs being required to limit their vessels
fishing for swordfish in the Convention Area south of 20º S to the number in any one year between 2000

982

WCPFC. (2006). Conservation and Management Measure for Swordfish in the Southwest Pacific (CMM 200603). Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2006. Apia, Samoa.
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Swordfish 1952-2004. Second Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 7-18 August 2006.
Manila, Philippines.WCPFC-SC4-2008/SA-WP-6. 4.
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WCPFC. (2006). Report of the Second Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 7-18 August
2006. Manila, Philippines. 16. The 2006 stock assessment was unable to determine whether the stock was overfished
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declining catch rates.
987
Ibid at 19.
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and 2005. 988 The measure applied to the entire Convention Area south of 20º S, yet the stock assessment
at the time was limited to the South-West Pacific to around 175º W. 989

The measure also required CCMs to report the number of vessels that fished for swordfish between 2000
and 2005, and to nominate the maximum number of vessels permitted to fish for swordfish south of 20º
degrees S. 990 Like other CMMs, SIDS and PTs were exempt from the vessel limit restriction, provided
they were pursuing responsible development of their fisheries in the area.991

In 2008 a new stock assessment for south Pacific swordfish was conducted. 992 An important objective of
the assessment was to evaluate the entire stock, as the Commission had only been managing the stock
beyond the south-western Pacific. Accordingly, the stock assessment evaluated swordfish in two regions
of the Convention Area: 1) the south-western Pacific; and 2) the south-central Pacific.993 The assessment
identified that swordfish catches in the south-central Pacific were historically much lower than in the
south-west Pacific, but began to increase rapidly in 1990s, with a similar trend occurring around the same
in the south-west region. 994 Most of the catch in the south-central region was taken as bycatch in
equatorial longline fisheries, but in 2004 a rapidly expanding Spanish fleet began targeting swordfish. By
2006, swordfish catches by Spanish vessels were greater than all nations combined in the south-west and
south-central regions. 995 The stock assessment found that the status of swordfish in the south-west region
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was not overfished or experiencing overfishing. However, the stock assessment for the south-central
Pacific was unable to determine an overfished/not overfished status due to a lack of data.996

After reviewing the 2008 stock assessment, the WCPFC SC recommended there be no further increase in
catch or effort for the south-western area. 997 For the south-central region, the SC recommended that
constraining the (existing) fishing mortality level was appropriate. 998 Based on the SC’s advice, and the
recognition that the number of Spanish vessels (and their catches) had rapidly increased, New Zealand (on
behalf of FFA members) proposed a new measure at WCPFC5 that would replace CMM 2006-03. The
proposal would have restricted catch and effort levels to the maximum amount in any one year between
2000 and 2006. 999 New Zealand argued that the existing measure, while it might have constrained vessels
fishing for swordfish south of 20º S, did not impose catch or effort restrictions and failed to control
fishing mortality. 1000 Some CCMs opposed the FFA’s proposal, arguing that the stock status did not
indicate overfishing or an overfished condition, and further, that the Commission should focus on stocks
that are in much worse condition and establish longline limits for those fisheries, as appropriate.1001 An
alternative view was expressed by another CCM, which declared that although the stock was not in a
precarious situation, management action should not be deferred. In making this pronouncement, the CCM
reminded the other members that the objective of the Commission is to ensure the long-term conservation
and sustainable use of fish stocks in the Convention Area.1002

Notwithstanding the arguments against the proposal, the Commission agreed to a new measure, CMM
2008-05, which included the provision that CCMs limit the amount of swordfish caught on an annual
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basis south of 20º S to the amount in any one year between 2000 and 2006.1003 The vessel limits
established under CMM 2006-03 were maintained in the new measure. CCMs were also required to
nominate their respective maximum total catch for 2009 in the area south of 20º S. 1004

The new measure included a data verification provision which was specific to one member only - the
EU. 1005 This was because during the negotiation of the new measure, the EU delegate indicated that the
2005 swordfish catch data previously submitted by the EU was actually 2-4 times higher than the data
indicated.1006 This led other member delegations to believe the EU was fabricating data to ensure a higher
catch limit under the new measure. Therefore, the EU was required to be subject to an independent catch
verification review. 1007 CMM 2008-05 also identified that New Zealand and Australia had domestic catch
limits already in place at 885 mt and 1400 mt respectively. 1008

In 2009, the Commission again revised the swordfish measure, largely because CMM 2008-05 had
established catch limits applicable to 2009 only. The Commission agreed on CMM 2009-03, which
maintains most of the provisions of CMM 2008-05. 1009 Under the new measure, if a CCM exceeds its
nominated catch limit, that CCM is to reduce the next year’s catch limit by the overage in the previous
year. 1010 A data verification scheme was also introduced, such that operational data is to be verified by the
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SPC for CCMs that have vessels catching south-west Pacific swordfish either through direct targeting or
as bycatch in waters south of 20ºS. 1011

The stock status of South Pacific swordfish was assessed in 2017, with the results indicating that the stock
is likely not overfished or subject to overfishing. However, spawning biomass appears to on a gradual,
continued decline. 1012 Taking into account the stock assessment, the WCPFC SC recommended that the
Commission consider developing management measures for the area north of 20º S, which is currently
not covered under the existing CMM. If one considers that catches in the northern area represent half of
the total catch of the stock, the SC’s recommendation is both timely and appropriate.1013
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6.7.1 Findings on South Pacific Swordfish

Neither the Principle nor Article 8 are referenced in any of the agreed WCPFC conservation and
management measures for South-western Pacific swordfish. In CMM 2008-05, the predecessor to the
existing measure in place, domestically established catch limits in effect for Australia and New Zealand
were identified, representing consistency with Article 8(2)(b)(i). In the replacement measure (CMM
2009-03), however, the domestic limits for Australia and New Zealand have been removed. There is no
indication in the records as to why this information was omitted from the replacement measure.

With regard to Article (2)(a) and the biological unity of South-western Pacific swordfish, the measure
does not cover the entire range of the stock. Moreover, around half of the total catch occurs outside of the
measure’s area of application (i.e., north of 20º S). While the existing measure instructs CCMs not to shift
effort north of 20º S, the measure provides a blanket exemption to SIDS and PTs, whereby catch limits do
not apply provided these CCMs are undertaking responsible development of their fisheries. CMM 200903 acknowledges the importance of the WCPFC and IATTC in establishing complementary measures for
species of mutual interest, and that swordfish stocks likely occur within the area of responsibility of both
RFMOs.

The measure also maintains provisions that require the submission of catch data on an annual basis.
Indeed, these provisions support the application of the Principle and could potentially be used to identify
respective dependence in accordance with Article 8(2)(d). However, there is no clear indication in the
records of any CCM having made claims of substantial dependence on South Pacific swordfish.

The EHSPSMA does occur within the range of the stock, and thus vessels are required to notify the
Commission of their entry and exit within the area, including the quantity of fish they have on board. In
this regard, the EHSPSMA can be viewed as supporting compatibility with respect to Article 8(4).
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6.7.2 Compatibility Rating
Table 13: Compatibility assessment for Southwest Pacific Swordfish
CMM on Southwest Pacific Swordfish
Standard
1. Article 8 in
general

Criteria
Does the measure
reference Article 8?

2. Article
8(2)(b)(i-ii)
and (c)

Does the measure
recognize measures
established for EEZs or
prior measures
established for the high
seas?
What is the extent of
the measure’s area of
application and does it
take into account the
biological unity of the
stocks and fisheries
concerned?
To what extent are
considerations of
respective dependence
on the stocks concerned
taken into account?
To what extent does the
CMM accommodate
considerations for high
seas pockets?
What is the status of the
stock(s) concerned
given the collective
obligation to ensure
long-term conservation
through effective
management?

3. Article
8(2)(a)

4. Article
8(2)(d)

5. Article 8(4)

6. Article 2
Stock Status

Justification
No, the CMM does not reference Article 8. The
measure does reference the need for consistent
measures between the WCPFC and IATTC.
The predecessor measure did reference domestic
catch limits in place for Australia and New
Zealand. However, reference to those limits were
removed from the CMM currently in place.

Score
0.25

The CMM does not apply to the entire range of the
stock as the area north of 20º S is not subject to the
measure. Around half of the total catch occurs
outside of the measure’s area of application.

0.5

0.5

No references relating to the respective dependence 0.25
on the stock by CCMs appear in the CMM.
However, the measure does require some degree of
reporting, which in the future could be used to
identify respective dependence.
There is no mention of high seas pockets in the
0.5
measure. However the EHSPSMA does occur
within the range of the stock and entry/exit vessel
notifications do apply to swordfish.
Southwest Pacific swordfish is not overfished or
1
experiencing overfishing.

Total Score
(3/6)
50%
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6.8 North Pacific Striped Marlin

In 2010, the Commission adopted CMM 2010-01 on north Pacific striped marlin. Indeed, available
information at the time suggested that the stock was subject to overfishing and likely overfished with
regard to spawning biomass. 1014 The main controls in CMM 2010-01 are provisions that establish flagbased catch limits, beginning in 2011 with phased reductions through 2013, with 2013 catch levels
restricted to 80% of each CCMs highest catch between 2000 and 2003.1015 After 2013, CCMs are to
maintain the catch limits that apply in 2013. Interestingly, the measure establishes flag-based catch limits
that apply irrespective of fishing gear. Typically, WCPFC measures identify the gear types to which the
provisions apply (e.g., longline, purse seine etc.) However, this measure is void of such specificity and
thus applies to all commercial fisheries of a CCM harvesting North Pacific striped marlin.

CMM 2010-01 identifies the area of application to be in the high seas and EEZs within the Convention
Area north of the equator. 1016 The measure requires each CCM to report “verifiable” information
regarding its catch of North Pacific striped marlin, as well as the status of domestic implementation of the
measure on an annual basis in their Part 2 Reports. 1017 Exemptions to the catch limits are provided to
SIDS and PTs. 1018

1014

WCPFC. (2010). Conservation and Management Measure for North Pacific Striped Marlin (CMM 2010-01).
Seventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 6-10 December 2010. At the time the measure was adopted, the latest stock
assessment for North Pacific striped marlin had been completed in 2007. See WCPFC. (2010). Sixth Regular Session
of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 10-19 August 2010. Nukualofa, Tonga. xvi.
1015
CMM 2010-01 at 1, paragraphs 5(a)-(c).
1016
CMM 2010-01 at 1, paragraph 1.
1017
Ibid at 7.
1018
Ibid at 1, paragraph 3.
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6.8.1 Findings on North Pacific Striped Marlin

With respect to the Principle, Article 8 is not referenced in CMM 2010-01. The measure does, however,
reference FFA members adopting a system of zone-based longline limits to replace the current system of
flag-based arrangements that are applicable to their EEZs. This reference has linkages to Article 8(2)(b)(i)
with respect the development of compatible measures and measures in place for areas under national
jurisdiction.

Regarding the need to consider the biological unity of stock (Article 8(2)(d)), the measure applies to
EEZs and the highs seas of the Convention Area north of equator, which indicates that it does take into
account the full range of the stock. One potential weakness of the measure is the exemptions provided to
SIDS and PTs, such that any increases in catch by SIDS and PTs would likely occur on the high seas.
Increased catches on the high seas could be viewed as problematic if those catches are incompatible with
catches taken within waters under national jurisdiction. However, the likelihood of this eventuating is
low. The measure requires verifiable fisheries information to be provided, which could be used for future
respective dependence considerations. However, the provision of such information finds greater
resonance with the issue of compliance monitoring than Article 8(2)(d).

The stock occurs in the North Pacific predominately in northerly latitudes where there are not high seas
pockets, and therefore the measure is not assessed in accordance with Article 8(4). The latest (2015) stock
assessment for North Pacific striped marlin found that the stock continues to be subject to overfishing and
was overfished with regard to MSY-related biomass reference points.1019

1019

ISC. (2015). Stock assessment update for striped marlin (Kajikia audax) in the Western and Central North
Pacific Ocean through 2013. Report of the Billfish Working Group. 15-20 July 2015. Kona, USA.
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6.8.2 Compatibility Rating
Table 14: Compatibility assessment for North Pacific striped marlin
CMM on North Pacific Striped Marlin
Standard
1. Article 8 in
general
2. Article
8(2)(b)(i-ii)
and(c)

3. Article
8(2)(a)

4. Article
8(2)(d)

5. Article 8(4)

6. Article 2
Stock Status

Criteria
Does the measure
reference Article 8?
Does the measure
recognize measures
established for EEZs or
prior measures
established for the high
seas?
What is the extent of
the measure’s area of
application and does it
take into account the
biological unity of the
stocks and fisheries
concerned?
To what extent are
considerations of
respective dependence
on the stocks concerned
taken into account?
To what extent does the
CMM accommodate
considerations for high
seas pockets?
What is the status of the
stock(s) concerned
given the collective
obligation to ensure
long-term conservation
through effective
management?

Justification
No, the CMM does not reference Article 8.

Score
0

The measure does mention that FFA members will
be adopting a system of zone-based longline limits
to replace the current system of flag-based
arrangements that are applicable to their EEZs.
However, there is no indication that the limits were
in place prior to the adoption of the measure.
The CMM applies throughout the entire range of
the stock and to all gears catching North Pacific
striped marlin.

0.5

No references to the respective dependence on the
stock by CCMs appear in the CMM. However, the
measure does require some degree of reporting,
which in the future could be used to identify
respective dependence.
Although North Pacific striped marlin is not
considered a northern stock, its distribution is
concentrated at latitudes greater than the two
equatorial high seas pockets.
North Pacific striped marlin is overfished and
experiencing overfishing.

0.25

1

Not assessed

0

Total Score
(1.75/5)
35%
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6.9 Sharks

The WCPFC first agreed to a CMM on sharks in 2006. 1020 The measure (CMM 2006-05) required CCMs
to, inter alia, implement the following: a) the FAO International Plan of Action for the Conservation and
Management of Sharks. 1021 This plan encourages the development of National Plans of Action for shark
conservation; b) the submission of shark catch data for key shark species identified by the SC; and c) a
requirement that shark fins retained by vessels on board total no more than 5% of the weight of sharks
retained on board. 1022 The area of application of the shark measure was not specified; thus, ipso facto, the
measure applied throughout the Convention Area.1023 However, the measure also provided an exemption
to areas under national jurisdiction, stating that nothing in the measure prejudices the sovereign rights of
coastal States to implement alternative measures for the purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving and
managing sharks in waters under national jurisdiction. 1024 The term “exploiting” suggests that domestic
laws within waters under national jurisdiction that allow for shark finning could be maintained, depending
on how a particular member chose to implement the measure domestically. In this regard, international
waters within the Convention Area were likely managed more conservatively with respect to the practice
of shark finning than the national waters of some members. On the other hand, some members already
had anti-shark finning prohibitions in place, with such prohibitions attaching to their flagged vessels
operating on the high seas and in national waters. However, the measure does not identify these countries,

1020

WCPFC. (2006). Conservation and Management Measure for Sharks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
(CMM 2006-05). Adopted at the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2016. Apia, Samoa.
1021
FAO. (1998). The International Plan of Action for Conservation and Management of Sharks. The IPOA on
Sharks is a non-binding international instrument developed by the FAO.
1022
CMM 2006-05 at 1, paragraph 7.
1023
There is no discussion in the records of the WCPFC’s Third Regular Session of the shark measure not applying
in the archipelagic waters of coastal States within the WCPO.
1024
CMM 2006-5, at 2, paragraph 11.
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nor does it require CCMs to identify domestic measures that are in effect.1025 Another important
exemption found in the measure is that it only applied to vessels greater than 24 meters, so vessels less
than 24 meters could continue to conduct shark fining. 1026 As there are thousands of longline vessels
operating in the Convention Area less than 24 meters, the narrow application of the measure substantially
reduced its conservation potential.

The WCPFC revised the shark measure in 2008 to require CCMs to, among other things: a) report on the
implementation status of the shark IPOA in their Part 2 Annual Reports, including the status of their
National Plans of Action and/or assessment of the need to have a National Plan; b) provide catch and
effort data by gear type for SC-identified key shark species (blue, oceanic white tip, mako and thresher
sharks; and c) apply the measure to all their flagged vessels fishing for HMS species within the
Convention Area. 1027 Unfortunately, Part 2 Annual Reports are not available in the public domain,
drastically reducing transparency of the implementation of the measure. 1028

During the negotiation of the shark measure at WCPFC5, Papua New Guinea intervened to ensure that
their domestic shark fishery operating in PNG waters was exempted from the measure. Indeed, PNG
argued for the inclusion of the term “traditional fisheries” in the paragraph referencing the sovereign

1025

In the United States, for example, the Shark Fin Prohibition Act of 2000 prohibited shark finning but allowed a
5% fin to carcass ratio. In 2010, the statute was amended to require all sharks loaded on board to have their fins
naturally attached. See US Public Law 106-557. There are also shark sanctuaries across the WCPO, including in the
national waters of Palau, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, New Caledonia, the
Cook Islands and French Polynesia. See: http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/factsheets/2016/03/shark-sanctuaries-around-the-world.
1026
Ibid.
1027
WCPFC. (2008). Conservation and Management Measure for Sharks (CMM 2008-06). Adopted at the Fifth
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December 2008. Busan, Korea. The United States introduced the proposal to
amend CMM 2006-05, referencing the Scientific Committee’s finding that there is no substantial difference in shark
catches by vessels greater than and less than 24 meters in length.
1028
Gilman, E., & Kingma, E. (2013). Standard for assessing transparency in information on compliance with
obligations of regional fisheries management organizations: Validation through assessment of the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Ocean & Coastal Management, 84, 31-39.
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rights of coastal States. 1029 In this regard, the measure only applies to national waters of coastal States if
they so choose, with such States still being able to implement alternative measures for sharks.

The following year, the WCPFC again revised the shark measure, but only by adding silky sharks to the
list of key shark species. 1030 The Commission also tasked the SC to evaluate whether or not hammerhead
and porbeagle sharks should be added to the list of key shark species, and to consider reviewing the shark
measure the following year.1031 With little to no debate indicated in the meeting records, the shark
measure was again revised in 2010, but only to include hammerhead and porbeagle sharks on the key
species lists. The measure, CMM 2010-07, maintained the exemption for national waters and did not
specify a timeframe to review the measure’s effectiveness.1032

Shark management was again on the agenda at the 2011 Commission meeting, but this time the focus was
on oceanic whitetip sharks. Based on fisheries data showing a steep decline in the catch rates and size of
whitetips, the outlook of the stock was grim, prompting a strong call to action by civic society and
environmental organizations for both the WCPFC and IATTC to adopt species specific measures for
oceanic whitetips. 1033 The WCPFC responded by adopting a CMM specific to oceanic whitetip sharks
(CMM 2011-04), such that CCMs are to implement regulations that prohibit their vessels from retaining,
transshipping or landing any oceanic whitetip shark (in whole or in part) within the Convention Area. 1034
Unlike previous shark CMMs, this measure did not contain express language exempting coastal States
1029

WCPFC. (2008). Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December, 2008. Busan, Korea. 36.
WCPFC. (2009). Conservation and Management Measure for Sharks (2009-04). Adopted at the Sixth Regular
Session of the WCPFC. 7-11 December 2009. Papeete, French Polynesia. The key shark species list dictates which
data reporting obligations apply to CCMs with regard to sharks.
1031
WCPFC. (2009). Summary Report of the Sixth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 7-11 December 2009. Papeete,
French Polynesia. 39.
1032
WCPFC. (2010). Conservation and Management Measure for Sharks (CMM 2010-07). Adopted at the Seventh
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 6-10 December 2010. Hawaii, USA.
1033
WCPFC. (2011). Summary Report of the Seventh Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 917 August 2011. Pohnpei, FSM. 91.
1034
WCPFC. (2011). Conservation and Management Measure for Oceanic Whitetip Shark (CMM 2011-04).
Adopted at the Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, USA. The IATTC adopted a
similar non-retention measure for oceanic whitetip sharks earlier in 2011. See: IATTC. (2011). Resolution on the
Conservation of Oceanic Whitetip Sharks Caught in Association with Fishing in the Antigua Convention Area.
Adopted at the 82nd Meeting of the IATTC. 4-8 July 2011. La Jolla, USA.
1030
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from the retention-ban in their national waters. In this way, the WCPFC had adopted a measure to be
applied uniformly throughout the Convention area - one which left little to no room for discretion in its
domestic implementation by CCMs.

Whale sharks were next on the WCPFC shark management agenda, with a measure (CMM 2012-04)
adopted the following year prohibiting the intentional setting of purse seine gear around a whale shark. 1035
Importantly, Article 8 is specifically referenced in the preamble section of the WCPFC whale shark
measure. 1036 The reference to Article 8 immediately follows mention of the PNA’s Third Implementing
Arrangement, which is listed as already prohibiting vessels operating in PNA waters from encircling
whale sharks as part of purse seine fishing operations. 1037 In referencing Article 8 immediately after
referring to the existing PNA whale shark measures, it denoted that management gap existed on the high
seas and for the EEZs of non-PNA members – a gap which the measure would resolve through the
adoption of compatible measures.

In 2013, the Commission adopted a CMM to prohibit the retention, transshipment and landing of silky
sharks throughout the Convention Area. 1038 The CMM followed a stock assessment which found there
had been significant reductions in the catch rates of silky sharks, coupled with excess fishing mortality
(which indicated that overfishing was occurring). 1039 Likewise, silky shark biomass was estimated to be
below levels associated with MSY; thus, the stock was also considered overfished.1040 After reviewing the
stock assessment, the SC acknowledged that the greatest impact on the stock was attributable to bycatch
from the longline fishery in the tropical and subtropical areas, but that there were also significant impacts
1035

WCPFC. (2012). Conservation and Management Measure for Protection of Whale Sharks from Purse Seine
Fishing Operations (CMM 2012-02). Adopted at the Ninth Regular Session of the WCPFC. Manila, Philippines. 2-6
December 2012.
1036
Ibid at 1.
1037
Ibid. See PNA (2008). Third Implementing Arrangement. 3.
1038
WCPFC. (2013). Conservation and management measure for silky sharks (CMM 2013-08). Adopted at the
Tenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, Australia.
1039
Rice, J., & Harley, S.. (2013). Updated stock assessment of silky sharks in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean. Ninth Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee. 6-14 August 2013. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFCSC9-2013/SA-WP-03.
1040
Ibid at 3.

289

from the associated purse-seine fishery that catches predominantly juvenile sharks. 1041 The SC advised the
Commission to consider measures directed at bycatch mitigation, as well as measures directed at targeted
catch (such as from shark lines), to improve the status of the silky shark population. 1042

As opposed to the whale shark measure, CMM 2013-09 does not refer to any pre-existing measures for
silky sharks adopted by CCMs for their national waters. The measure required members to collect data on
the catch of silky sharks and their release condition (e.g., dead or alive), with members to provide such
information in their Part 1 Annual Reports to the Commission.1043 The data collection requirement can
further be evaluated as supporting the Principle, as silky shark data was not being provided by members
prior to the measure being adopted. Good data supports effective management, and for severely depleted
species such oceanic white tips and silky sharks, coordinated and compatible measures based on
comprehensive data supplied by Commission members are essential for the long-term sustainability of
these shark species in the WCPO.

In 2014, the Commission adopted CMM 2014-05, which requires members to prohibit their longline
vessels from using shark lines and wire tracers as branch liners. 1044 The measure’s area of application was
not identified, but it is reasonable to conclude that the measure applies within EEZs and the high seas of
the Convention Area. The measure did not include any reference to similar measures already in place for
waters under national jurisdiction.

1041

WCPFC. (2013). Summary Report of the Ninth Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee. 6-14
August 2013. Pohnpei, FSM.12.
1042
Ibid.
1043
Ibid.
1044
WCPFC. (2014). Conservation and management measure for sharks (CMM 2014-05). Adopted at the Eleventh
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December 2014. Apia, Samoa.
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6.9.1 Findings on Sharks

Article 8 is generally not referenced in the Commission’s shark measures. The one exception is the CMM
on whale sharks, which references Article 8 and prior measures in effect for PNA waters. For the most
part, the Commission’s shark measures apply throughout the Convention Area, which is consistent with
the biological unity of shark stocks and their wide dispersion. However, a notable exception with respect
to the applicability of measures is the 5% fin to carcass ratio for waters under national jurisdiction. There
is a growing concern that this ratio is unenforceable and that shark finning is occurring on the high seas of
the WCPO, and quite possibly in the national waters of some members as well.1045 For example, the
WCPFC TCC has concluded that compliance with the 5% fin to carcass ratio cannot be assessed with the
Commission’s Compliance Monitoring Scheme. 1046 On the other hand, there are several members that
have implemented domestic regulations that prohibit shark finning, and further, require sharks to be
landed whole, with fins naturally attached.1047 For shark species that are severely depleted such as oceanic
whitetips and silky sharks, retention is prohibited throughout the Convention Area.

The Commission has required data reporting on key shark species, which could be used in the future with
regard to considerations of respective dependence in accordance with Article 8(2)(d). There has been no
specific consideration regarding sharks and high seas pockets; however, the EHSPSMA does prohibit
transshipment within the area, as well as requiring vessel notification of the amount of retained species on
board prior to entry and upon exit. These measures could indeed have linkages to Article 8(4). With
respect to the stock status of sharks, two species are known to be overfished (silky shark and oceanic
1045

European Union. (2016). Proposal for a conservation and management measure on sharks caught in association
with fisheries managed by the WCPFC. Submitted at the Thirteenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 5-9 December
2016. Denarau, Fiji. WCPFC13-2016-DP07.
1046
WCPFC. (2016). Summary Report of the Twelfth Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee
of the WCPFC. 21-27 September 2016. Pohnpei, FSM. 56.
1047
Several countries that are members of the WCPFC either prohibit the commercial harvest of sharks in their
national waters or require sharks to be landed whole. These countries include, but are not limited to, French
Polynesia, Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Kiribati (Phoenix Island Protected Area), the Cook Islands,
the United States, Australia, New Zealand (territory waters only) and Chinese Taipei. See
https://awionline.org/content/international-shark-finning-bans-and-policies.
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whitetip), with poor stock status for several other species, including hammerhead, thresher, porbeagle,
mako and whale sharks. 1048

1048

IUCN. (2017). Status of pelagic elasombranchs (sharks and rays) of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.
Prepared by the IUCN shark specialist group at the New Zealand and Oceania shark red list assessment workshop.
26-27 June 2017. Auckland, New Zealand.
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6.9.2 Compatibility Rating
Table 15: Compatibility assessment for Sharks

Standard
1. Article 8 in
general

Criteria
Does the measure
reference Article 8?

2. Article
8(2)(b)(i-ii)
and (c)

Does the measure
recognize measures
established for EEZs
or: prior measures
established for the high
seas?
What is the extent of
the measure’s area of
application and does it
take into account the
biological unity of the
stocks and fisheries
concerned?
To what extent are
considerations of
respective dependence
on the stocks concerned
taken into account?

3. Article
8(2)(a)?

4. Article
8(2(d)

5. Article 8(4)

To what extent does the
CMM accommodate
considerations for high
seas pockets?

6. Article 2
Stock Status

What is the status of the
stock(s) concerned given
the collective obligation
to ensure long-term
conservation through
effective management?

CMMs on Sharks
Justification
The majority of the shark measures have not referenced
Article 8, with the one exception being the CMM on
whale sharks. The measure to prohibit the retention of
oceanic whitetip sharks called upon the IATTC to adopt
a similar prohibition.
Only the whale shark measure references prior measures
in place for national waters of PNA members.

Shark CMMs do apply generally throughout the
Convention Area.

Score
0.25

0.25

1

The main shark measure that prohibits shark finning in
0.5
the Convention Area does provide exemptions to waters
under national jurisdiction, such that the measure shall
not prejudice the sovereignty and sovereign rights of
coastal States, including for traditional fishing activities
and the rights of traditional artisanal fishers, to
apply alternative measures for the purposes of
exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing sharks.
There are no specific references to high seas pockets and 0.25
shark management, but transshipment is prohibited in
the EHSPSMA and entry and exit notifications with
associated catch information are required in that area.
Illegal transshipment of shark fins is a known problem
within the WCPO. 1049
The stock status of several shark species within the
0.50
WCPO is of substantial concern, with two known to be
overfished and others likely facing similar conditions.
However, the shark species caught in the greatest
number, blue sharks, is not experiencing overfishing.
Total Score
(2.75/6)
46%

1049

M. McCoy. (2007). Regulation of transshipment by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission:
Issues and consideration for FFA member countries. FFA Report #2007/26. Honiara, Solomon Islands. 37.
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6.10 Which WCPFC members make more references to the Principle?

A review of WCPFC meeting records was conducted to determine the occurrence of references to the
Principle, as well as gain an understanding of which CCMs most often provide statements recognizing the
Principle (see Appendix 3). The inquiry revealed that the CMMs of SIDS referenced the Principle with
much greater frequency than other members (Figure 44). This is not a surprising result, as SIDS are
invariably coastal States within the Convention area, and thus more likely to voice concern over
compatibility with respect to high seas fishing. However, as previously noted, the vast proportion of the
WCPO total catch derives from fishing within the EEZs of these CCMs, in particular the EEZs of PNA
members. Thus, the balance of fishing effort occurs mostly within national waters as opposed to the high
seas. If this situation were reversed, one would anticipate that SIDS members would place even greater
emphasis on the need for compatible measures.
35
30

FFA/PNA

25

Commission

20

Unidentified CCMs

15

DWFN

10

Chair

5

Observer

0
Number of references to the Principle in
WCPFC Meeting Records

Legal Advisor

Figure 44: Number of references to the Principle in WCPFC meeting records, 2004-2016
Source: Records of WCPFC meetings. Figure made by author.
Note: References to the Principle have been assigned to the categories listed above. For the ‘commission’
category, references to compatibility are found in agreed decisions made by the commission, such as
participatory rights for cooperating non-members.
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6.11 MCS measures that support compatibility

While controlling catch and/or fishing effort is an important duty of the Commission, there are other
components of a sound fisheries management regime that support the development of compatible
measures. Generally, such measures relate to the Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) of fishing
vessels. The Honolulu Convention is a comprehensive instrument with respect to MCS and covers the
following: 1) a record of fishing vessels; 1050 2) vessel monitoring systems; 1051 3) the provision of data; 1052
4) a regional observer program; 1053 5) transshipment; 1054 6) high seas boarding and inspection; 1055 and 7)
compliance monitoring. 1056

Each MCS element identified above contributes to effective fisheries management, which in turn supports
the application of the Principle. For example, it is critical to know how many fishing vessels are operating

1050

Honolulu Convention. Article 24, paragraph 4. See also: Annex IV “Information Requirements” of the Honolulu
Convention for the list of requirements CCMs must include to list a vessel on the WCPFC RFV. --WCPFC. (2013).
Conservation and Management Measure on WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels and Authorizations to Fish (CMM
2013-10). Tenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, Australia. Note that CMM 2013-10
replaced earlier RFV CMMs (2009-01 and 2004-01). -- WCPFC. (2014). Standards, Specifications, and Procedures
for the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels (CMM 2014-03). Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5
December 2014. Apia, Samoa.
1051
Honolulu Convention. Article 10, paragraph 1(i). --WCPFC. (2014). Commission Vessel Monitoring System.
Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC (CMM 2014-02). 1-5 December 2014. Apia, Samoa. 4. CMM 2014-02
replaced earlier VMS CMMs (2011-01, 2007-02 and 2006-06).
1052
Honolulu Convention. Article 5, paragraph i. --See: Scientific Data to be Provided to the Commission. Available
at:
https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/Scientific%20Data%20to%20be%20Provided%20to%20the%20Commission%2
0-%20decision%20made%20by%20WCPFC10%20%28clean%29.pdf. These requirements were last refined and
adopted at the 9th Regular Session of the Commission, held 2-6 December 2012, in Manila, Philippines.
1053
Honolulu Convention. Article 28, paragraph. 1. --WCPFC. (2007). Conservation and Management Measure for
the Regional Observer Program (CMM 2007-01). Fourth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-7 December 2007.
Guam, USA.
1054
Honolulu Convention. Article 29. -- WCPFC. (2009). Conservation and Management for the Regulation of
Transshipment (CMM 2009-06). Sixth Regular Session of the WCPFC.7-11 December 2009. Papeete, French
Polynesia. Pursuant to the Honolulu Convention, at-sea transshipment is prohibited for purse seine vessels.
Longline fisheries are allowed to transship at-sea under certain conditions.
1055
Honolulu Convention, Article 26. – WCPFC. (2006). WCPFC High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures.
(CMM 2006-08). Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11- 15 December 2006.
1056
Honolulu Convention. Article 14(b). --WCPFC. (2015). Conservation and Management Measure for the
Compliance Monitoring Scheme (CMM 2015-07). Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015.
Bali, Indonesia. Note that CMM 2015-07 replaced earlier CMR CMMs (2014-07, 2013-02, 2012-02, 2011-06 and
2010-03).
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and where (i.e., EEZs, high seas), as well as the catch of these vessels and their associated fishing effort.
A strong enforcement capability is also needed to promote compliance and respond to non-compliance as
required. Ensuring a level playing field among fishing vessels and member States is vital to maintaining
confidence and effectiveness in the management regime, which is also key to the establishment of
compatible measures.

Since the Honolulu Convention came into effect, the Commission has implemented and refined a wide
range of MCS measures – a process which continues to this day. For brevity, this analysis does not
provide further details on the effect of MCS measures or their negotiating history. However, the work of
the WCPFC in the MCS arena is to be commended, and arguably, is essential to the Commission’s
development of compatible measures for reasons outlined above.

6.12 Chapter Conclusion

As this chapter has demonstrated, the Commission is inconsistently applying the Principle and provisions
of Article 8. The assessment conducted in this chapter has yielded an average compatibility rating of 47%
for the Commission’s application of the Principle – a rating which leaves significant room for
improvement (Table 10; scores range from 35% to 71%). The Commission’s marquee tropical tuna
measure received the highest rating, referencing Article 8 and identifying the Principle as a main
objective. Several provisions of the measure apply to both the high seas and national waters. The main
focus of compatibility within the tropical tuna measure is centered on the balance of purse seine fishing
effort limits between EEZs and the high seas. The current balance is being driven by the PNA, whose
collective EEZs comprise the main purse seine fishing grounds within the Convention area. The
Commission’s adoption of a skipjack TRP serves to solidify the existing balance of purse seine effort
among EEZs and the high seas.
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While the tropical tuna measure has received a relatively high rating in terms of the application of the
Principle, the Commission seems to have performed under par with respect to other key measures. Take,
for example, the South Pacific albacore conservation and management measure, which does not even
reference the Principle. Moreover, recent proposals have sought to reduce high seas catches while
establishing EEZ based limits under sub-regional agreements (e.g., the Tokelau Arrangement) or through
unilateral action. And yet the Principle is conspicuously and consistently absent from these
discussions. 1057 Opposition to the proposals has come from DWFNs that have substantial high seas
catches of South Pacific albacore, such as China and Chinese Taipei. The primary factor preventing the
Commission from adopting stronger conservation measures is that South Pacific albacore is not
overfished or experiencing overfishing. Without ‘red light’ biomass conditions which threaten stock
collapse, let alone overfishing, it is safe to say that some members do not feel compelled to adopt stricter
controls on catches, whether in support of the Principle or not.

Relatedly, when FFA members sought the adoption of a South Pacific albacore TRP, the same countries
voiced opposition. The TRP proposed by the FFA was 45% of recent unfished biomass – a figure which
modeling indicated would bring back profitable economic returns for domestic longline fisheries of PICs.
The problem, however, was that in order to achieve the proposed TRP, a 37% reduction in current catch
within a rebuilding program was required.1058 Thus, perhaps it was not the TRP that some members did
not support, but rather the means by which to achieve it.

The management of Pacific bluefin is an interesting case study as it relates to the establishment of
compatible measures between the WCPFC and IATTC. While measures have been adopted to restrict
catches in both RFMO jurisdictions, the extremely low biomass levels of the stock are cause for
substantial concern (and of global interest with respect to measures necessary for recovery). Given the
stock’s precarious status, compatibility between RFMOs is critical to ensure the stock’s long-term
1057
1058

See discussion in Chapter 5 on the Tokelau Arrangement.
WCPFC12 (2015) at 50.
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conservation. With regard to other stocks harvested to lesser degrees and/or caught as bycatch, the
Commission has largely not been focused on applying the Principle.

The preceding analysis indicates that the Principle is being applied to some extent for some fisheries, but
overall the Commission is applying the Principle and Article 8 provisions in an inconsistent manner. The
Commission has generally followed an ad-hoc process with regard to developing measures consistent
with the Principle. Moreover, there is currently no formal process in place by which the Commission can
methodically evaluate proposals against Article 8 (or any other compatibility standard). By contrast, every
CMM proposal must undergo a disproportionate conservation burden analysis in accordance with CMM
2013-6. 1059 To improve this situation, the Commission needs to develop a formal process to apply the
Principle. Such a process is described in the following chapter.

1059

CMM 2013-06.

298

Table 16: Overall Compatibility Assessment

Compatibility Standards, Criteria, and Assessed Score
Conservation
and
management
Measure

Tropical
Tunas

Article 8:
Does the
measure
reference
Article 8?

Article
8(2)(b)(i-ii)
and(c): Does
the measure
recognize prior
measures
established for
EEZs or the
high seas?
Yes, Article 8 Yes, but
is referenced principally for
in every
PNA
tropical tuna
management
measure
measures
since 2005
associated with
(with the
the VDS. No
exception of
other prior
CMM 2011measures are
01, which
mentioned.
was a
Purse seine
temporary
fishing is
extension of
responsible for
CMM 2008over 60% of the
01). (1)
catch, so effort
limits are
certainly not
insignificant.
(0.75)

Article 8(2)(a):
What is the extent of
the measure’s area
of application and
does it take into
account the
biological unity of
the stocks and
fisheries concerned?
For the most part,
the tropical CMMs
have taken into
account the
biological unity of
the stock as they
apply in EEZ waters
and on the high seas.
Archipelagic waters
and territorial seas
remain outside the
purview of
Commission CMMs,
and yet the catch of
skipjack, yellowfin
and bigeye is not
insignificant in these
waters. The amount
of catch taken in
archipelagic waters
and territorial seas is
believed to be less
than 25% of the total
catch of skipjack,
yellowfin and

Article 8(2)(d):
Respective
Dependence
considerations

Article 8(4):
To what extent does
the CMM
accommodate
considerations for
high seas pockets?

Explicit
consideration of the
respective
dependence of
CCMs on fisheries is
not found in the
negotiation records
on the tropical tuna
measures. However,
deliberations on the
issue of
disproportionate
conservation burden
have revealed the
importance of FAD
closures to some
SIDS members. The
measures are also
replete with
exemptions which
could be viewed as
reducing the impacts
on some members
which may be
disproportionately

The Commission did
restrict purse seine
fishing from 20092011 in the two
western high seas
pockets. The
Commission
subsequently lifted
that restriction for
the Philippines in
2012 and for all
members in 2014.
The PNA, however,
has continued to
restrict fishing in the
two high seas
pockets as a
condition of access
to their national
waters by foreign
vessels. (0.50)

Rating
Article 2(Stock
Compatibility
status): What is the
Rating
status of the stock(s)
concerned given the
collective obligation to
ensure long-term
conservation through
effective
management?
None of the three
tropical tuna stocks
are overfished or
experiencing
overfishing as of 2017.
However, since the
early 2000s bigeye
was considered to be
experiencing
overfishing. (1)
71%
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South Pacific
albacore

Pacific bluefin

bigeye. (0.25)

burdened due to
their respective
dependence on the
fishery. However,
specific information
is largely missing
with regard to
economic and or
other factors such as
food security and
employment. (0.25)
No references to the
respective
dependence of some
members on South
Pacific albacore are
included in the three
CMMs. There are
numerous instances
in the records of
Commission
meetings, however,
where PICs refer to
their dependence on
domestic longline
fisheries. (0.5)
No references to the
respective
dependence of some
CMMs on Pacific
bluefin are made
within WCPFC
measures. There are
numerous instances
in the records of

No, none of
the three
South Pacific
albacore
CMMs
reference the
Principle or
Article 8. (0)

No, none of the
three South
Pacific albacore
CMMs
reference
previously
agreed measures
applicable to
EEZs or the
high seas. (0)

The CMMs do not
cover the entire
range of the stock.
(0.5)

No, none of
the WCPFC
bluefin
measures
reference
Article 8.
However,
Article 22 is
referenced,

No, none of the
WCPFC bluefin
measures
reference
existing
measures. (0)

The WCPFC
measures apply
within national
waters and the high
seas, and when
combined with
IATTC measures,
cover the range of
the stock. The

The Commission
has established a
special management
area for the eastern
high seas pocket in
the South Pacific.
However, reference
to that measure is
not included in the
South Pacific
albacore tuna
measure(s). (0.5)

South Pacific albacore
is not considered
overfished or subject
to overfishing.
However, depletion
levels of adult biomass
is resulting in catch
rates that cannot be
economically
sustained for most
fleets, especially those
flagged to PICs and
PTs. (0.75)

Since Pacific bluefin
is a northern stock,
and there are no
high seas pockets
north of 20° N, this
standard does not
apply to Pacific
bluefin. (not
assessed)

Pacific bluefin is
experiencing
overfishing and is in a
severely overfished
condition. Given
recent recruitment and
existing catch
restrictions, the stock
is expected to rebuild

37.5%

45%
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which
promotes
consistency
between
WCPFC and
IATTC
management
areas. (0.5)
North Pacific
albacore
CMM 2005-03

Southwest
Pacific striped
marlin
CMM 2006-04

No, the
CMM does
not reference
Article 8.
Reference is
made to
Article 22
which
recognizes
consistent
management
measures
between
WCPFC and
IATTC. (0.5)
No, the
CMM does
not reference
Article 8. (0)

WCPFC measure
also applies to
Japanese artisanal
fisheries occurring
within Japan’s
coastal waters. (1)

Commission
meetings, however,
where Japan affirms
the importance of
the fishery to its
domestic fishermen
and seafood
markets. (0.5)

No, none of the
measures
reference
existing
measures in
place for EEZ or
high seas prior
to the CMM. (0)

Yes, the WCPFC
measures apply
within national
waters and high
seas, and when
combined with
IATTC measures,
cover the range of
the stock.

No references to the
respective
dependence of some
CMMs are made
within the measure.
(0)

Yes, the CMM
does reference
existing
measures in
place for those
countries that
already have a
commercial
moratorium in
effect. (0.5)

The CMM does
apply to the entire
range of the stock,
as the area north of
15° South is not
subject to the
measure. The stock
is believed to extend
to the equator. (0.5)

No references exist
to the respective
dependence on the
stock by CCMs.
However, the
measure does
require some degree
of reporting, which
in the future could
be used to identify
respective
dependence. (0.25)

to higher levels, but
large gains in stock
recovery may not
occur. (0.25)

Since North Pacific
albacore is a
northern stock, and
there are no high
seas pockets north of
20° N, this standard
does not apply.
(not assessed)

North Pacific albacore
is not overfished or
experiencing
overfishing. The
Northern Committee is
initiating a harvest
strategy for the stock,
including MSE to help
determine an
appropriate TRP. (1)

There is no mention
of high seas pockets
in the measure, but
the EHSPSMA has
been established in
the South Pacific.
(0.25)

Southwest Pacific
striped marlin is not
experiencing
overfishing, but it is
approaching an
overfished condition.
(0.5)

50%

42%
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Southwest
Pacific
swordfish
CMM 2009-03

North Pacific
striped marlin
CMM 2010-01

No, the
CMM does
not reference
Article 8. The
measure does
reference the
need for
consistent
measures
between the
WCPFC and
IATTC.
(0.25)
No, the
CMM does
not reference
Article 8. (0)

The predecessor
measure did
reference
domestic catch
limits in place
for Australia and
New Zealand.
However, these
limits do not
appear in the
CMM currently
in place. (0.5)

The CMM does not
apply to the entire
range of the stock,
as the area north of
20° South is not
subject to the
measure. Around
half of the total
catch occurs outside
of the measure’s
area of application.
(0.5)

The measure
does refer to
FFA members
adopting a
system of zonebased longline
limits to replace
the current
system of flagbased
arrangements
that are
applicable to
their EEZs.
However, there
is no indication
that the limits
were in place
prior to
measure. (0.5)

The CMM applies
throughout the entire
range of the stock,
and to all gears
catching North
Pacific striped
marlin. (1)

There are no
references to the
respective
dependence on the
stock by CCMs.
However, the
measure does
require some degree
of reporting, which
in the future could
be used to identify
respective
dependence. (.25)
No references exist
to the respective
dependence on the
stock by CCMs.
However, the
measure does
require some degree
of reporting, which
in the future could
be used to identify
respective
dependence. (0.25)

There is no mention
of high seas pockets
in the measure.
However, the
EHSPSMA does
occur within the
range of stock and
entry/exit vessel
notifications do
apply to swordfish.
(0.5)

Southwest Pacific
swordfish is not
overfished or
experiencing
overfishing. (1)

Although North
Pacific striped
marlin is not
considered a
northern stock, its
stock distribution is
concentrated at
latitudes greater than
the two equatorial
high seas pockets.
(Not assessed)

North Pacific striped
marlin is experiencing
overfishing and is in
an overfished
condition. (0)

50%

35%
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Sharks

Most of the
shark
measures
have not
referenced
article 8, with
the exception
of the CMM
on whale
sharks. The
measure to
prohibit the
retention of
oceanic
whitetip
sharks called
upon the
IATTC to
adopt a
similar
prohibition.
(0.25)

Only the whale
shark measure
references prior
measures in
place for
national waters
of PNA
members. (0.25)

Shark CMMs do
apply generally
throughout the
Convention Area.
(1)

The main shark
measure that
prohibits shark
finning in the
Convention Area
does provide
exemptions to
waters under
national jurisdiction,
such that the
measure shall not
prejudice the
sovereignty and
sovereign rights of
coastal States,
including for
traditional fishing
activities and the
rights of traditional
artisanal fishers, to
apply alternative
measures for the
purpose of
exploring,
exploiting,
conserving and
managing sharks.
(0.5)

There are no specific
references to high
seas pockets and
shark management,
but transshipment is
prohibited in the
EHSPSMA, and
entry and exit
notifications with
associated catch
information are
required in that area.
(0.25)

The stock status of
several shark species
within the WCPO is of
substantial concern,
with two known to be
overfished and others
likely facing similar
conditions. However,
the shark species
caught in the greatest
number, blue sharks,
is not experiencing
overfishing. (0.5)

46%

Compatibility rating across 8 CMMs
(35%-71%):
Average: 47%
Median: 45.5%
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Chapter 7- Harvest Strategies: a process to achieve to
compatibility?
7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided a comprehensive review of each of the CMMs adopted by the Commission
with respect to the application of the Principle. Through 2017, the Commission has adopted a total of 87
CMMs, of which 44 have been replaced with subsequent measures. The number of CMMs adopted by the
Commission is impressive, covering a wide range of fisheries management measures that support data
collection, the sharing of information, catch and effort allocations, as well as MCS activities.

In 2014, the Commission adopted a Harvest Strategy approach to manage key stocks and fisheries within
the WCPO. 1060 This chapter will explore how the WCPFC Harvest Strategy approach and associated
processes may promote a more consistent and formal application of the Principle.

7.2 What is a Harvest Strategy Approach?

A harvest strategy framework for fisheries is widely considered to be a management best practice, with
several models having been employed around the world by nations with the best fishery management
systems. 1061 Australia, for example, has been credited with developing the first harvest strategy policy in
2007, but other nations such as the United States implemented elements of a harvest strategy several years
earlier. 1062 A harvest strategy has been defined as: “a framework that specifies the pre-determined

1060

WCPFC. (2014). Conservation and management measure for establishing a harvest strategy for key fisheries
and stocks in the Western Pacific Region (CMM 2014-06). Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December
2014. Apia, Samoa.
1061
McIlgorm A. (2013). Literature study and review of international best practice, fisheries harvest strategy policy
approaches. A report to the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Canberra, by ANCORS,
University of Wollongong, Australia. . -- The 1996 reauthorization of the United States’ Magnuson-Stevens
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act required the establishment of LRPs and status determination criteria,
including rebuilding timeframes for overfished stocks. US Public Law 94-265.
1062
Ibid at 69.
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management actions in a fishery for defined species (at the stock or management unit level) necessary to
achieve the agreed ecological, economic and/or social management objectives.” 1063 Figure 45 shows a
conceptual model of a harvest strategy framework and associated processes.

Figure 45 Conceptual model of elements and processes associated with a fisheries harvest strategy
Source: Cartwright, I. 2012. Presentation to the WCPFC Management Objectives Workshop.
https://www.wcpfc.int/node/5620

7.2.1 Management Strategy Evaluation

An important aspect of a harvest strategy approach is Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE). MSE in a
general sense involves assessing the consequences of a range of management options and presenting the
results as trade-offs with respect to fisheries performance across a range of management objectives. 1064
1063

Sloan, S., Smith, T., Gardner, C., Crosthwaite, C., Triantafillos, L., Jefferiess B., & N. Kimber. (2014). National
Guidelines to Develop Harvest Strategies. Adelaide, Australia. Fisheries Research and Development Corporation.
Project No.2010/061. 11.
1064
Smith, A. D. M. (1994). Management strategy evaluation: the light on the hill. In D.A. Hancock (Ed.)
Population dynamics for fisheries management; Australian Society for Fish Biology Workshop Proceedings. (pp.
249-253). 24-25 August 1993. Perth, Australia.

305

MSE supports the needs of decision makers by providing potential outcomes and associated uncertainty
levels related to a range of management alternatives. In doing so, MSE allows for the identification of a
best management strategy or a determination of how well an existing management strategy is performing
(or both). 1065 Moreover, MSE allows for the estimation of a full range of uncertainty which decisionmakers can use to consider longer term trade-offs among the management objectives, instead of focusing
on short-term considerations. 1066 In the context of fisheries management, MSE can apply to single stocks
as well as multispecies fisheries and ecosystems. 1067

7.3 WCPFC’s Harvest Strategy Approach

Following three WCPFC workshops convened between 2012 and 2014 on developing management
objectives, the Commission adopted its Harvest Strategy measure (CMM 2014-06) in 2014 at
WCPFC11. 1068 The WCPFC Harvest Strategy measure outlines the following elements to be developed
for key stocks or fisheries: 1069
1) Defined operational objectives, including timeframes, for stocks or fisheries;
2) Target and limit reference points for each stock;
3) Acceptable levels of risk associated with not breaching LRPs;
4) A monitoring strategy to assess performance;
5) Decision rules aimed at achieving TRPs and avoiding LRPs; and
6) MSE of harvest control rules against management objectives.
Article 8 is referenced in the CMM 2014-06, such that the Commission shall take into account harvest
strategies or elements thereof already implemented in the region. The measure does not identify any
1065

Punt, A. E., Butterworth, D. S., Moor, C. L., De Oliveira, J. A., & Haddon, M. (2014). Management strategy
evaluation: best practices. Fish and Fisheries, 17, 303-334.
1066
Ibid at 304.
1067
Ibid at 305.
1068
Cartwright, I. (2012). Report of the Management Objectives Workshop. 28-29 November 2012. Manila,
Philippines. . -- Cartwright, I. (2014). Report of the Second Management Objectives Workshop. 28-29 November
2013. Cairns, Australia. . -- Cartwright, I. (2014). Report of the Third Management Objectives Workshop. 28-29
November 2013. Apia, Samoa. -- Cartwright, I. (2015). Report of the Harvest Strategy Workshop (MOW4). Twelfth
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia.
1069
WCPFC. (2014). Conservation and management measure on establishing a harvest strategy for key fisheries
and stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (CMM 2014-06). Adopted at the Eleventh Regular Session of
the WCPFC. 1-5 December 2014. Apia, Samoa. 2.
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existing harvest strategies that apply within the Convention Area, but one could surmise that certain
Commission members may pursue the opportunity to establish such measures ahead of other members.
This is because, in establishing a harvest strategy, the Commission member would also be shaping the
development of compatible measures. It is important to note, however, that the measure refers to
“compatibility…on harvest strategies or elements thereof,” which could mean the establishment of
management objectives with respect to stocks occurring in national waters.

Management objectives are the key to harvest strategies and essential for MSE. Under the Commission’s
Harvest Strategy measure, conceptual management objectives shall be determined for each fishery or
stock, and if there are trade-offs between each objective, as well as trade-offs between objectives for
different fisheries or stocks, then any contradictions or tensions between competing objectives should be
reconciled to the extent possible.1070 The measure further instructs that the SC or other relevant subsidiary
bodies translate the conceptual management objectives into operational objectives, against which
performance can then be evaluated.1071

Other elements of the measure include the development of a Harvest Strategy workplan with indicative
timeframes to adopt or refine harvest strategies for skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye, South Pacific albacore,
Pacific bluefin and northern albacore tuna.1072 The Commission instructed that the work plan be adopted
no later than WCPFC12, with a review to occur in 2017. 1073

The Commission did indeed adopt a Harvest Strategy work plan at WCPFC12, but it is limited to South
Pacific albacore, skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin.1074 The work plan identifies annual targets to be

1070

Ibid at 5.
Ibid at 5.
1072
Ibid.
1073
Ibid at 3. The measure also indicates that the Northern Committee will recommend draft timeframes and harvest
strategies for northern stocks.
1074
Note that North Pacific albacore was not included in the adopted work plan, because the Northern Committee
had already initiated a harvest strategy approach for this stock.
1071
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achieved for these stocks from 2015 to 2018. 1075 With the adoption of a skipjack TRP in 2015, the
Commission showed initial promise following the work plan. In 2016, however, the Commission’s record
in meeting workplan targets was sub-par.

According to the work plan for 2016, the Commission was supposed to: a) record management objectives
for skipjack, South Pacific albacore, bigeye and yellowfin tuna; b) agree to acceptable levels of risk for
breaching LRPs for each stock; c) agree on the following for skipjack: a monitoring strategy, harvest
controls and a MSE; d) agree on the following for South Pacific albacore: a TRP, a monitoring strategy,
harvest controls and a MSE; and e) agree on a rebuilding timeframe for bigeye tuna. Of the work plan
targets listed above, the Commission at WCPFC13 was able to agree on: 1) a range of acceptable levels of
risk for breaching LRPs for each stock (0-20%); 1076 and 2) a timeframe for bigeye rebuilding of up to 10
years. 1077

In a deviation from the work plan, the Commission agreed on an interim list of performance indicators for
the tropical purse seine fishery. 1078 The Commission was supposed to record management objectives for
the four tuna stocks in 2016, but negotiations quickly deteriorated at WCPFC13. 1079 The negotiation
chasm was primarily between Asian DWFNs and FFA members, with the latter group supporting a
‘strawman’ list of management objectives developed out of the Second MOW workshop. Indeed, FFA
members stated that this workshop was a two year process involving independent experts and was

1075

WCPFC. (2015). Agreed work plan for the adoption of Harvest Strategies under CMM 2014-06 (suppl_CMM
2014-06). Adopted at the Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia.
1076
WCPFC(2016) at 43. The Commission did not agree on specifying acceptable levels of risk for each species, but
rather agreed to: i) refrain from specifying acceptable levels of risk for breaching the LRP for each stock for the time
being; ii) consider any risk level greater than 20% to be inconsistent with the LRP-related principle in UNFSA (as
referenced in Article 6 of the Convention), including that the risk of breaching LRPs be very low; and iii) determine
the acceptability of potential Harvest Control Rules (HCRs) where the estimated risk of breaching the LRP is
between zero and 20%.
1077
Ibid at 44. At WCPFC13, the chair stated that although the work plan was developed to be aspirational, the
Commission should keep Harvest Strategy elements moving forward. Ibid at 45.
1078
WCPFC (2016) at 36-39.
1079
Ibid at 36.
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appropriate for the purpose of initial analysis. 1080 China, on the other hand, stated that Harvest Strategies
were a means of achieving objectives found in the Convention, including the need to base reference
points on MSY. 1081 China further voiced concern over the potential for reference points to be applied only
to the high seas and not waters under national jurisdiction. 1082 In response, PNA members voiced support
for the development of Harvest Strategies within the Commission, noting that although such strategies
were not a means to reshape existing agreements such as the VDS, they could help ensure sustainability in
certain circumstances. 1083 PNA members further stated that they would support Harvest Strategies that
strengthen (rather than undermine) the rights of resource-owning CCMs to manage resources and
fisheries in their waters compatibly with measures applied within other areas of the Convention Area.1084

The less than nuanced statements by China and PNA members are indicative of the continued tension
between FFA/PNA members and DWFNs regarding the Principle and the role of the Commission. The
FFA/PNA position seems to be one to proceed with measures that apply to their national waters and
which further their economic interests, and in doing so, force the Commission to adopt compatible
measures for the high seas. The position of some DWFNs seem content with status quo and that there is
no rush to develop pre-determined harvest control rules for stocks that are not overfished or subject to
overfishing.

These competing interests were made strikingly apparent in the case of the Commission’s consideration
of a TRP for South Pacific albacore, which the Commission should have adopted by 2016 according to
the Harvest Strategy Work Plan. At WCPFC13, FFA members re-introduced a proposal to establish a
TRP of 45%SB/SBF=0, which they stated could serve as a guide for other members to work with in terms

1080

Ibid.
Ibid.
1082
Ibid at 37.
1083
Ibid at 37.
1084
Ibid at 38.
1081
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of testing different harvest control rules.1085 China was the most vocal of the DWFNs opposing the FFA’s
proposal, citing the need to evaluate various TRP levels and reminding the other members that the
Commission was still observing how the skipjack TRP was functioning. 1086 Noting the lack of consensus
on a TRP, FFA members stated that the interim TRP for South Pacific albacore agreed to by members of
the Tokelau Arrangement remains in place and will guide their decision making for management actions
applicable to waters under national jurisdiction. FFA members further directed the attention of other
CCMs to the requirements of Article 8, and in particular paragraphs 2(b)(i), 2(c) and 2(d) of the
Article. 1087

If the stalemate situation described persists, it is likely the Commission will be formally tested in the near
future with regard to the application of the Principle and the instructions provided under Article 8 of
Convention. Indeed, if that much is accepted, then South Pacific albacore management is ripe for
consideration. On the one hand, there are several coastal States with domestic longline fisheries that target
South Pacific albacore within their flag-EEZs. Generally, these States are not PNA States (the Solomon
Islands being an exception), and most of their largest fisheries are dependent on South Pacific albacore as
a target species. 1088 Moreover, most of these coastal States comprise the parties to the Tokelau
Arrangement, with the same EEZs being fished by DWFN fleets (under access agreements) and by
domestic longline vessels. The collective catch within these national waters is approximately 60-70% of
the total catch within the Convention Area. Even so, the high seas catch increased significantly between
2009-2013, bringing the combined high seas/EEZ catch to record high levels in 2012. Catch rates for

1085

Ibid at 44.
Ibid at 45.
1087
Ibid at 45. Note that Article 8(2)(b)(1) instructs the Commission to take into account measures applied for
waters under national jurisdiction. Article 8(2)(c) instructs the Commission to take into account previously agreed
measures established by subregional management organizations. Under Article 8(2)(d), the Commission is to take
into account the respective dependence of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned.
1088
Coastal states and PTs in this category include Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, French Polynesia
and American Samoa.
1086
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domestic South Pacific albacore longline fisheries subsequently reduced, leaving several domestic fleets
facing substantial economic challenges.1089

Despite repeated attempts by FFA members to either strengthen the existing South Pacific albacore
measure or establish a TRP for the stock, the Commission has failed to reach agreement. It could be
argued that the lack of agreement on a TRP is restricting the Commission’s ability to develop and
implement compatible measures. The setting of a TRP is just that - a target level for stock biomass
associated with a specific management objective. Defined targets facilitate the evaluation of various
harvest control rules, which can be linked to management objectives identified for a particular fishery or
stock. Absent a TRP, the Commission must rely on the Convention, which states that stocks should be
maintained or restored to levels capable of producing MSY. 1090 The dilemma (of sorts), is that South
Pacific albacore has been assessed as not being overfished or experiencing overfishing, and the recent
catch rate for the stock is well below MSY levels. However, in recent years, catch rates and yields derived
from the domestic longline fishing operations of Pacific Island fleets within the Central Pacific Ocean
(e.g. Fiji, American Samoa) have been economically sub-optimal. To fish at MSY levels, substantial
increases in fishing effort would be need to be realized, but CPUE would fall by nearly 65%, further
exacerbating the already dire economic conditions for some fleets.1091 Fishing at MEY for South Pacific
albacore would require approximately a 25% to 40% reduction in catch rates from 2013 levels.1092
Another factor contributing to the apparent indifference of some CCMs to make management changes is
that their fishing industries are being heavily subsidized. In this way, it is possible for subsidized vessels
to still make a profit despite lower catches. China is among the global leaders in fisheries subsidies,
providing indirect (e.g., tax incentives) and direct (e.g., fuel offsets) to hundreds of longline vessels
1089

Reid, C., & Raubani, J. (2015). Trends in Economic Conditions in the Southern Longline Fishery. Eleventh
Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 5-13 August 2015. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-SC112015/MIWP-03-Rev1. 13. In addition to poor catch rates, fluctuating fish prices and operating costs play a
significant role in the economic conditions facing domestic South Pacific longline fleets.
1090
Article 5(b) of the Honolulu Convention.
1091
SPC. (2015). Potential Target Reference Points for South Pacific Albacore Fisheries. WCPFC Harvest Strategy
Workshop. 30 November -1 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia. 2.
1092
Ibid at 3.
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targeting South Pacific albacore.1093 The extent and magnitude of the subsidies and other support given by
the Chinese government to its distant-water longline fleet is substantial, resulting in Chinese vessels
having a significant cost advantage over unsubsidized fleets.

With China blocking further advancement of the harvest strategy approach for South Pacific albacore, the
Commission is losing the opportunity to conduct an endorsed MSE process on a range of harvest control
rate scenarios – a process which would better inform the management of the stock. 1094 Of course, the
blocking by China could be remedied through a voting process within the Commission. Indeed,
establishing a TRP is not an allocation issue, and therefore does not have to be agreed by consensus by all
members. Instead, the TRP could be the subject of a vote. To date, however, FFA members and other
proponents of a South Pacific albacore TRP have not demanded a Commission vote on the matter.1095
There are two reasons for this: 1) Chinese Taipei and other DWFNs would undoubtedly support China’s
position; and 2) there may not be a clear consensus within the FFA membership favoring a very
conservative TRP.

Although the Commission has yet to agree on a TRP for South Pacific albacore, it has agreed to prioritize
the development and adoption of TRP at WCPFC15. 1096

As previously discussed in relation to skipjack, the adoption of a TRP is providing a means to design
compatible measures associated with purse seine effort. However, if the Commission fails in this regard
for South Pacific albacore, tensions among members may increase, a situation which could be construed

1093

Ilakini, J., & Imo,R. (2014). Fisheries subsidies and incentives provided by the Peoples Republic of China to the
its distant water fishing industry. Prepared for the Forum Fisheries Agency. Honiara, Solomon Islands. 8.
1094
Punt et al. (2014) state that: “The evaluation of management strategies using simulation is widely considered to
be the most appropriate way to evaluate the trade-offs achieved by alternative management strategies and to assess
the consequences of uncertainty for achieving management goals.”
1095
At WCPFC14, the Fiji delegation did call for a vote on the issue of establishing a South Pacific albacore TRP;
however, the vote did not occur, as there was agreement that consensus could be achieved on the matter in the
future. See: WCPFC. 2017. Draft Summary Fourteenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-7 December 2017.
Manila, Philippines. 36.
1096
Ibid at 38.
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as resulting from a failure to adopt compatible measures in the first place. To avoid such an outcome, the
Commission should look towards identifying the Principle as a management objective within the Harvest
Strategy approach. This would lead to the identification of compatible measures for certain species or
fisheries, which could further be assessed in MSE. In other words, compatibility is better served if the
Commission defines with precision what it means with respect to management objectives and
performance indicators.

7.3.1 The Role of the Principle within the WCPFC Harvest Strategy Approach

In the development of the WCPFC’s Harvest Strategy Approach, the Principle has been cursorily
referenced in the Commission’s workshops on Management Objectives. However, to date, compatibility
has not been a major consideration within the Commission’s Harvest Strategy.

1097

Based on the present

analysis, which included a review of the importance of the Principle during the Commission’s formation
in the MHLC process, through to its deliberations and agreed CMMs, the Principle does hold a high level
of importance within the Commission. Under the existing Commission framework, however, there is no
agreed method to review measures with respect to compatibility, and to date, the application of the
Principle and consistency with Article 8 has been ad-hoc. While an ad-hoc process could serve the
interests of the two opposing camps within the Commission – i.e., those who advocate for the application
of the Principle and those who prefer to rely on other elements of Honolulu Convention, continued
ambiguity will likely impede the work of the Commission. 1098

The development and implementation of the Commission’s Harvest Strategies has the potential to change
the current ad-hoc approach to developing compatible measures within the WCPFC. This is because

1097

This is based on a review of the records of the MOW workshops. Article 8 has been referenced in the WCPFC’s
Harvest Strategy measure, but the reference seeks to ensure that harvest strategies already implemented in the region
are accounted for in the further development of the Commission’s Harvest Strategies. See CMM 2014-06.
1098
One only needs to look at the issue of disproportionate conservation burden and the development of CMM 201301 to see how ambiguity can impede Commission decisions.
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harvest strategies allow for the identification and definition of operational objectives and performance
indicators.

Article 8 does indeed contain provisions which require the taking into account of biological and socioeconomic factors when developing compatible measures. In this regard, the Principle could be linked to
biological and economic management objectives. 1099 However, the Honolulu Convention does not offer
any more detail on how to treat these considerations in the development of compatible measures in a
manner which allows for the Commission’s performance to be evaluated. It is in this ambiguous space
that we see the Commission’s continued reference to the importance of the Principle, whereas Article 8
has been (and continues to be) applied in an ad-hoc manner.

This analysis suggests that compatibility should be treated as a management objective within the
Commission’s Harvest Strategy approach for the following reasons. First, the mosaic of EEZs that occur
throughout the core fishing grounds within the Convention Area elevates the importance of, and need for,
compatible measures. This much is reflected in the records of the Commission. Moreover, that fact that
80% of the current total catch within the WCPO is caught within waters under national jurisdiction, and
that the revenue generated by selling access rights to fisheries is incredibly important for many Pacific
Island SIDS in region, further supports the need for compatible measures. In addition, the main tuna
stocks in the region, which make up the world’s largest fishery, are fully exploited, and in some cases
have been subject to fishing levels that exceed MSY (bigeye) and/or MEY (South Pacific albacore). It is
undoubtedly apparent that the balance of the existing catch and/or fishing effort levels between the high
seas and EEZ is an incredibly important issue, and critical to the political and socio-economic well-being
of several members of the Commission.

1099

For example, Article 8, paragraph 2(a) requires consideration of the biological unity of stocks. Article 8,
paragraph 2(d) requires consideration of the relative dependence of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas
on the stocks concerned.
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Secondly, based on UNCLOS and UNFSA, all States have the right to fish on the high seas, subject to
their obligation to cooperate in the management of transboundary stocks. Coastal States also have
sovereign rights to exploit transboundary fish stocks while they occur in their EEZs. Both coastal States
and States fishing on the high seas are obligated to cooperate in order to ensure stock sustainability, while
also ensuring that compatible measures exist with respect to the relevant maritime jurisdictional zones. If
there is no organized process to evaluate compatibility, claims with little supporting evidence could be
made that the Commission, and/or member(s), are not fulfilling their obligations to establish compatible
measures. 1100 Such claims would suggest an abdication of the rights and responsibilities of Commission
members.

Third, the establishment of compatible measures could help avoid transferring a disproportionate
conservation burden onto SIDS - a long-standing point of controversy within the Commission. Like the
earlier point regarding the need for a clear process to evaluate compatibility, the issue of disproportionate
conservation burden suffers from a similar problem. Indeed, at present, there is no clear process or
independent review of claims made by members that certain CMMs, or elements thereof, will transfer a
disproportionate conservation burden onto SIDS. The issue of disproportionate conservation burden is
probably the most controversial within the Commission, and continues to hinder Commission outcomes.
Similarly, without a clear process to evaluate and agree on what compatibility means, the work of the
Commission could be stymied by claims that compatibility is not being achieved. The effect of this would
be diluted conservation and management measures that have varying degrees of success, and which
depending on the particular member’s interest, could either be the very objective of the particular measure
1100

See Summary report of WCPFC10. For example, at WCPFC10, Tuvalu stated that it was highly dependent on
FAD fishing, and that the seasonal FAD closure had resulted in the State sustaining a direct loss of $1.5 million
(USD) per month. This led Tuvalu to assert that additional FAD closures would lead it bear an unfair and
disproportionate conservation burden. While it is appropriate for a CCM to provide a statement with respect to the
costs of conservation, there is no independent verification process within the Commission to evaluate such claims.
The WPFMC workshop on disproportionate burden in 2014 (WPFMC 2014) recommended an independent review
process to address claims of disproportionate burden, but to date the Commission has not adopted such a process.
For additional reading on the issue of transparency related to conservation burden claims, see: Hanich, Q., & Ota,
Y. (2013). Moving beyond rights-based management: a transparent approach to distributing the conservation burden
and benefit in tuna fisheries. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 28(1), 135-170.
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or a major point of contention among other members. The numerous exemptions found within the tropical
tuna measure exemplify how a measure’s effectiveness may be reduced due to perceived inconsistency
with the Convention.

Although the WCPFC’s Harvest Strategy Approach is still in its infancy, recent work in this area by the
Commission has failed to include compatibility as a relevant consideration with respect to management
objectives and the various strategies to achieve such objectives. This is questionable given the clear
obligation under the Honolulu Convention for the Commission to establish compatible measures. As
shown in Figure 45, the introductory material provided by the SPC to the Commission on Harvest
Strategies includes the identification of biological, economic, social and political management objectives.
However, recent work by the Commission to develop Harvest Strategies has not included the
identification or evaluation of any political management objectives.1101 As outlined above, because the
requirement to establish compatible measures requires Commission members to carry out their agreed
duties both as they apply to waters under national jurisdiction and on the high seas, it is justifiable for the
Principle to be categorized as a political management objective within the Commission’s Harvest Strategy
approach.

As previously explored in Chapter 5, the recourse in the event of a claim being brought for noncompatibility (and assuming all attempts to reconcile the parties’ differences within the Commission have
failed), would be to seek dispute resolution according to the UNFSA/UNCLOS procedures. Resorting to
such action would indicate a failure by both the Commission and individual members to work
cooperatively to achieve the long-term conservation of tuna and tuna-like stocks within the Convention
Area. Certainly, dispute resolution regarding a failure to achieve compatibility would involve a long and

1101

The products below both failed to include ‘political objectives’ within the list of management objectives. 1)
Scott, R., G. Pilling, J. Hampton. (2016). Performance Indicators and Monitoring Strategies for Skipjack and South
Pacific Albacore Commensurate with: Candidate management objectives for the tropical purse seine fishery and
Southern longline fishery. 5-9 December 2016. Denarau, Fiji. 9. -- 2) WCPFC. (2016). Results of Small Working
Group on Management Objectives. 5-9 December 2016. Denarau, Fiji. 6.
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difficult legal process. 1102 Thus, the first best option is to achieve compatibility through a clear and
transparent manner – and the Commission’s Harvest Strategy approach represents such a mechanism.

In order to consider the Principle in clear and transparent process, as opposed to its current inconsistent
and ad-hoc incantation, the Commission should assess compatibility through a deliberative evaluation of
applicable objectives and performance indicators. The difficult part, however, is to identify and reach
agreement on what would constitute an appropriate management objective with respect to compatibility.
Clearly, the Principle is about striking a balance between the amount of fishing occurring on the high seas
and within waters under national jurisdiction. Therefore, the Commission would need to identify
management objectives and performance indicators for stocks and fisheries that reflect such a balance,
such as fishing effort or catch levels. For example, what level of purse seine fishing effort within national
waters versus high seas fishing effort may be considered compatible? On this particular question, the
Commission has already adopted a TRP that generally corresponds to current purse seine effort levels.
Thus, the Commission could decide that the current purse seine balance – approximately 80% within
EEZs versus 20% on the high seas – is compatible. As such, a management objective could be recorded as
“existing levels of purse seine high seas and EEZ fishing effort levels, 20% and 80%, respectively,” with
the monitoring of both high seas and EEZ-based purse fishing effort serving as a performance indicator.

Similarly, the Commission could record a management objective relative to the high seas and EEZ
catches for South Pacific albacore. This notion has already found expression in the FFA’s draft South
Pacific albacore proposal that was introduced to WCPFC13. The draft proposal referenced a total catch
limit and a table identifying the percent of catch limit to be taken in national waters versus the percent to
be taken on the high seas. 1103 Similar to the purse seine example, a management objective for South

1102

For the complexities associated with international fisheries disputes, one need only look to the Southern Bluefin
Tuna Case between New Zealand, Australia and Japan. For further reading on this case, see: Sturtz, L. (2001).
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case: Australia and New Zealand v. Japan. Ecology Law Quarterly, 28(2), 455-486.
1103
FFA. (2016). Consultative draft measure to establish a limit for South Pacific albacore. Thirteenth Regular
Session of the WCPFC. 5-9 December 2016. Denarau, Fiji. WCPFC13-2016-DP13. 5.
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Pacific albacore could be “an EEZ catch of 70% vs 30% for high seas,” which is essentially the current
breakdown of the catch between the relevant areas. An important factor when considering EEZ/high seas
percentage limits, whether related to catch or effort, is that they need to be rationally supported. If the
EEZ limits are too aspirational, high seas fishing nations will likely rebuff the proposed limits. Such a
scenario represents the current landscape with respect to the PNA’s longline VDS initiative. Indeed, PNA
would like to see more longline fishing in their waters (which comes at a cost to foreign vessels through
access fees), and less high seas longline fishing. This issue is certainty set to cause further controversy
within the Commission, as PNA members attempt to transform historical longline fishing patterns within
the WCPO.

Table 11 provides a suggested list of objectives and performance indicators related to the Principle and
the provisions of Article 8 which could be used within the Commission’s Harvest Strategy approach.
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Table 17: Suggested list of objectives and performance indicators related to the Principle
Fishery or Species
Tropical purse seine
(skipjack)

Management
Objective (political)
Compatibility

South Pacific albacore

Compatibility

Tropical longline
(20 N-20 S)

Compatibility

Bigeye

Compatibility

Bigeye

Compatibility

N. Pacific bluefin

Compatibility

All fisheries

Compatibility

All fisheries

Compatibility

Operational Objective

Performance Indicator

Balance of EEZ effort vs
high seas effort
(e.g., 80/20)

Annual percentage of
purse seine catch/effort
within EEZs and high
seas
Balance of EEZ catch
Annual percentage of
(e.g., 70%) vs high seas
total catch/effort within
catch (e.g., 30%)
EEZs and high seas
EEZ (effort or catch) vs
Annual percentage of
50% high seas (effort or
total catch/effort within
catch)
EEZs and high seas
Purse Seine (e.g., 40 %)
Annual percentage of
longline (e.g., 40%) /
total catch by fishing
other fisheries (10%).
gear or impact on the
stock by fishing gear
Limit high seas
Annual percentage of
transshipment
bigeye catch
transshipped on high
seas
WCPO (e.g., 60% catch) Annual percentage of
/ EPO (e.g., 40% catch)
total catch by area
Special attention to high
Annual amount of
seas pockets
fishing effort, catch and
transshipment activity in
high seas pockets
Take into account
X% of fisheries
respective dependence on generated revenue
fisheries
divided by GDP of flag
State

As discussed earlier, a key component of Harvest Strategies is MSE, which involves applying a proposed
management strategy to a model of a fishery and projecting that model into the future under various
scenarios to see how well the strategy performs in achieving its objectives.1104 An adjustable parameter
within an MSE evaluation could be the location of catch or effort, whether in the high seas or waters
under national jurisdiction. The existing WCPFC data reporting requirements (under which operational
level data must be submitted, among other data sources), support a monitoring strategy that is able to
1104

Cartwright, I. (2015). Report on the Harvest Strategy Workshop (MOW4). Twelfth Regular Session of the
WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia.8.
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discern catch and effort spatially. Moreover, recent progress has been made in addressing gaps in the
provision of operational level data by some CCMs.

In addition, the current development of the WCPFC’s Harvest Strategy includes economic and social
objectives. The identification and further elucidation of social and economic management objectives will
support performance indicators that help assess compatibility between harvest control rules. MSE could
support analyses that assist in discerning trade-offs that impact CCMs and provide further insight into the
respective dependence of CMMs on the stocks concerned. In turn, this information could be used in the
development of compatible measures.

7.4 Complicating Factors in Developing Operational Objectives for Compatibility

7.4.1 Fishing capacity, Increasing SIDS Fleets, and High Seas Access

As discussed in Chapter 4, it is believed that there is excess fishing vessel capacity in the WCPO purse
seine fleet, and likely the longline fleet as well. The WCPFC has addressed fishing capacity in a nonbinding resolution (2005) and in the tropical tuna CMM beginning in 2013. Under the tropical tuna
measure, vessel limits only apply to purse seine vessels operating between 20° N and 20° S, and to the
longline fleets of non-SIDS. Indonesian vessels and those belonging to SIDS are exempted from the
vessel limits. 1105 Moreover, there is only a cap on longline vessels that target bigeye, not for those
targeting yellowfin or albacore. As the measure provides exemptions to SIDS and Indonesia, and only
covers longline bigeye vessels, it is clear that the Commission has not taken comprehensive steps to cap
overall capacity within the Convention Area. Furthermore, because the measure provides exemptions to
SIDS, it is expected that the size of SIDS fleets will increase. Indeed, this trend is already becoming
evident, with the purse seine fleets of SIDS having steadily increased since the early 1990s. In 2016,
1105

WCPFC CMMs 2013-01 through 2016-01. Only purse seine vessel capacity is spatially constrained between
20°N and 20°S, whereas longline vessel capacity limits for non-SIDS apply wherever they fish for bigeye.
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approximately one-third of the large scale purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO belonged to SIDS
(116 out of 309 vessels). 1106

The increase in the size of fleets flagged to SIDS can be viewed as beneficial in that it offers greater local
benefits and management control in comparison to foreign vessels. However, the expansion of SIDS
fleets could also prove problematic with respect to the FFA’s current fisheries roadmap, which seeks to
reduce high seas fishing effort. 1107 In 2015, for the first time on record, the high seas fishing effort of
purse seine fleets flagged to SIDS exceeded the fishing effort of purse seine vessels flagged to DWFNs
(Figure 46). 1108

Purse Seine Fishing Effort in
International Waters of the WCPO
9000
8000
Vessel Days 7000
Fished
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0

DWFN Fleets
SIDS Fleets

2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

Figure 46: Purse seine fishing effort on the high seas of the WCPO
Source: SPC Tropical Tuna CMM data summaries. Figure made by author.
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Williams et al. (2017) at 4. These vessel numbers do not include the large number of ring net boats and small
purse seine vessels operating in the domestic fisheries of Indonesia, Japan’s coastal areas and the Philippines.
1107
See discussion of the FFA roadmap in Chapter 6.
1108
It should be noted that the sharp reduction in high seas fishing effort by DWFN-flagged purse seine vessels was
a result of PNA countries restricting high seas effort by these vessels as a condition of access to fish in PNA waters.
See discussion of this issue in Chapter 6.
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If this trend continues, SIDS will have difficulty in advocating for further reductions in high seas fishing
effort limits for DWFNs while the effort of their own fleets in the area increases. This would clearly be
seen as a double-standard. For example, what provisions of the Honolulu Convention will SIDS rely on to
support the notion that SIDS effort on high seas is more justifiable than DWFN fishing effort? One likely
possibility is Article 30, which supports the concept of responsible fisheries development by SIDS.
Indeed, SIDS could argue that the current high seas limits agreed under the tropical tuna measure
represent historic fishing levels when SIDS fleets were much smaller than what they are today.

Notwithstanding a reasonable justification for SIDS fishing effort on the high seas, if the expansion of
SIDS effort continues in the future, coupled with current levels of purse seine fishing effort within the
main EEZ fishing grounds (PNA national waters), the existing balance between EEZ and high seas
fishing effort may shift. Such a shift would have implications for the compatibility between fishing effort
in national waters versus international waters. Moreover, if a lack of compatibility were to result in an
increase in overall effort, skipjack catches would most likely also increase, thus leading to a breach of the
skipjack TRP.

A remedy which has been proposed by PNA members is for the Commission to establish a “global TAC”
for the high seas, as well as the elimination of flag based high seas effort limits for non-SIDS and the
exemptions currently in place for SIDS fleets.1109 This would likely result in a ‘race to fish’ on the high
seas, as foreign fleets would not be liable to pay the exorbitant, daily VDS costs associated with fishing in
the national waters of PNA members. Even so, such a proposal would surely mean that the “global TAC”
would be fulfilled in a short space of time. This would serve the PNA objective of forcing fishing effort
into their national waters, thus allowing them to charge fishing access fees. PNA members also charge a

1109

PNA Members and Tokelau. (2015). Proposed Revisions to the Tropical Tuna Measure (CMM 2014-01).
Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia. 9 at 2. Specifically, PNA members
proposed a quarterly fishing effort limit of 531 days for the high seas, with unused effort to be carried over to the
following quarter. The proposal included an exemption for Kiribati-flagged vessels.
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VDS fee for vessels flying their own flag, albeit at a discounted rate compared to the costs incurred by
foreign vessels.

However, it is axiomatic that the interests of PNA national governments, which include generating
revenue from the VDS, likely do not overlap with those of vessel owners of purse seine vessels flagged to
PNA members. Vessels owners, regardless of flag, would rather see operational flexibility with regard to
high seas access, as opposed to being limited to fishing grounds within national waters. This is certainly
the case during El Nino conditions, where fishing effort by purse seine vessels fishing in the WCPO has
been observed to shift eastward by 2,000 nm. 1110 As SIDS fleets increase, SIDS will find it difficult to
justify restricting DWFN fleets on the high seas while advancing the right of their own flagged vessels to
fish in the same area. On this issue, SIDS will undoubtedly face mounting pressure from both DWFNs
and vessel owners of vessels flying SIDS flags.

7.4.1 Climate Change, Redistribution of Tuna Resources, and Compatibility

The preceding section discussed the expansion of purse seine SIDS fleets, which has been the trend for
the last two decades. Historically, under the PNA VDS, the members with the largest allocations of the
VDS TAE have been Papua New Guinea, Kiribati and the FSM. 1111 Since the WCPO purse seine fishery
began in the mid-1980s, PNG waters have seen the highest levels of catch and effort. However, the
impacts of climate change may change this situation.

As our planet becomes increasingly warmer, productivity in the tropical Pacific Ocean is expected to
decrease, with changes in ocean circulation, vertical stratification, and mesoscale eddy activity poised to

1110

Lehodey et al. (1997).
Havice, E. (2013). Rights-based management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean tuna fishery: Economic
and environmental change under the Vessel Day Scheme. Marine Policy, 42, 259–267.
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affect tuna spawning distribution and foraging locations. 1112 By the end of the 21st century, it is predicted
that the surface waters of the Western Pacific warm pool will exceed the skipjack upper temperature
threshold (above 30° C), forcing skipjack further east or south to cooler waters, or to a greater depth
(which will reduce tuna catchability).1113 Where the eastern edge of the warm pool converges with the
equatorial cold tongue, differences in sea surface temperature and salinity are observed. This area of
convergence, which constitutes a prime fishing ground for skipjack tuna, is generally centered between
160°E and 170° E longitude. 1114 Increases in sea surface temperature of the Western Pacific warm pool as
a result of a warming planet is predicted to result in an eastward shift of skipjack in the latter half of the
21st century. 1115 Such as shift would likely see reduced levels of catch and effort by the tropical purse
seine fishery in and around PNG waters. 1116

The effects of El Nino serve as a model for how purse seine effort shifts from west to east along the
equatorial Pacific as the warm pool pushes eastward towards the central Pacific. One of the strongest El
Nino events on record occurred in early 2015 to mid-2016. 1117 In 2015, purse seine catch within PNG
national waters was reported to be around 186,000 mt - a 67% decrease from the previous five-year
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Lehodey P., Hampton, J., Brill, R.W., Nicol, S., Senina, I., Calmettes, B., Pörtner, H.O., Bopp, L., Ilyina, T.,
Bell, J.D., & Sibert J. (2011). Vulnerability of oceanic fisheries in the tropical Pacific to climate change. In J. Bell,
J.E. Johnson & A.J. Hobday AJ (Eds.), Vulnerability of tropical pacific fisheries and aquaculture to climate change
(pp. 447–506). Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Noumea, New Caledonia.
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Brown, J. N., Langlais, C., & Gupta, A. S. (2015). Projected sea surface temperature changes in the equatorial
Pacific relative to the Warm Pool edge. Deep Sea Research Part II: Topical Studies in Oceanography, 113, 47-58.
1114
Maes, C., Sudre, J., and Garçon, V. (2010). Detection of the eastern edge of the equatorial Pacific warm pool
using satellite-based ocean color observations. Sola, 6, 129-132 at 130.
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Lehody et al. (2011) at 475.
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Ibid.
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Lian, T., Chen, D. & Tang, Y. (2017) China Earth Science. In press. The 2015-16 El Nino was preceded by a
weak El Nino in 2014.
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average of approximately 570,000 mt. 1118 By contrast, the 2015 purse seine catch taken from Kiribati
national waters increased 63% over the 2010-2014 average. 1119

As discussed above, human induced climate change is predicted to result in an eastward shift of the warm
pool, with a concomitant redistribution of tropical tuna stocks. In addition, the frequency of El Nino
conditions is predicted to increase. 1120 Both of these scenarios do not bode well for countries such as
PNG, which are likely to see decreased tuna production from their national waters as a result of climate
change. For a country like PNG, which is rich in other natural resources, the economic impact could be
dampened, whereas countries such as Nauru would face greater economic effects. On the other hand,
countries with large EEZs such as Kiribati and the Cook Islands could stand to benefit from a
redistribution and shift eastward of skipjack tuna. Moreover, there are greater international waters east of
180° than west, which could create implications for the application the Principle as fleets seek access to
these high seas waters.

If tuna (and particularly skipjack) distribution shifts more eastward beyond 180° longitude as a result of
climate change, there will likely be greater interest in international waters for purse seine fishing grounds
due to the possibility of higher CPUE levels and lower per day costs absent any VDS for fishing in
national waters of a PNA member. As a shift towards greater reliance on international waters for purse
seine fishing occurs in the future, the application of the Principle within the WCPFC will come into play.
The Commission will need to decide how much effort should be allowed on the high seas, while taking
into consideration purse seine fishing effort and other factors within national waters of coastal States,
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Calculation based on data found at http://ffa.int/node/1877. At the time of drafting, 2016 catch information was
unavailable.
1119
Ibid. In 2014, the purse seine catch in Kiribati waters was reported to be approximately 707,000 mt - a record for
the country. Prior to 2014, the highest purse seine catch in Kiribati national waters was reported to be around
345,000 mt (in 2002).
1120
Timmermann, A., Oberhuber, J., Bacher, A., Esch, M., Latif, M., & Roeckner, E. (1999). Increased El Niño
frequency in a climate model forced by future greenhouse warming. Nature, 398(6729), 694-697.
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including SIDS and their high respective dependence on revenue generated from selling fishing access to
their national waters.

It is expected that sub-regional agreements such as the PNA VDS will also need adjustment to reflect
shifting tuna distributions.

7.4 Shifting Effort and Avoiding a Disproportionate Burden

Another complicating factor in developing operational objectives associated with the Principle and
balancing EEZ/high seas fishing is the issue of disproportionate conservation burden. For example, if the
predicted shift in skipjack distribution occurs as a result of increasing ocean temperatures, more effort
may be expended on the high seas versus what is observed today. Under this scenario, coastal States may
choose to claim a disproportionate conservation burden if tasked to reduce catch or effort in their waters
due to what may be considered overexploitation in the high seas.

The issue of disproportionate conservation burden can also manifest when establishing the catch or effort
split for national waters versus the high seas, and also for such allocations within waters under national
jurisdiction. The current composition of PICs is that they collectively form the FFA; however, the PNA,
which is a subgroup of FFA members, control a large proportion of skipjack fishing grounds. While there
is strong regional solidarity among FFA members, there has been (and continues to be) conflict between
PNA members and non-PNA members with regard to the balance of fishing effort. In 2017, for example,
several non-PNA members of the FFA developed a proposal to pool EEZ purse seine effort, allowing
transfers of such effort among their small membership to be used on the high seas.1121 When the
significant domestic catches of the Philippines, Indonesia and Japan are factored into the equation, along
with shifting effort on the high seas and fishing in PNA waters, calibrating each country’s fair share of
1121

Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. (2017) Proposal of Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Samoa,
Tonga, Vanuatue to Draft Bridging Measure for Tropical Tunas Rev5. WCPFC Interessional Meeting to Progress
the Draft Briding Measure for Tropical Tunas. 22-24 August 2017. Honolulu, Hawaii.
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conservation costs to achieve a TRP is vital to avoid claims of disproportionate conservation burden and
to ensure compatibility.

7.5 Chapter Conclusion

The WCPFC Harvest Strategy approach is recognized as a best practice with regard to effective fisheries
management, incorporating a general framework involving management objectives, operational
performance indicators and MSE. This chapter has argued that the Commission’s Harvest Strategy
approach is a mechanism to facilitate a more consistent application of the Principle by recognizing
compatibility as a political management objective which sits on an equal footing with social, economic
and biological management objectives. Furthermore, the process would involve defining operational
indicators that focus on the balance of catch or fishing effort between EEZs and the high seas, including
acceptable ratios of catch or effort between jurisdictions. Following a deliberative, transparent process
would provide for a more consistent application of the Principle, while also reducing the potential for
claims being brought that the Commission is not achieving compatible measures. Indeed, claims of
incompatibility between high seas measures and those adopted for national waters have the ability to lead
to conflict among members, thereby eroding international cooperation.

The chapter has also identified that, even if a more deliberative process to achieve compatibility is
undertaken within the Harvest Strategy approach, future challenges lie ahead. These challenges include
the expansion of fleets flagged to PICs, which will lead to greater interest in fishing on the high seas. An
increase in high seas fishing by Pacific Island fleets could disrupt any balanced ratio of EEZ/high seas
fishing established under the Harvest Strategy. Furthermore, PICs could find it difficult justifying their
greater interest in high seas fishing while trying to restrict such fishing by DWFNs.
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Even if Pacific Island fleets do not expand, the chapter has shown that climate change is predicted to
redistribute tuna stocks further to the east, where there are greater high seas areas. This may also lead to a
shift in fishing grounds and a greater reliance on the high seas or the EEZs of a smaller group of
countries. In turn, any balance between EEZ/high seas fishing effort agreed to under an existing
framework will likely become strained.

Lastly, the chapter identified that as fishing effort shifts in the future, the issue of disproportionate
conservation burden will likely continue to be a central focus of the Commission. This is particularly true
in circumstances where developing countries are asked to take measures in EEZ waters in support of
stock-wide conservation efforts, but where a greater percentage of exploitation occurs in the high seas or
in the EEZs of neighboring countries. As this occurs, the application of the Principle will be tested on
several fronts.
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Chapter 8: Thesis Summary and Conclusions
8.1 Summary

The WCPO supports the world’s largest tuna fishery, and its geopolitical composition is unique with
regard to the mosaic of EEZs made up of mostly SIDS, high seas pockets, and other high seas areas
within primary fishing grounds. This distinctive seascape, coupled with the high levels of dependence by
PICs on tuna for their long-term economic stability and food security, brings the importance of the
Principle into sharp focus. The preceding analysis has evaluated the application of the Principle within
this region, and specifically by the WCPFC.
Chapter 2 traced the development of international fisheries law and the emergence of the Principle at a
time when generally accepted delineations of marine jurisdictional zones and high seas freedoms were
being called into question. While Mare Liberum, or freedom of high seas, had been recognized as a
customary international law rule since the 19th century, coastal State jurisdictional boundaries were not
settled until the early 1980s. UNCLOS cemented international agreement on the 200 nm EEZ, with
attention then turning towards high seas fisheries management. Rapid increases in high seas fishing on
transboundary stocks, coupled with a lack of adequate controls, led to a global high seas fishing crisis in
the years after UNCLOS was concluded.

The international community responded in the mid-1990s with new legally-binding agreement covering
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks - UNFSA. The Principle was borne out of UNFSA and
established in recognition of the rights and obligations of coastal States with regard to managing fishery
resources within their EEZs, as well as the rights and obligations of States with vessels fishing on the high
seas. Specifically, the Principle was the management bridge between EEZs and the high seas, and
foundational in coastal States and high seas fishing States reaching agreement during the UNFSA
negotiations.
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Chapter 3 analyzed the development of Principle within UNFSA, which is contained within Article 7 and
includes several considerations to take into account when developing compatible measures. The main
provision of Article 7 specifies the need to consider existing management measures, whether in place and
applicable to EEZs or the high seas, when developing compatible measures. Additional considerations to
take into account pursuant to Article 7 include: a) the biological unity of the stocks; b) the respective
dependence of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned; and c) the need
to ensure that adopted measures do not have a harmful impact on living marine resources as a whole.
Another important element of Article 7 is the instruction that measures established for the high seas not
undermine measures adopted within areas of national jurisdiction. It has been stated that this provision
provides a noticeable tilt in favor of coastal States with regard to the development of compatible
measures. Even so, it does not obviate the overarching requirement for international cooperation on the
management of transboundary stocks.

The obligation for international cooperation was maintained within UNFSA, with a further direction for
cooperating States to form RFMOs. These RFMOs are required to take into account the specific
characteristics of the subregion or region over which they exert control, thus ensuring effective
conservation and management of the relevant fish stocks. To encourage participation with RFMOs,
UNFSA established a mechanism whereby if States are unable or unwilling to pursue cooperation, they
risk losing access to fisheries resources within the RFMO’s area of competence.

Chapter 4 presented the central case study of the thesis, which focused on the management of the world’s
largest tuna fishery, which occurs in the WCPO. Descriptions of key tuna stocks (skipjack, yellowfin,
bigeye, albacore and Pacific bluefin) were provided, including biology, stock delineations, catch data and
stock status. Information on fishing capacity was also presented, suggesting that excess fishing capacity
already exists in purse seine and longline fleets operating within the WCPO. A description of the
problems associated with overcapacity was also provided.
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Chapter 5 examined the development of international fisheries management within the WCPO, including
a description of key players such as PICs, DWFNs and other coastal States. The extensive history of
subregional management though the FFA and PNA was described - a management regime which has
shaped, and continues to shape, the development of compatible measures within the region. A review of
the negotiations that culminated in the Honolulu Convention was also provided, with particular focus on
the deliberations related to the Principle. An analysis of Article 7 of the Honolulu Convention was also
conducted, including a comparative analysis with the compatibility provisions contained within UNFSA.
Other key articles and provisions of the Honolulu Convention and functions of the WCPFC were also
described.
Chapter 6 evaluated the application of the Principle and provisions of Article 8 by the Commission using
an evaluation tool. Each of the CMMs that pertain to catch or effort allocations of managed stocks were
evaluated against a set of standards and associated criteria. Using a scoring system, a compatibility rating
was provided for each of these CMMs. Particular emphasis was placed on the application of the Principle
in the WCPFC’s marquee measure for tropical tunas (skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye). A detailed review
was also conducted for South Pacific albacore and Pacific bluefin. Results of the assessment
demonstrated that the Commission is applying the Principle and Article 8 in an inconsistent and ad hoc
manner, with an overall rating of 47% being achieved. However, the highest rating received by an
individual CMM (71%) did involve tropical tuna stocks, with these particular stocks collectively
representing over 90% of the WCPO tuna catch.
Chapter 7 proposed that the Commission incorporate the Principle within its Harvest Strategy approach as
a political management objective alongside social, economic and biological objectives. The Principle is a
pillar of international management for HMS stocks as it serves to bridge the gap between the rights and
obligations governing EEZ management and high seas fishing freedoms. Given the unique geographic
mosaic that makes up the Convention Area, Chapter 7 argued that identifying the Principle as a political
management objective is necessary for the long-term conservation of fisheries in the region. The chapter
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also identified challenges with regard to compatibility and the future balance of fishing effort between
EEZs and the high seas, including: a) the increasing number of vessels flagged to PICs; b) tuna stock
redistribution as a result of climate change; and c) reconciling claims by SIDS of disproportionate
conservation burden in response to potentially greater high seas fishing activity.

8.2 Conclusion

The Commission has not developed any deliberative guidance on how to implement compatible measures
within the Convention Area, but rather continues to rely on Article 8 of the Honolulu Convention, which
must be interpreted and applied in the context of, and in a manner consistent with, UNCLOS and
UNFSA. This thesis has demonstrated that the Commission has applied the Principle and the associated
provisions of Article 8 in an inconsistent manner. According to the assessment undertaken, the
Commission has achieved a combined average compatibility rating of 47% with respect to the application
of the Principle within CMMs that cover catch or effort allocations. However, the tropical tuna measure
does stand out as achieving the highest compatibility rating, which is noteworthy because it applies to
three tuna stocks that together make up around 90% of the WCPO tuna catch, driven mostly by the
disproportionately large catch of skipjack tuna by purse seine vessels (around 70% of the total catch).1122
With regard to the tropical tuna measure, the Principle has mostly been invoked in relation to balancing
purse seine fishing effort between EEZs and the high seas. 1123 This is hardly surprising, as the WCPO
tuna purse seine fishery is the largest in the world, boasting an annual wholesale value of approximately
$3 billion. While this figure is certainly impressive, it is satisfying that a significant proportion of the
fishery’s value flows to PICs. 1124 Indeed, it is in this regard that the Commission should be credited.
However, the Commission has done little to advance the Principle with respect to other important fishing
1122

Skipjack stock status in the WCPO is considered healthy, not subject to overfishing or overfished with regard to
the established biomass-related LRP. Moreover, the Commission has further supported the Principle by adopting a
skipjack TRP, which seeks to keep skipjack stock biomass at near current levels.
1123
The EEZ/high seas purse seine fishing balance has been fortified through the Commission-adopted skipjack TRP
of holding skipjack biomass at current levels.
1124
Williams et al. (2017) at 19.

332

gears that catch tropical tuna, such as the tropical longline fishery, which has value of over $1 billion
annually, as well as the artisanal fisheries of both Indonesia and the Philippines. 1125

There are also examples where, to date, the Commission has failed to achieve compatibility, such as with
the management of South Pacific albacore. The rapid increase in the catch of South Pacific albacore
between 2008-2012 has led to decreased catch rates across the range of the stock. Suffering most from the
reduced catches have been the domestic longline fleets of South Pacific countries that depend on albacore
as their main target catch – a situation which should trigger ‘respective dependence’ considerations
consistent with Article 8. Several domestic fleets have lost vessels to attrition because of poor economic
conditions, while China continues to expand its longline fleet. Chinese vessels are able to operate in poor
economic conditions as they receive a wide range of subsidies from the Chinese government, allowing
them to out-compete the domestic fleets of PICs.

There are two main reasons why the Commission has failed to establish compatible measures for South
Pacific albacore: 1) the stock is considered healthy – that is, it is not overfished or subject to overfishing
(and thus there is no collective urgency on the part of CCMs to act); and 2) a significant portion of the
increased catch in recent years has not solely been derived from the high seas but also national waters.
Even though there have been desperate pleas by South Pacific countries for the Commission to amend the
measure for the stock, there has been not been consensus among WCPFC members to restrict high seas
catches in favor of EEZ catches. Such unwillingness to act can also be seen with the proposals to establish
a Commission-adopted TRP. With a relatively healthy stock in terms of low fishing mortality and high
biomass levels, and the fact that the largest fleet catching South Pacific albacore is heavily subsidized,
establishing a TRP has proven extremely difficult. As discussed earlier with respect to evaluating
compatibility, a TRP can be helpful as it can serve as a performance indicator.

1125

Ibid at 32.
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The ability to measure performance against a set of management objectives is critical for effective
fisheries management. The Commission’s Harvest Strategy approach, despite being in its infancy, offers a
distinctive opportunity to formally recognize compatibility as a high-level management objective. For
SIDS in the region, which tend to have little in the way of natural resources apart from tuna, ensuring
compatibility can surely be viewed as a political objective. Thus, incorporating the Principle into the
Harvest Strategy approach as a political management objective would be a wise choice for the
Commission. This would require the Commission to develop metrics and associated performance
indicators to measure and assess whether compatibility is being achieved or not. Formally recognizing
compatibility within the Harvest Strategy framework would represent a vast improvement on how the
Commission has addressed compatibility to date. Indeed, as the analysis has demonstrated, the
Commission’s current track-record with respect to Article 8 provisions can be described as inconsistent at
best.

Failure to institute a defined process and detailed guidelines for establishing compatible measures within
the Convention Area will lead to problems in the future. A prime example is the requirement to avoid
transferring a disproportionate conservation burden onto SIDS. To date, the failure to adequately address
disproportionate conservation burden, as claimed by several SIDS, has hamstrung the work of the
Commission and reduced the effectiveness of conservation measures.1126 Ensuring that compatibility is
achieved will reduce the potential for conservation measures to transfer a disproportionate conservation
burden onto SIDS, which makes reaching consensus on allocations and other management measures a
much easier and effective process.

Based on the analysis presented herein, which found an average rating of 47% in the Commission’s
application of the Principal, it is clear that the Commission could be doing more in terms of both process
(consistency) and outcomes (objectives). Unequivocally, mechanisms to achieve compatibility should be
1126

Refer to WCPFC CMM 2013-01 for examples of exemptions and several references to disproportionate
conservation burden.
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embraced by the Commission. The Commission’s Harvest Strategy approach offers such a mechanism,
providing opportunities to define compatibility with respect to key fisheries or stocks, and a process to
evaluate the performance of measures against identified indicators. Failing to achieve compatibility would
constitute a contravention of the Honolulu Convention and UNFSA - a situation which would not only
jeopardize the sustainability of tuna stocks which collectively comprise the world’s largest tuna fishery,
but also result in significant economic impacts and food security risks to PICs and territories of the
Western and Central Pacific. Indeed, the consequences of not taking swift and decisive action –
politically, socially and economically – will be both substantial and long-lasting.
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Appendix 1: Article 7 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
Article 7
Compatibility of Conservation and Management Measures
1.
Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the living marine resources within areas under national jurisdiction
as provided for in the Convention, and the right of all States for their nationals to engage in fishing on the
high seas in accordance with the Convention:
(a) with respect to straddling fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and the States whose
nationals fish for such stocks in the adjacent high seas area shall seek, either directly or through the
appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, to agree upon the measures necessary for
the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent high seas area;
(b) with respect to highly migratory fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and other States
whose nationals fish for such stocks in the region shall cooperate, either directly or through the
appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, with a view to ensuring conservation and
promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such stocks throughout the region, both within and
beyond the areas under national jurisdiction.
2.
Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and
those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and
management of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety.
To this
end, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of
achieving compatible measures in respect of such stocks. In determining compatible conservation and
management measures, States shall:
(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and applied in
accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same stocks by coastal States within areas
under national jurisdiction and ensure
that measures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of
such measures;
(b) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied for the high seas in
accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by relevant coastal States and States fishing
on the high seas;
(c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied
in accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or regional fisheries
management organization or arrangement;
(d) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of the stocks and the
relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the geographical particularities of
the region concerned, including the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national
jurisdiction;
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(e) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing on the
high seas on the stocks concerned; and
whole.

(f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine resources as a

3.
In giving effect to their duty to cooperate, States shall make every effort to agree on compatible
conservation and management measures within a reasonable period of time.
4.
If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, any of the States concerned
may invoke the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided for in Part VIII.
5.
Pending agreement on compatible conservation and management measures, the States concerned,
in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional
arrangements of a practical nature.In the event that they are unable to agree on such arrangements, any of
the States concerned may, for the purpose of obtaining provisional measures, submit the dispute to a court
or tribunal in accordance with the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided for in Part VIII.
6.
Provisional arrangements or measures entered into or prescribed pursuant to paragraph 5 shall
take into account the provisions of this Part, shall have due regard to the rights and obligations of all
States concerned, shall not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of final agreement on compatible
conservation and management measures and shall be without prejudice to the final outcome of any
dispute settlement procedure.
7.
Coastal States shall regularly inform States fishing on the high seas in the subregion or region,
either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or
arrangements, or through other appropriate means, of the measures they have adopted for straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks within areas under their national jurisdiction.
8.
States fishing on the high seas shall regularly inform other interested States, either directly or
through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements, or
through other appropriate means, of the measures they have adopted for regulating the activities of vessels
flying their flag which fish for such stocks on the high seas.
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Appendix 2: Article 8 of the Honolulu Convention
Article 8
Compatibility of Conservation and Management Measures
1.
Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas
under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management of highly
migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, the members of the Commission have a duty to
cooperate for the purpose of achieving compatible measures in respect of such stocks.
2.
In establishing compatible conservation and management measures for highly migratory fish
stocks in the Convention Area, the Commission shall:
(a) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of the stocks and the
relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the geographical particularities of
the region concerned, including the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national
jurisdiction;
(b) take into account:
(i) the conservation and management measures adopted and applied in accordance with
article 61 of the 1982 Convention in respect of the same stocks by coastal States within areas
under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures established in respect of such stocks for the
Convention Area as a whole do not undermine the effectiveness of such measures;
(ii) previously agreed measures established and applied in respect of the same stocks for
the high seas which form part of the Convention Area by relevant coastal States and States fishing
on the high seas in accordance with the 1982 Convention and the Agreement;
(c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied in accordance with the
1982 Convention and the Agreement in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or regional fisheries
management organization or arrangement;
(d) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing on the
high seas on the stocks concerned; and
whole.
3.

(e) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine resources as a
The coastal State shall ensure that the measures adopted and applied by it to highly migratory fish

stocks within areas under its national jurisdiction do not undermine the effectiveness of measures adopted
by the Commission under this Convention in respect of the same stocks.
4.
Where there are areas of high seas in the Convention Area entirely surrounded by the exclusive
economic zones of members of the Commission, the Commission shall, in giving effect to this article, pay
special attention to ensuring compatibility between conservation and management measures established
for such high seas areas and those established in respect of the same stocks in accordance with article 61
of the 1982 Convention by the surrounding coastal States in areas under national jurisdiction.
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Appendix 3: Review of WCPFC Annual Meeting Records with Regards to Statements on Compatibility (2004-2016)

Meeting #

Issue

CCM

WCPFC2

Compatible seabird measures as
other RFMOs (e.g. CAMLR)

Comm. adopted
report language

WCPFC2

Compatibility between HS and
national waters

FSM- opening
remarks by FSM
President

WCPFC3
NC Report

Seabirds

several CCMs

WCPFC3

Proposal for purse seine
closures (YFT and BET
measures)

Taiwan, supported
by several CCMs

WCPFC3

MCS measures

Samoa
(Prime
Minister opening
remarks)

Statement

Need to implement compatible measures to
ensure our precious tuna resource is not
squandered.
Several CCMs also expressed concerns about
the adoption of seabird catch mitigation
measures applicable north of 20ºN latitude and
the compatibility of those measures with
CMMs that apply to the entire Convention
Area.
Measures should strive for compatibility
between high seas and waters under national
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 8 of the
Convention.
There is an urgent need to develop a
comprehensive package for monitoring and
controlling. FFA members like Samoa are
taking appropriate measures for their EEZs and
therefore the
Commission must adopt compatible measures
for the high seas. IUU fishing (illegal,
unreported, and unregulated) in the high seas
and in the Convention Area, continue to
threaten
and undermine fisheries conservation and
management efforts by both national fisheries
administrations and regional fisheries
organizations like FFA.

page

paragraph #

8

36

20

14

60

23

134

34

119

368

WCPFC4

High seas pockets

PNG

WCPFC4

High seas

Comm. adopted
report language

WCPFC4

Transhipment

several CCMs

WCPFC4

CMM proposal on SIDS
aspirations (RMI asserting that
Taiwan blocking their attempt
to get PS vessel

Legal Advisor

WCPFC4

Commission work plan to
develop measures compatible
with PNA measures

Chair

PNG expressed strong reservations against any
actions that would continue to allow fishing in
high seas areas just outside EEZs (“high seas
pockets”). PNG believes this is leading to
illegal incursions into EEZs and loss of coastal
State resources, which is preventing the
development of SIDS. It requested the
Commission to take immediate action to
impose compatible management measures on
the high seas and in the EEZs of other nonParties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) CCMs.
The Commission agreed that providing for
compatible management measures for fishing
on the high seas was a priority area of work
over the coming year
Those CCMs who proposed to allow
transhipment at sea looked to the factors
defined in TCC3 Summary Report para 75 as
elements of a transhipment measure. They cited
the
importance of compatibility with other RFMOs
that allow such activities, and consistency with
the WCPF Convention text.
The VDS applies to purse-seine capacity in the
EEZs of PNA Member CCMs. Further, the
Commission is required to implement
compatible measures on the high seas and
in waters under the national jurisdiction of nonPNA CCMs to control total capacity and total
fishing effort in the Convention Area.
development of compatible measures for the
high seas, including development of measures
for the high seas and for EEZs of other nonPNA CCMs, which are compatible with those
measures applicable to the PNA members of
the Commission consistent with paras 9 and 10
of CMM-2005-01;

13

61

13

62

26

151

48

323

52

353

369

WCPFC4

New members, high seas MCS

PNG Opening
Statement

WCPFC5

Meeting priorities

Chair

WCPFC5

Compatibility with PNA VDS

PNA members

WCPFC5

High seas VDS

FFA members

We see more and more non-Commission
Members applying to join the WCPFC without
the Commission first putting in place measures
compatible with our in-zone measures, which
have been in place since 2004 but so far were
not adequately implemented in the high seas
because MCS measures for the high seas were
never put in place to ensure compliance.
The Chair made an opening statement
(Attachment C), highlighting four key items
before the Commission at WCPFC5, including
a conservation and management measure
(CMM) for bigeye and yellowfin tuna, a CMM
for transhipment, compatible measures between
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the high
seas, and decisions on the application process
for CNMs.
Effort is being limited to 2004 levels according
to CMM 2005-01,
with a provision to allow transfer of days
between PNA members. For these limits to be
effective in reducing fishing mortality on the
stocks, it will be important for the Commission
to adopt compatible measures for high seas
areas and other areas not covered by the Third
Implementing Arrangement of the Parties to the
Nauru Agreement.
FFA members noted their support for a high
seas VDS and the establishment of compatible
arrangements for controlling purse-seine effort.
These members suggested that the issue be
referred to SC5 and TCC5 for further
consideration.

98

Attachment F

6

10

29

163

29

167

370

WCPFC5

compatibility in general

Legal Advisor

Martin Tsamenyi provided an introduction to
WCPFC5’s consideration of compatibility
issues. Article 8 of the Convention requires that
“conservation and management measures
established for the high seas and those adopted
for areas under national jurisdiction shall be
compatible in order to ensure conservation and
management of highly migratory stocks in their
entirety.” In his presentation, Tsamenyi
considered that, because the term “areas under
national jurisdiction” is not defined in the
Convention or UNFSA, that the Rules of Treaty
interpretation under the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties may provide for this term
to be interpreted in several ways, including: i)
literally to include the EEZ, territorial sea,
archipelagic waters and internal waters; and ii)
in the context of the fisheries provisions under
the 1982 Convention to refer only to the EEZ.
Tsamenyi noted that consistent with the
objective to manage the stocks in their
entirety, Commission Members are obliged to
seek a cooperative approach to the requirement
under the Convention for compatibility of
measures between the high seas and areas under
national jurisdiction. In the discussion that
followed, it was apparent that there were many
differences of view among Members as to how
the term “areas undernational jurisdiction”
should be interpreted and applied with respect
to implementation of the WCPF Convention.
The issue will require further consideration and
clarification
among Members.

30

174

371

WCPFC5

WCPFC5

Special requirements of
developing states

Compatibility with PNA
measures

FFA members

Kiribati opening
statement

Another FFA member stressed the importance
of cooperation of Commission Members on a
wide range of fronts, including not only the
Special Requirements Fund, but also the
development of equitable and compatible
management measures and issues of vessel
provision and licensing.
Kiribati has signed up to the PNA Third
Implementation Arrangements on the
Conservation and Management of Bigeye and
Yellowfin and we are proud to be associated
with this initiative. The measures to be
undertaken under this initiative although could
be painful for us smaller island developing
states who depend very much for revenue and
economic development on the harvest of these
tuna species, this is the sacrifice that we have
taken to ensure the long-term security of
the species and future of the industry. We
encourage members of the Commission to
consider and endorse compatible measures for
the high seas. The burden of conservation
measures should be shared in an equitable
manner in order to work.Kiribati maintains the
belief of coastal states’ sovereign right over
their 200 mile EEZ and we believe that the
Commission’s responsibility on matters of
conservation and management of any species,
should be for the high seas and that such
measures should be no less stringent or
effective
as those measures that are in place in-zone.

43

264

105

Attachment K

372

WCPFC5

Compatibility with PNA
measures

RMI opening
statement

WCPFC6

Participatory rights

WCPFC

WCPFC6

Participatory rights

WCPFC

WCPFC6

Striped marlin compatibility
between WCPFC and IATTC

WCPFC

To this end, it is equally critical for the
Commission to develop and implement
compatible measures for areas beyond national
jurisdiction of coastal states, particularly SIDS,
whose
national waters account for a significant
proportion of the catch harvested in the WCPO.
WCPFC6 encouraged Indonesia to apply
compatible measures within its archipelagic
waters given that the significance of these
waters for juvenile yellowfin and bigeye
catches.
Noting the need for cooperation between
Vietnam and the Commission to achieve
compatibility of fisheries management and
conservation, WCPFC6 agreed to grant CNM
status to Vietnam for 2010 on the
understanding that CNM status would only
relate to the acquisition and exchange of fishery
information and data and that Vietnam would
require assistance in that regard.
FFA members called attention to the need to
scrutinize reference points for northern stocks
before such reference points are applied, and
stated that since striped marlin in the North
Pacific has not been designated as a northern
stock, it would be inappropriate for the NC to
lead the development of a CMM for this
species. However, these CCMs welcomed the
development of a management measure for
striped marlin in the North Pacific in the
margins of WCPFC6 and encouraged
compatibility in management measures
between WCPFC and IATTC for northern
stocks.
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373

WCPFC6

Seasonal FAD closure on high
seas as compatible with existing
PNA FAD closure

PNA members

WCPFC6

Compatibility with PNA
measures

WCPFC decision

WCPFC6

High seas VDS

WCPFC

PNA members noted that the proposal
represents a potential extension to the high seas
of rules, which are already applicable inside
PNA waters and which contain the majority of
tropical tuna catches. These CCMs stated that if
compatibility is to be ensured, the high seas
rules should conform to the PNA rules. It was
also pointed out that compatibility of rules will
benefit the ROP.
On the understanding that some CCMs’
domestic regulations are compatible with, but
not identical to, the PNA rules, and that those
CCMs will submit copies of these regulations
to the WCPFC Secretariat prior to the 2010
FAD closure, WCPFC6 agreed to permit some
flexibility in the implementation of the measure
for 2010 for those CCMs.
The Secretariat prepared WCPFC6-2009/17 in
response to the requirement of CMM 2008-01,
para. 21 for the Commission to consider
development of a VDS for the high seas, which
would be compatible with the PNA VDS.
Efforts by the Philippines to provide catch and
effort data for the high seas were
acknowledged. Because no substantive
comments on the issue were provided by SC5
or TCC5, the Commission was invited to
consider recommendations for any further work
necessary for a high seas VDS in 2010.
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374

WCPFC6

WCPFC6

Archipelagic waters

Archipelagic waters

PNG

Chair

WCPFC6

Archipelagic waters

WCPFC

WCPFC7

Archipelagic
waters/participatory rights

WCPFC

PNG expressed grave disappointment in the
WCPFC Secretariat in allowing certain CCMs
to manipulate the opinion of the WCPFC Legal
Advisor regarding the application of the
Commission‘s CMMs to archipelagic and
internal waters, and changing the initial draft of
the WCPFC5 Summary Report, as it was
further noted that the Commission‘s area of
competence is the EEZs and the high seas, not
territorial seas and archipelagic waters, quoting
Article 56 of UNCLOS.
The WCPFC Chair agreed that the issue of
application of CMMs to support sustainable use
of the stock throughout their range remained
open for discussion. The Chair also noted that
the purpose of the Convention is to establish a
framework for cooperation between coastal
States‘ management and high seas
management, and to harmonize the interests of
all parties while implementing best practices.
There was consensus that CMMs are required
in both EEZs and high seas waters, and that
these should be compatible in order to
effectively manage fisheries resources
throughout their range for sustainable benefit.
WCPFC7 encouraged Indonesia to apply
compatible measures within its archipelagic
waters given the significance of these waters
for juvenile yellowfin and bigeye catch.
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WCPFC7

Participatory rights

WCPFC

WCPFC7

CDS/compatibility with other
RFMOs

unspecified CCMs

WCPFC7

Tropical tuna measure

WCPFC

WCPFC7

Commission measures to be
compatible with measures
adopted by PNA and FFA

FFA and PNA
members

Noting the need for cooperation between
Vietnam and the Commission to achieve
compatibility of fisheries management and
conservation, WCPFC7 agreed to grant CNM
status to Vietnam for 2011 on the
understanding that CNM status would only
relate to the acquisition and exchange of fishery
information and data and that Vietnam would
require assistance in that regard. Vietnam has
no participatory rights for fishing for highly
migratory fish stocks in the high seas of the
Convention Area.
CCMs also stressed the need for an open and
transparent process, and compatibility with
measures taken by other RFMOs.
The advice and recommendations will, inter
alia, include consideration of the status and
distribution of stocks, fairness, equity,
enforceability, compatibility, multi-species
effects, socio-economic factors involved and
the special requirements of developing
members, SIDS and territories.
FFA and PNA members expressed their
disappointment with the progress achieved at
the meeting, and concern that some members
were being threatened in response to possible
license closures. They looked forward to future
development of conservation measures by the
Commission compatible with measures adopted
by the PNA and FFA.
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WCPFC7

Compatibility with FFA zonebased limits

Niue opening
statement

WCPFC7

Compatibility with EEZ
measures

PNG Opening
Statement

WCPFC7

Compatibility with EEZ
measures

Greenpeace observer
statement

Secondly, exploring the implementation of
zone based limits for albacore, skipjack, bigeye
and yellowfin tunas and swordfish, to preserve
and protect TVM participants’ interests in these
fisheries and to fulfil our international
obligations. The group’s obligations include a
requirement to develop compatible measures in
2008-01 for Bigeye and Yellowfin, and that 0502 for South Pacific Albacore, 06-03 for
Striped Marlin, 08-01 and 09-03 for Swordfish
contain exemptions for our development.
Furthermore, the in-zone measures that will be
developed and implement
Importantly though, Mr. Chairman, we wish to
remind members of this Commission that
unlike other RFMOs this Commission is very
special and unique because most of the
productive waters within the Western and
Central Pacific Commission Convention area
are found within the EEZs of coastal states.
This Commission was established purposely to
put in place compatible measures in the high
seas, so we preserve our fish for our future
generations going by the theme of the PIF
Leaders meeting in Vava'u, Tonga, "Our Fish
Our Future"
Greenpeace would like to commend the
leadership and continued efforts by all the
Pacific Island countries that are members of the
Commission to secure ad safeguard the future
of this fishery. In particular, The Parties to the
Nauru Agreement (PNA) for taking the bold
and positive step by agreeing to the
implementation of the 3rd Implementing
Arrangement and we urge this Commission to
adopt compatible measures as mandated by the
Convention.
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377

WCPFC8

WCPFC8

Participatory
rights/compatibility/
archipelagic waters

Participatory
rights/compatibility/
archipelagic waters

WCPFC

WCPFC

WCPFC8

High seas purse seine fishing

FFA members

WCPFC8

South Pacific albacorer

WWF, Greenpeace
and PEW

WCPFC8 encouraged Indonesia to apply
compatible measures within its archipelagic
waters given the significance of these waters
for juvenile yellowfin and bigeye catch.
Noting the need for continued cooperation
between Vietnam and the Commission to
achieve compatibility of fisheries management
and conservation, as well as on the acquisition
and exchange of fishery information and data,
for which Vietnam would require
assistance,WCPFC8 agreed to grant CNM
status to Vietnam for 2012. Vietnam has no
participatory
rights for fishing for highly migratory fish
stocks in the high seas of the Convention Area.
They noted that the PNA’s banon high seas
fishing by those purse seiners operating in PNA
waters would continue and as such they would
expect to see compatible measures
implemented by the WCPFC.
These observers encouraged management
efforts by Te
Vaka Moana members and urged the
Commission to support compatible measures.
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WCPFC8

WCPFC9

Purse Seine VDS

Participatory rights

Tokelau opening
statement

WCPFC

WCPFC9

Participatory rights

WCPFC

WCPFC9

WCPFC/IATTC
compatibility/overlap area

unspecified CCMs

Tokelau is in the process of implementing the
relevant provisions of CMM 2008-01. As part
of this process, we have decided to impose an
EEZ limit for purse seine fisheries. The EEZ
limit has initially been set at 1000 vessel days.
This limit may be subject to minor changes as a
result of the Commission’s decisions on the
replacement of CMM 2008/01 and the
renegotiation of the US Tuna Treaty. It is our
intention that Tokelau’s purse seine fisheries be
managed under a
regime that is fully compatible with the PNA’s
Vessel Day Scheme. I can advise the
Commission that Tokelau has recently gained
PNA observer status.
WCPFC9 encouraged Indonesia to apply
compatible measures within its archipelagic
waters given the significance of these waters
for juvenile yellowfin and bigeye catch.
Noting the need for continued cooperation
between Vietnam and the Commission to
achieve compatibility of fisheries management
and conservation, as well as on the acquisition
and exchange of fishery information and data,
for which Vietnam would require assistance,
WCPFC9 agreed to grant CNM status to
Vietnam for 2013.
Some CCMs pointed to the low amount of
catch taken in the overlap area (0.175% of the
entire catch from the WCPFC and IATTC
Convention Areas), and suggested that while
the issues associated with overlap area
management itself do not constitute a high
priority for either Commission overall, the issue
of management compatibility between them
does, and should be given attention through the
proposed joint working group.
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WCPFC9

WCPFC9

WCPFC9

PNA measures

FAD closure/PNA measures

Catch retention/PNA measures

PNA

PNG on behalf of PNA countries, emphasized
the importance of recognizing the sovereignty
of Island States’ and the need to recognise their
existing in-zone anchored FAD management
plans and the obligation of other members in
assisting with their development aspirations.
CCMs were encouraged to recognize the
advanced management systems being put in
place by the PNA and to focus on
implementing compatible measures.
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FFA members

FFA members noted that whilst PNA nations
have imposed FAD closures and other
conservation measures in their waters, to date
there is no evidence of other CCMs applying
compatible measures to their purse seine and
Big eye longline fishing effort in WCP waters.
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unspecified CCMs

Some CCMs supported the catch retention
requirements as written, including covering
additional species, noting that they are
compatible with PNA measures, create a
disincentive for FAD sets, and will contribute
to food security.
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WCPFC9

South Pacific albacore

FFA members

WCPFC9

Whale sharks

unspecified CCMs

WCPFC9

Shark conservation

FFA members

Several CCMs, including FFA and TVM
members, urged the Commission to move
toward stronger control of the South Pacific
ALB fishery through a combination of
measures including vessel/effort limits, catch
limits based first on biological reference points
and later on economic reference points, national
allocations to allow rights-based management,
and a compatible and consistent management
approach to both EEZ and high seas fishing
grounds. These CCMs noted the high reliance
of some of the most vulnerable SIDS on this
fishery and the importance of taking action
before the stock reached critical levels.
Overcapacity in high seas areas, dynamic
targeting switching, and recent declines in the
market price for ALB were cited as examples
of a need to manage the fishery to maximize
long-term economic benefits to SIDS.
Several CCMs expressed support for the
proposal citing its compatibility with measures
already in place in PNA waters and its benefits
for conservation of the whale shark.
FFA members reiterated their support for the
proposal on the basis of the precautionary
approach, their desire for high seas measures
compatible with national shark sanctuaries, and
the need to implement effective mitigation
measures to reduce shark mortality. These
CCMs registered their disappointment that the
proposal was not adopted and called for the
Commission to continue its work on shark
management.
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WCPFC9

WCPFC10

IUU guidelines

Participatory rights/Vietnam

Tonga

Tonga expressed its disappointment at the lack
of support within the Commission for the
development of guidelines to ensure coastal
State satisfaction plays a major role in the
resolution of WCPFC IUU Vessel listing
decisions. Tonga noted it will continue to
progress development of these guidelines for
application in national waters, regardless of
whether the Commission accepts them as
compatible measures for the high seas.
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WCPFC

WCPFC10 noted the need for continued
cooperation between Vietnam and
theCommission to achieve compatibility of
fisheries management and conservation, as well
as on the acquisition and exchange of fishery
information and data, for which Vietnam would
require assistance. The Commission noted the
significant improvements in the collection and
provision of data from Vietnam fisheries
through
the GEF WPEA project, administered by the
WCPFC, and encouraged Vietnam to continue
to cooperate with the Commission to improve
the acquisition and exchange
of fishery information and data. The
participatory rights of Vietnam in the WCPO
are limited to the provision of carrier and
bunker vessels only.
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WCPFC10

WCPFC10

High Seas purse seine fishing
effort

North Pacific
Bluefin/archipelagic
waters/territorial waters

FFA

Japan

With regard to the high seas purse seine effort
levels, FFA members stated that these should
be based on 2010 levels. FFA members would
prefer that these limits are allocated but in the
short term if this is not possible the high seas
fishery should be closed when the 2010 limits
are reached. Reverting to baseline levels in
CMM 2008-01 is not supported because it is
considered i) incompatible with the scientific
advice, ii) contrary to the requirement to
implement compatible measures in EEZs and
the high seas, and iii) would
lead to increases in high seas and overall effort.
Japan stated that the relevant provisions of
UNCLOS, UNFSA and Article 4 of the
WCPFC convention make it very clear that the
Convention applies only to the high seas and
EEZs in the Convention Area but does not
apply to territorial seas, archipelagic waters and
internal waters, unless otherwise specified such
as measures for inspection at port. Japan
stressed that its view on the area of the
application on the Convention does not mean
that Japan would allow the Pacific bluefin tuna
fisheries in its territorial seas and internal
waters to be operated without regard to the new
Pacific bluefin tuna measure. Rather, Japan
assured WCPFC10 that it would fulfil its
responsibility as a major Pacific bluefin tuna
fishing nation by conserving and managing this
stock in its territorial seas and internal waters in
a way that is compatible with the newly
adopted CMM.
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WCPFC11

Vietnam/participatory rights

WCPFC

WCPFC11

NP Bluefin/IATTC
compatibility

Japan

WCPFC11

Shark conservation

FFA members

WCPFC11 noted the need for continued
cooperation between Vietnam and the
Commission to achieve compatibility of
fisheries management and conservation, as well
as on the acquisition and exchange of fishery
information and data, for which Vietnam would
require assistance. WCPFC11 agreed to
approve the application for renewal of CNM
status in 2015 from Vietnam. The Commission
notes the significant
improvements in the collection and provision of
data from Vietnam fisheries through the GEF
WPEA project, administered by the WCPFC
and encourages Vietnam to continue to
cooperate with the Commission to improve the
acquisition and exchange of fishery information
and data. The participatory rights of Vietnam in
the WCPO are limited to the provision of
carrier and bunker vessels only.
Japan noted that the draft measure for Pacific
bluefin was adopted at NC considering the
stock status, which is currently at its
historically lowest level. Japan reminded the
Commission that IATTC was requested to
introduce a compatible measure in the eastern
Pacific Ocean and it has adopted measures for
2015-2016, introducing a 40% reduction of the
commercial catch in October 2014.
FFA members introduced (WCPFC11-2014DP03_rev1), advising that they are working
towards more comprehensive measures for
sharks taken in their waters, through
increasingly stringent Harmonized Minimum
Terms and Conditions for access and through
National Plans of Action. These CCMs noted
that for these measures to be fully effective
they need to be complemented by compatible
measures on the high seas.
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WCPFC11

South Pacific albacore/high
seas pockets

Cook Islands

WCPFC12

Archipelagic waters

Indonesia

WCPC12

Vietnam/participatory rights

WCPFC

WCPFC12

WCPFC12

Zone based limits vs flag based
limits

Purse seine high seas limits

FFA members

PNA members

The Cook Islands commented that coastal states
are moving towards zone-based management
and seek some high seas compatibility,
observing that there is a tremendous amount of
albacore being caught in the high seas pocket
next to the Cook Islands EEZ.
Indonesia noted that it is developing a harvest
strategy and/or harvestcontrol rule for yellowfin
and skipjack tunas within Indonesia’s
archipelagic waters (Indonesia Fisheries
Management Areas 713, 714 and 715) to ensure
that tuna resources in Indonesian waters are
managed
with compatible measures adopted by RFMOs.
The Commission noted the need for continued
cooperation between Vietnam and the
Commission to achieve compatibility of
fisheries management and conservation, as well
as on the acquisition and exchange of fishery
information and data, for which Vietnam would
require assistance.
FFA members explained that in the purse-seine
fishery, the main management measure is zonebased effort limits, so flag-based arrangements
for FADs are particularly incompatible.
The purse-seine proposals included a hard limit
on high seas purse seine effort at the 2010
level, compatible with the limits being applied
in PNA EEZs, a pre-dawn set ban during the
FAD closure, extending coverage to the
deployment and servicing of FADs by support
vessels, providing for observers to be carried by
support
vessels, and a requirement for observers on
ROP purse-seine trips to be sourced from other
CCMs.
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WCPFC12

Indonesian archipelagic waters

Indonesia

WCPFC13

High seas longline

Solomon Islands

Indonesia supported the work plan, and stated
that when Indonesia ratified the WCPFC
convention in 2013 it also attached a
declaration that the Convention area did not
cover certain Indonesian waters, noting that
archipelagic waters play an important role in
Indonesian fisheries – 320,000 tonnes of tuna is
taken from these waters. Indonesia seeks to
ensure measures within these waters are
compatible with WCPFC measures, and
understand this is their obligation under
UNCLOS and the FSA. The WPEA project and
other organisations had assisted the
development of high seas fisheries for
yellowfin and skipjack, with a plan to finish
this work by 2017.
Solomon Islands looked forward to the day
when the Commission implements compatible
longline measures for the
high seas.
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WCPFC13

High seas pockets

FFA members

FFA members introduced WCPFC13-2016DP14, a proposed CMM for the special
management of certain high seas areas. If
adopted, the measure would prohibit
transhipment in the Eastern High Seas Pocket
(EHSP) Special Management Area that was
created in CMM 2010-02, and extend the same
conditions to five fully- or semi-enclosed areas
of high seas adjacent to FFA member EEZs. It
was noted that these areas are either difficult or
impossible to access except by going through
the
surrounding EEZs. Currently, foreign fishing
vessels and carriers are not obliged to report
their entry or exit to most of these EEZs if they
are not licenced to also fish in them, which
complicates monitoring and increases the risk
of IUU fishing in EEZ waters. FFA members
reiterated their concern about
longline vessels transhipping to carriers on the
high seas and noted that the Commission had
not beenable to agree that high seas purse-seine
transhipment should be prohibited, particularly
in areas distant from port. These CCMs
considered the high seas pockets to be a special
case, with a unique status
under the Convention which provides that
“special attention” be paid to compatibility
between CMMs and national measures
established in EEZs for the same stocks. FFA
members took the view that it is practicable to
prohibit transhipment in these limited areas. For
FFA members, coordinating the management of
high seas fishing is one of WCPFC’s priority
responsibilities. They can cooperate among
themselves in the sustainable management and
conservation of fish stocks in their EEZs, but
only the Commission can deal effectively with
high seas fishing.
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WCPFC13

Harvest strategies

PNA

PNA members were pleased to see this work
being undertaken at WCPFC13. These CCMs
supported the work on harvest strategies and
the application of the precautionary approach as
a way of improving decision-making on
management and conservation of key stocks
and saw the potential benefits of having preagreed rules for how fishing will be adjusted as
status of stocks change, and better taking
account of uncertainty. These CCMs
commented that harvest strategies were not a
way of reshaping arrangements and approaches
already agreed, except where necessary to
ensure
sustainability. On this basis, PNA would
continue to strongly support harvest strategy
outcomes that strengthen and do not undermine
the rights of resource-owning CCMs to manage
resources and fisheries in their waters
compatibly with measures applied in other
areas within the Convention area.
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